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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a comprehensive examination o f the notion o f moral 
stability in Rawls’s political philosophy. I argue that the problem of stability is 
essentially concerned with the motivational priority o f a sense o f justice. A 
conception o f justice is justified if  and only if it can effectively motivate rational 
agents to act as justice requires. It is a constitutive condition o f justifiability rather 
than a practical matter o f feasibility. I vindicate my claim through a philosophical 
interpretation o f Rawls’s account of practical reason for action. I then contend that 
stability plays an essential role in Rawls’s two stage justification. At the first stage, 
taking place in the original position, stability is one o f the main grounds for 
Rawls’s principles. Nevertheless, I argue that the motive for contractors to adopt 
the maximin rule stems from moral considerations rather than an egoistic rational 
choice. At the second stage, the question o f how to reconcile justice and goodness 
arises. We need to consider whether the regulative desire to act justly is congruent 
with a person’s own good. This concern leads to Rawls’s congruence argument 
through a Kantian interpretation o f human nature. I suggest that this interpretation 
has turned Rawls into a liberal perfectionist within a classical teleological 
framework -  a position inconsistent with Rawls’s desire-based conception o f 
prudential rationality. It is this internal inconsistency which makes the congruence 
argument fundamentally flawed. I then turn to examine political liberalism and 
point out that the idea o f an overlapping consensus fails to justify the priority of 
political values over non-political ones. Finally, I propose an idea of potential 
congruence to support justice as fairness as a stable conception o f justice. I 
conclude that this is the right direction to resolve the problem of stability and 
justification.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of stability is fundamental to John Rawls’s political philosophy. 
It is the main theme of Part III of A Theory o f  Justice.' There he proposes an 
argument for congruence to resolve the problem. Rawls once said that this 
argument is one o f the most original contributions he makes in that book.2 
Surprisingly, it attracts little attention.3 As Freeman remarks, of all the 
voluminous commentary on this work, “virtually nothing has been written on the 
central feature o f that argument [stability] on the ‘congruence o f the right and the 
good’.”4 Critics must have overlooked the significance o f this problem.
The publication o f Rawls’s second book Political Liberalism has changed the 
situation.5 In an important passage explaining his philosophical turn, Rawls says:
But to understand the nature and extent o f the differences, one 
must see them as arising from trying to resolve a serious 
problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that 
the account o f stability in Part III o f Theory is not consistent 
with the view as a whole. I believe all differences are 
consequences o f  removing that inconsistency. Otherwise these
1 In his introduction to Part III, Rawls reminds us that “sometimes in this part the overall direction 
o f  the exposition may seem less clear, and the transition from one topic to another more abrupt. It 
might help to keep in mind that the central aim is to prepare the way to settle the questions o f  
stability and congruence, and to account for the values o f  society and the good o f justice.” A 
Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.395; Revised Edition, 1999, p.347, 
my emphasis. (Referred to hereafter as TJ, with page references given parenthetically in the text, 
in which the first and second represent the page number o f  first and revised edition respectively.)
2 Samuel Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 
ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.308.
3 According to Freeman, Rawls “is puzzled why it did not attract more comment.” “Congruence 
and the Good o f  Justice,” p.308.
4 Samuel Freeman, “Political Liberalism and the Possibility o f  a Just Democratic Constitution” 
Chicago-Kent Law Review  69, (1994), p.623.
5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), paper edition 
(Referred to hereafter as PL, with page references given parenthetically in the text).
lectures take the structure and content o f Theory to remain 
substantially the same. (PL:xvii-xviii)
Rawls ascribes the changes in his view to the problem of stability. He goes 
on to say that “the problem of stability has played very little role in the history of 
moral philosophy, so it may seem odd that an inconsistency o f this kind should 
turn out to force such extensive revisions. Yet the problem o f stability is 
fundamental to political philosophy and an inconsistency there is bound to require 
basic readjustments.” (PL:xix) To critics’ surprise, the problem of stability comes 
to the forefront o f justice as fairness and becomes the cornerstone o f Rawls’s later 
development o f political liberalism. So much so that if we want to understand 
Rawls’s change, we must first understand the nature o f stability, its proper role in 
the justificatory structure o f justice as fairness, and why the later Rawls is 
unsatisfied with his first attempt to solve the problem in A Theory o f  Justice. I aim 
to probe these questions in this thesis.
A brief literature review may illuminate the significance o f this project. 
There are different kinds o f explanation for Rawls’s change to political liberalism. 
An influential and widely-held account regards it as a response to the critique o f 
communitarianism.6 Few critics are convinced by Rawls’s own account that his 
changes result from an internal inconsistency between the congruence argument
6 For example, Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992); Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and its Critics 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit ed., Communitaranism and 
Individualism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Communitarian thinkers include 
Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1981); Charles Taylor, Philosophy 
and the Human Sciences vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Michael Walzer, 
Spheres o f  Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
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and the fact o f reasonable pluralism.7 Moreover, even those who are sympathetic 
to Rawls’s liberal position have strong doubts about the importance o f stability in 
general and the desirability of introducing it into justice as fairness in particular. 
Their reservations are based on a conventional interpretation o f the problem of 
stability. According to this view, stability is concerned with social order and the 
feasibility of a conception o f justice. As long as the effective means o f 
maintaining an enduring and peaceful social cooperation can be found, the 
political conception is considered stable. This is a purely practical matter. Rawls 
takes stability seriously because he has a deep concern about how unity will be 
viable in a society profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Reasonable pluralism is a permanent 
fact o f modem democratic society. We must take this fact into account in 
constructing political principles. For “the aims of political philosophy depend on 
the society it addresses. In a constitutional democracy one o f its most important 
aims is presenting a political conception o f justice that can not only provide a 
shared pubic basis for the justification o f political and social institutions but also 
helps ensure stability from one generation to the next.”* Rawls seems to have 
abandoned his universalist ambition to justify a conception o f justice from the 
perspective that regards “the human situation not only from all social but also 
from all temporal points o f view.” (TJ:587/514 rev.) The concern for social order 
in an era o f reasonable pluralism urges Rawls to take a practical turn to search for
7 To my knowledge, the first literature to show sympathy with this account is Freeman, “Political 
Liberalism and the Possibility o f  a Just Democratic Constitution,” pp.919-668. Barry also provides 
an intensive analysis from this perspective though he does not agree with Rawls’s change. “John 
Rawls and the Search for Stability” Ethics 105, (1995), pp.874-915.
8 Rawls, “The Idea o f  an Overlapping Consensus,” in Collected Papers ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.421.
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an overlapping consensus on a freestanding political conception o f justice. Rawls 
thus defines the central problem of political liberalism as “how is it possible that 
deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and 
all affirm the political conception o f a constitutional regime?” (PL:xx) This 
interpretation seems to give a coherent and self-sufficient account of the causal 
relations between stability and the need for political liberalism.
Suppose this conventional interpretation is correct, several challenges ensue. 
If  stability is viewed as a primary concern o f political justification, justice will be 
substantially identified with a stable social order. Whether a conception of justice 
is justified depends on whether it can reduce conflict and achieve a state o f 
peaceful and lasting cooperation. Feasibility sets a constraint on desirability at the 
outset. A Hobbesian pragmatism thus underlies Rawls’s political liberalism.9 If  so, 
Rawls must pay a heavy moral cost. For by itself social stability does not define a 
moral point of view. It is entirely possible that a stable social order may be built 
on unjust social institutions. Coercive force, the threat o f penalties, and 
internalization of the dominant class’s ideology through education and 
brainwashing may well bring people to comply with the political rules as 
effectively as a sense o f justice.
However, the point is not whether Rawls’s proposal is practicable or not. It is 
rather that moral justification should not take social stability into consideration in 
the first place. What political philosophy should do is to look for the most 
desirable conception o f justice justified by independent moral reasons. Whether
9 Jean Hampton, “Should Political Liberalism Be Done without Metaphysics?” Ethics 99 (July 
1989), pp.791-814.
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the conception derived is stable is a separate issue that should only be taken up in 
the application level.
Therefore, Rawls’s viewing stability as the first subject o f political 
justification will obscure the moral character of justice as fairness and risk 
conceding desirability to feasibility. Worse still, it commits a category mistake. 
For justice and stability belongs to different categories. The latter is not a property 
o f the former. 10 As a consequence, Rawls’s whole project o f political liberalism 
is grounded on a mistake. And given that stability is irrelevant to justification, 
there is no need for Rawls to shift to political liberalism even if  an inconsistency 
is found in the congruence argument o f A Theory o f  Justice. He can simply 
neglect it."
I do not agree with this conventional interpretation. I intend to refute it and 
vindicate the moral importance o f stability in justice as fairness. I want to argue 
that stability is a necessary condition of justification. Thus my thesis is entitled 
“moral stability and liberal justification.” The thesis will focus on four related 
questions. (1), what does the notion of stability mean in Rawls’s context? (2), why 
is it essential to moral justification? (3), to what extent does Rawls provide a 
satisfactory solution to the problem? (4), if  not, what will be the alternative? The 
thesis will answer these questions in order. As my discussion proceeds, a different 
picture of stability will gradually emerge.
The first three chapters are intended to answer the first and second questions
10 G. A. Cohen, “Rescuing Justice from Constructivism,” typescript.
" This seems to be Barry's position. “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” p.883.
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while the remaining three chapters are designed to deal with the third and fourth 
ones. In Chapter One, I draw a distinction between moral and social stability and 
show that Rawls’s notion o f stability is concerned with the motivational priority of 
a sense o f justice. It claims that a conception of justice is justified if  and only if it 
can effectively motivate rational agents to act as justice requires. It seeks to 
establish the overridingness o f moral reasons. Moral stability is therefore 
conceptually independent o f social stability. It has its own moral agenda. Once 
this is clear, most criticism originating from the conventional interpretation can be 
dismissed. Chapter Two turns to explore the importance o f moral stability. I 
contend that Rawls has adopted a conception o f prudential rationality and 
reason/motive intemalism, which leads him to hold that the motivational priority 
of justice can only be made sense o f by showing its regulative status in an agent’s 
rational plan o f life. Chapter Three sets out to investigate the place o f stability in 
justice as fairness. Against Rawls and his critics, I make three major claims. First, 
stability is one o f the main grounds for the principles o f justice in the first stage. 
Second, the real force moving the parties in the original position to adopt the 
maximin rule actually results from moral considerations. Finally, the second stage 
is indispensable to the justification of justice as fairness. Its function is, however, 
not to confirm the feasibility o f principles o f justice, but to justify the 
overridingness o f moral motivation.
Once the meaning o f moral stability and its proper place have been settled, I 
proceed to examine Rawls’s substantive arguments for stability. Chapter Four will 
assess the congruence argument. I shall first explicate the main ideas o f 
congruence and then show that its main ground lies in a Kantian interpretation of 
justice as fairness. I argue that this interpretation has turned Rawls into a liberal
13
perfectionist within a classical teleological framework -  a position inconsistent 
with Rawls’s desire-based conception o f prudential rationality. For this conception 
cannot warrant that rational persons would necessarily accept a Kantian 
interpretation o f human nature. I contend that it is this internal inconsistency 
which makes the congruence argument fundamentally flawed. Chapter Five will 
turn to examine whether the idea o f an overlapping consensus can provide a better 
alternative to resolve the problem of stability. My discussion focuses on a specific 
question: will a political conception o f justice provide sufficient reason for a 
rational agent to accept the priority o f political values? By examining Rawls’s 
three arguments, including the greatness o f political values, two model cases, and 
the idea of burdens o f judgment, I argue that Rawls fails to vindicate his claim. 
This failure leads to the last chapter in which I propose an idea o f potential 
congruence to support moral stability. I claim that it is rational for a person to give 
precedence to morality over narrow self-interest because leading a just life itself 
can be presented as a higher-order regulative good under favourable conditions. I 
first discuss two pre-conditions for potential congruence. They are the unity of 
practical reasoning and the pervasiveness o f moral feelings. After that, I continue 
to argue that there are good reasons for an agent to give priority to Rawls’s two 
principles of justice. Potential congruence is achievable in a well-ordered society. 
The claim of moral stability can then be vindicated.
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CHAPTER 1 
MORAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY
The problem of stability occupies a central place in Rawls’s theory. It sets a 
normative constraint on the justifiability of a conception of justice. Rawls believes 
that a theory that fails to be sufficiently stable is morally unjustified. To assess 
Rawls’s claim, the first thing we need to know is what stability means in Rawls’s 
context, and why it is so fundamental to political philosophy. This chapter aims to 
explore these two questions.
This chapter consists o f four sections. The first section presents Rawls’s 
characterisation o f stability and its role in the justificatory structure o f justice as 
fairness. I call Rawls’s conception o f stability moral stability. It is concerned with 
the motivational priority o f the sense o f justice. The second section presents a 
predominant interpretation o f stability held by most critics. This view holds that 
the problem of stability is primarily derived from a Hobbesian concern for social 
order. I dub this conception social stability and call the predominant view the 
conventional interpretation. According to this interpretation, the purpose o f moral 
stability is to serve social stability. The former only has instrumental value in 
terms of its contribution to the latter. I shall explain why this conventional view 
looks plausible for many critics, and then refute it in the third and fourth sections. 
Section 3 shows that moral stability is not necessarily the most effective means to 
realize social stability. Section 4 takes up a more serious and difficult question 
about whether the later Rawls undergoes a fundamental change from a Kantian to 
a Hobbesian position by taking social stability as the first subject o f justice under 
the challenge o f reasonable pluralism. My answer is No. I argue that i f  we follow
the conventional interpretation, Rawls’s account o f stability would be normatively 
undesirable and conceptually absurd. If the conventional interpretation is sound, 
Rawls’s claim that stability is fundamental to political justification would fail. 
Worse still, his turn to political liberalism resulting from an inconsistent account 
o f stability would make his whole project vulnerable to further charges. So, in 
order to make sense o f the moral significance o f stability, I conclude that we 
should give up the conventional interpretation. In particular, we should disconnect 
moral stability from social stability, and search for a more coherent and attractive 
account o f stability to make sense o f its justificatory role injustice as fairness.
1 The Meaning of Moral Stability
According to Rawls, the problem of stability is concerned with whether a 
conception o f justice can generate a sufficient sense o f justice to win the willing 
compliance o f citizens. The sense o f justice is an effective settled desire to apply 
and to act from the principles o f justice. A conception of justice is stable if and 
only if  the sense o f justice is shown to have regulative priority over other desires 
that would otherwise lead people to act unjustly. As Rawls puts it, “to insure 
stability men must have a sense o f justice or a concern for those who would be 
disadvantaged by their defection, preferably both. When these sentiments are 
sufficiently strong to overrule the temptations to violate the rules, just schemes are 
stable.” (TJ:497/435 rev.) When a conception is stable, the scheme o f social 
cooperation will tend to endure over time. Even if  deviations or infractions occur, 
citizens’ settled desire to act justly will come into play to prevent further disorder, 
and thus restoring the just arrangement. This definition of stability remains intact 
throughout Rawls’s writings. In A Theory o f  Justice, he states:
16
One conception of justice is more stable than another if the 
sense o f justice that it tends to generate is stronger and more 
likely to override disruptive inclinations and if  the institutions it 
allows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly.
The stability o f a conception o f justice depends upon a balance 
of motives: the sense o f justice that it cultivates and the aims 
that it encourages must normally win out against propensities 
toward injustice. (TJ:454/398 rev.)
Rawls maintains this definition in Political Liberalism. What has changed is 
his new proposal to secure stability by reformulating justice as fairness as a 
political conception and grounding it on an overlapping consensus among 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. But the realization o f stability still depends 
upon:
Citizens’ sense o f justice, given their traits of character and 
interests as formed by living under a just basic structure, is 
strong enough to resist the normal tendencies to injustice.
Citizens act willingly so as to give one another justice over time.
Stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate 
kind acquired under just institutions. (PL: 142-43)
Several distinctive features o f stability are noteworthy. First, Rawls is 
concerned with a special kind o f stability, to wit, the stabilising force must spring 
from an agent’s effective sense o f justice. A conception o f justice would not be 
stable if  people were coerced, tricked, or pressured into acquiescing in the dictates 
of principles o f justice. It is neither a consequence o f the effective use of coercive 
state power nor a result o f modus vivendi. “Citizens act willingly so as to give one 
another justice over time.”(PL:142) I will call this conception moral stability. The 
first question o f stability is to explain how citizens can acquire effective sense o f 
justice to comply with political principles. This requires an account o f moral
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psychology. Briefly speaking, Rawls believes that rational agents beyond a certain 
age and possessing the requisite intellectual capacity will naturally develop a 
sense of justice under normal social circumstances. He even claims that “one who 
lacks a sense o f justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes and capacities included 
under the notion of humanity.” (TJ:488/428 rev.) Chapter 8 o f A Theory o f  Justice 
is devoted to exploring how and under what conditions this moral sentiment is 
acquired. The argument draws heavily on moral psychology concerning the stages 
o f moral learning from early age to maturity. Rawls believes that a normal agent 
in a just society will undergo three stages with respect to three psychological laws 
(the morality of authority, the morality o f association, and the morality o f 
principle) and gradually develop an effective sense o f justice.
The second feature of stability is that the effectiveness o f moral motivation is 
tied to the reasonableness o f a conception o f justice. In normal circumstances our 
reasons for action will give rise to a corresponding motive to act. The desire to act 
justly largely depends upon the justifying reasons for the conception o f justice. 
While most people over a certain age develop a capacity for a sense o f justice, to 
what extent it is regulative varies with the requirements o f different theories o f 
justice. As Nagel remarks, “the motives are not independent o f political and 
ethical theory. Ethical argument reveals possibilities o f moral motivation that 
cannot be understood without it, and in political theory these possibilities are 
elaborated through institutions to which people are able to adhere partly because 
of their moral attractiveness.”1 For example, the same person may find that the 
dictates o f utilitarianism are much more demanding than those o f Rawlsian
1 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.27
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liberalism because the latter can better protect their rights and basic liberties while 
respecting the distinctness o f individuals. Other things being equal, the agent can 
develop a stronger desire to comply with justice as fairness than with 
utilitarianism. As Rawls puts it, “the account of moral development is tied 
throughout to the conception o f justice which is to be learned, and therefore 
presupposes the plausibility if not the correctness of this theory.” (TJ:461/404 rev.) 
Moral stability is inseparable from the substantive content of justice. This explains 
why Rawls describes stability primarily as an attribute of a conception o f justice 
rather than that o f a political system.
It should, however, be noted that even if  citizens have a capacity for a sense 
of justice, it does not mean that they will give priority to the sense o f justice over 
other interests without qualification o f any kind. Undoubtedly, justice makes 
claims on us. Political principles set limits to our pursuit of the good. These limits 
may not always be in harmony with our interest. When they conflict, a theory o f 
justice commands the priority of moral considerations over other interests. The 
right is, in this sense, prior to the good. This priority o f the right should be 
understood as a structural requirement. It does not tell us whether rational people 
actually have sufficient motive to act as justice requires in case o f conflict. The 
overridingness o f moral motivation is not warranted by definition. It must be 
supported by substantive reason. For the sense o f justice is just one desire among 
many in an agent’s motivational system. A conception o f justice needs to explain 
how the demands o f justice are derived from, compatible with, or at least not in 
deep conflict with people’s reasonable conceptions o f the good. As Freeman notes, 
merely showing that citizens have a sense of justice is not enough to ensure that 
they will consistently act justly, and that a just society will be stable. Moral
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stability hinges on a satisfactory answer to the following question: “Why should 
they care about it sufficiently so that they have reason to subordinate pursuit o f 
their ends to requirements of justice?”2
Thus the challenge o f stability is to justify how a conception o f justice can 
win the whole-hearted allegiance o f citizens who have their distinct conceptions 
o f the good. It acknowledges a tension between justice and self-interest, and then 
seeks to justify the priority of the former over the latter. If there is no conflict 
between two perspectives, or the consideration of justice is logically prior to that 
o f the good, stability would not become an issue at all. Therefore, “the stability o f 
a conception depends upon a balance o f motives: the sense o f justice that it 
cultivates and the aims that it encourages must normally win out against 
propensities toward injustice.” (TJ:454/398 rev.). The overridingness o f moral 
motivation is a necessary and sufficient condition o f stability. This is the third 
feature o f Rawls’s conception o f stability.
The last feature is that stability is essential to Rawls’s idea of a well-ordered 
society. A well-ordered society is a highly idealised concept that provides a useful 
frame of reference to compare different conceptions o f justice. Rawls assumes 
that a reasonable theory of justice must accord with this ideal society. A 
well-ordered society consists o f three conditions. First, everyone accepts, and 
knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles o f justice; second, its 
basic structure generally satisfies and is publicly known to satisfy these principles; 
and finally its members have a strong and normally effective desire to act as the
2 Samuel Freeman, ‘‘Congruence and the Good o f  Justice," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.280.
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principles o f justice require. (TJ: 453-54/397-98 rev.; PL:35). In such a society, 
principles o f justice and its grounds are publicly known to, and accepted by free 
and equal citizens. Moreover, citizens have strong inclinations to act in 
accordance with the publicly recognized principles. They have no intention either 
to violate or to renegotiate the terms of social cooperation, given their present and 
prospective social position. We can note that the third condition refers to moral 
stability. A well-ordered society must be morally stable.
Since a conception o f justice must meet the requirements o f a well-ordered 
society, it follows that stability sets normative constraints on justification. A 
political conception that could not be sufficiently stable is unjustified. As Rawls 
remarks, “however attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds, it 
is seriously defective if  the principles o f moral psychology are such that it fails to 
engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it.” (TJ:455/399 rev., 
my emphasis) Put it another way, it “is imposed as a condition on a reasonable 
conception o f political justice.” 3 Furthermore, it is also crucial to political 
liberalism because the possibility o f political liberalism hinges upon a satisfactory 
answer to the question o f “how can the values of the special domain o f the 
political—the values o f a subdomain of the realm of all values—normally 
outweigh whatever values may conflict with them?” (PL: 139) We can readily 
translate this into the problem of moral stability: Given the sense o f justice as one 
motive among other desires, how can it normally be granted priority when they 
conflict? The concerns of stability turn out to be the same as the concerns o f
3 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
p.89, footnote 10.
political liberalism.
We can now note that stability is essential to justification. It has an important 
bearing on the desirability o f a conception o f justice. This claim is however 
contestable even within Rawls’s own theory. In A Theory o f  Justice, Rawls gives 
readers an impression that stability, though important, is merely concerned with 
the problem of feasibility after the conception o f justice has been worked out in 
the original position. Similarly, the later Rawls reminds us that his argument for 
justice as fairness should be viewed as divided into two stages. In the first stage, 
the parties in the original position select principles without taking the special 
psychologies and their conceptions o f the good into account. The problem of 
stability arises only at the second stage where its task is to check if  justice as 
fairness is a feasible conception when people have full information about their 
conceptions o f the good.
This division o f stages seems to imply that no matter how important stability 
may be, it has no effect on the justifiability o f principles o f justice. There is a 
sharp distinction between desirability and feasibility. The real work o f justification 
takes place in the original position where the principles o f justice are chosen by 
rational parties. What is left for stability is to ensure that the chosen principles are 
workable and endurable. Freeman, for example, describes the aim of stability as 
that “assuming we have accounts o f the correct conception o f  justice, and of the 
institutions needed to realize it, how are we to motivate rational persons 
effectively so that they affirm and support these institutions and the conception o f
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justice that informs them?”4 In this case, the arguments for stability add nothing 
to the correct conception of justice from the point o f view of justification. Worse 
still, given that the right principles have been established in the original position, 
any change of the first stage argument because o f the pressure o f stability would 
be regarded as a trade-off between desirability and feasibility. This explains why 
Kukathas and Pettit ascribe Rawls’s change to political liberalism to his 
“increasing reliance on the feasibility arguments which dominate Part III of his 
book, and in the corresponding down-playing o f considerations o f desirability.”5
I believe that this popular reading is wrong. For Rawls, an unstable 
conception is not only infeasible, but also unjustified. In Political Liberalism , for 
example, he reminds us that the argument in the first stage is only provisionally on 
hand. “The argument for the principles of justice is not complete until the 
principles selected in the first part are shown in the second part to be sufficiently 
stable.” (PL: 141, footnote 7, my emphasis) Moreover, being unstable, “it is not a 
satisfactory political conception o f justice and it must be in some way revised.” 
(PL: 141) It is therefore incorrect for critics to say that stability has no bearing on 
determining a correct conception o f justice. It actually plays an important role in 
defining the reasonableness o f principles of justice.
I recognize that Rawls’s argument for justice as fairness has in fact 
experienced a shift from the first stage to the second stage as stability becomes a 
more salient issue in his search for an overlapping consensus in response to the
4 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice," p.280, my emphasis.
5 Kukathas & Pettit, Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 
p. 142.
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challenge of reasonable pluralism. But if  we pay more attention to Rawls’s 
articulation, we will find that the concern of stability has already been central to 
Rawls’s argument in A Theory o f  Justice. In dealing with the problem of envy, for 
instance, he has said that if  a conception of justice derived from the first stage 
arouses and encourages envy to such an extent that the social system becomes 
unstable, “the adoption o f  the conception o f  justice must be reconsidered.” 
(TJ:531/465 rev., my emphasis) This indicates that although the substantive 
principles o f justice must be worked out independent o f people’s conceptions of 
the good, the test o f stability has the final appeal to determine which conception 
o f justice is fully justified. If a conception o f justice lacks stability, it should either 
be revised, or given up. As the later Rawls says:
What if  it turns out that the principles o f justice cannot gain the 
support o f reasonable doctrines, so that the case for stability 
fails? Justice as fairness as we have stated it is then in difficulty.
We should have to see whether acceptable changes in the 
principles o f  justice would achieve stability. (PL:65-66, my 
emphasis)
Why should stability play such a fundamental role in political justification? 
In particular, why should the overridingness o f the sense o f justice be viewed as a 
necessary condition for a reasonable conception of justice? What kind o f higher 
moral end, if  any, does stability aim to achieve? These questions must be 
answered if  we want to understand Rawls’s theory o f justice. What we need is a 
coherent philosophical account which can reasonably explain the moral 
significance o f stability in Rawls’s project. In the rest o f this chapter, I will first 
present a conventional interpretation which offers a standard answer to the above 
questions, and then argue against its plausibility.
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2 The Conventional Interpretation
The conventional interpretation holds that the aim of moral stability is to 
maintain social order. Moral stability matters because it is the most effective 
means to preserve peaceful and harmonious social cooperation without 
discontinuity and disruption. As long as a social order lasts over time by whatever 
means, including persuasion or enforcement, a society is deemed to be stable. 
Neither the nature of this stabilising force nor where it comes from is the primary 
concern o f social stability. Let us call this social stability. The sense of justice is 
just one o f those means. Its importance depends upon its actual contribution to 
social order. If a conception o f justice is proven too demanding to motivate people 
to comply with its requirements, other means should be deployed. From the point 
o f view o f social stability, what makes Rawls’s idea o f stability so distinctive is 
not that it serves to realize other higher moral ends, but his belief that there is an 
intimate causal relationship between moral and social stability. Following this 
interpretation, Rawls seems to regard social stability as a normative constraint on 
moral justification. Unless a conception o f justice is able to generate sufficient 
motivational support for an enduring social order, it cannot claim to be justified.
This conventional interpretation has been adopted by almost all Rawls’s 
critics. Barry, for instance, suggests that the later Rawls actually shares the same 
concern with Hobbes. For Rawls’s problem of stability is indeed “the problem of 
social order.”6 He argues that there is nothing new in Rawls’s idea of stability 
since it has long been a central concern o f political philosophy, especially at times
6 Barry, "John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics 105 (1995), p .881.
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when order is particularly problematic. Rawls shares with Hobbes and all modern 
natural law theorists a preoccupation with the problem of how people with 
conflicting religious views and conceptions of the good can live together in peace. 
They aim to find minimum rules of social interaction that all can reasonably 
accept. Where Rawls differs from Hobbes is over the means to achieve social 
order. Barry thus says:
Formally, Rawls’s solution is the same as Hobbes’s: that people 
should retain their differing ends (or conceptions o f the good) 
but reach agreement on certain ideas about what justice requires.
Where he departs from Hobbes is in the motivation he seeks for 
adhering to the dictates of justice.7
Kukathas and Pettit also interpret stability as an attempt to find a solution to 
the problem o f how to maintain an enduring social unity in a pluralist liberal 
society. They hold that the core of Rawls’s political liberalism is peace and order. 
In this respect, “it gives Rawls’s politics a decidedly Hobbesian flavour, since he 
now ties his conception o f justice, not to autonomy or individuality, but order. ”8 
In a similar vein, Hampton suggests that the aim of stability is to define a modus 
vivendi for achieving peaceful cooperation in a community of people with 
conflicting conceptions o f the good. “The public, neutral justification o f the 
project is one that makes it the creation of peace and stability at the lowest 
political cost, and this is a Hobbesian justification.”9 For Hampton, the difference 
between Rawls and Hobbes is their different approaches to maintain peace. While
7 Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability," p.881.
8 Kukathas & Pettit, Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and Its Critics, p. 140.
9 Jean Hampton, “Should Political Liberalism Be Done without Metaphysics?7’ Ethics 99 (July 
1989), p.807, my emphasis.
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Hobbes appeals to an absolute sovereign, Rawls rests his hope on citizens’ sense 
o f justice and an overlapping consensus. An overlapping consensus is more 
favourable than a modus vivendi simply because the former can achieve peace in 
a less costly way. Even Habermas, who regards his disagreement with Rawls as 
one o f familial dispute, takes the problem at issue simply as a concern for social 
stability that “expresses the functional contribution that the theory o f justice can 
make to the peaceful institutionalization of social cooperation.”10 Lastly, Freeman, 
who shows great sympathy for Rawls’s idea o f stability, argues that if justice as 
fairness fails to motivate citizens to act as just institutions demand, “then just 
social order is unstable and for this reason utopian.”"
Despite their differences in other respects, the critics seem to share the same 
view that stability is solely concerned with a practical issue o f social order. In this 
sense, the motivational priority o f the sense o f justice is merely instrumentally 
valuable to maintaining social order. Its importance is judged by its degree o f 
contribution to achieving this goal. Hampton thus concludes that “because 
Rawls’s justification o f the project o f developing an overlapping consensus is 
instrumental, then no matter what turns out to be required for stability, his project 
is, and will always be, Hobbesian.”12 It is Hobbesian because the first subject o f 
political philosophy is concerned with social order. Feasibility is prior to 
desirability.
It is by no means surprising that most critics accept this conventional
10 Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use o f  Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism,” The Journal o f  Philosophy 92 (1995), p. 121.
11 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice,” p.280.
12 Hampton, “Should Political Liberalism Be Done without Metaphysics?”, p.806.
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interpretation. For Rawls has seldom made a clear distinction between moral 
stability and social stability. On a number o f occasions he even appears to suggest 
that the sole concern of stability is about how to maintain an enduring social unity 
in a pluralist society. Textual evidences can be found throughout Rawls’s earlier 
and later works to support this interpretation. For example, in explaining the 
structure o f justice as fairness, Rawls tells us that the main purpose o f the third 
part of A Theory o f  Justice is to check “if justice as fairness is a feasible 
conception. This forces us to raise the question o f stability and whether the right 
and the good as defined are congruent.” (TJ:580/509 rev.) It means that 
congruence is required simply because justice as fairness needs to confirm itself to 
be a workable conception. In Political Liberalism , Rawls defines the problem of 
political liberalism as how it is possible that there may exist over time a ju st and 
stable society o f free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Again, justice and 
stability are two separate issues. Justice is one thing while stability is another. 
They do not imply each other.
If  so, why should Rawls take social stability seriously? Critics suggest that 
the answer lies in Rawls’s understanding o f political philosophy. A general line of 
reasoning can be sketched as follows. First o f all, the main task o f political 
philosophy is to work out a set o f basic principles as a common basis to regulate 
social cooperation and arbitrate conflicting claims. These principles assign rights 
and duties, and determine citizens’ appropriate distribution o f benefits and 
burdens. However, what kind o f principles should be adopted is relative to the
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historical context o f a society. “The aims of political philosophy depend on the 
society it addresses.”13 In the case of modem liberal democracies the major task 
o f political philosophy is to find a solution to resolve the divisive social and 
political conflicts arising from the circumstances o f justice and the permanent 
existence o f reasonable pluralism. The fact o f pluralism has put the problem of 
social order in the forefront. Without the oppressive use o f state power, no 
comprehensive conception o f the good could be accepted as the basis o f social 
unity by free and equal citizens. It naturally follows that finding a neutral political 
conception o f justice that could be the focus o f an overlapping consensus is the 
only way to secure social stability without resorting to coercive force.
Bearing this background in mind, it is not difficult to explain why moral 
justification should take social stability into account. A conception o f justice 
should not only be desirable from a moral point o f view, but also be feasible from 
a practical perspective. Political philosophy is not intended to be utopian. No 
matter how perfectly just a principle is, it should be revised or even abandoned if 
it is incapable o f generating sufficient power to guarantee a peaceful and 
harmonious social order over time. Political justification must be realistic and 
sensitive to social condition. Therefore, the concern o f social order partly 
determines the acceptability o f a conception o f justice. Kukathas and Pettit thus 
suggest that in Rawls’s later project, the pursuit of desirability has been 
subordinated to the consideration o f social order. “All consideration o f what 
principles are desirable is framed in the context o f the question o f what principles
13 Rawls, “The Idea o f  an Overlapping Consensus,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.421.
29
are most reasonable or feasible for ‘us’ (i.e., most likely to bring stability).”14
If this interpretation is correct, justice as fairness has undergone a 
fundamental shift from the early Kantian liberalism to the later Hobbesian 
pragmatism. The worry o f social order in the era of pluralism has urged Rawls to 
re-think the proper role and function o f political philosophy. The task o f political 
philosophy is no longer perceived as constructing an ideal conception o f justice 
from an impartial, a-historical and universal perspective, and then applying it to 
the non-ideal world. Rather, it must confront the challenge o f our time. Thus, the 
nature o f Rawls’s principles o f justice has changed. For instance, freedom and 
equality are not regarded as valuable in themselves. On the contrary, as Hampton 
contends, “the ideals o f ‘fairness’ and ‘equality’ are taken to be instrumentally 
necessary to the achievement o f a stable cooperative society.”15 Each citizen 
should be treated fairly and accorded the equal protection o f basic liberties 
because this is taken to be necessary for a stable and lasting system o f cooperation. 
The search for social stability overshadows all other liberal values. It becomes the 
first virtue o f political philosophy in the modem democratic circumstance. Its 
importance arises “from divisive political conflict and the need to settle the 
problem of order.”16
3 Moral Motivation and Social Order
The conventional interpretation above offers a plausible account o f Rawls’s
14 Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and Its Critics, p. 143.
15 Hampton, “Should Political Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?" p.806.
16 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, p . l .
claim that the problem of stability is fundamental not only to his theory, but also 
to political philosophy in general. It contains three general claims.
1. Social stability matters. Finding ways to maintain a peaceful 
and enduring social order is the first and foremost task of 
political philosophy o f modem society characterized by 
reasonable pluralism.
2. Moral stability is the most effective means to secure social 
stability.
3. Social stability is a necessary condition o f moral justification.
In this and the following sections, I shall point out that this argument is 
untenable. This section will focus on (2) and argue that there are no grounds for 
attributing to Rawls the claim that moral stability arising from the overridingness 
o f the sense o f justice and consequent upon an overlapping consensus is the most 
effective means to attain social stability. In the next section, I will challenge (3) by 
showing that even if  (2) is right, it does not follow that social stability is a 
necessary condition for political justification. For doing this is not only 
undesirable, but also conceptually absurd. I f  my arguments are sound, then no 
matter how important social stability is, it should have no bearing on the 
justifiability o f justice. The conventional interpretation is flawed and we must 
look for an alternative argument to make sense o f the moral significance o f 
stability.
We now start with (2). Given that social order is what moral stability 
ultimately aims at, the conventional interpretation can only be sustained on 
conditions that (a) a majority o f citizens will actually give regulative priority to
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the sense of justice over their conceptions o f the good; (b) the fact of 
overridingness o f moral motivation alone will sufficiently account for an enduring 
and peaceful social scheme of cooperation. Applying these conditions to Rawls’s 
political liberalism, it means that social stability depends on moral stability which 
in turn hinges on whether justice as fairness can be the focus o f an overlapping 
consensus. Only when these conditions are actually met, can the link between the 
priority o f the sense o f justice and social order be connected. Social stability is 
expected to resolve an empirical problem of social order. If the overridingness o f 
the sense o f justice is merely a political ideal, the Hobbesians may dismiss 
Rawls’s proposal as useless to confront the challenge o f pluralism. Under certain 
circumstances, an absolute sovereign or an effective system o f coercive power 
may prove to be more appropriate to maintain peace and order. It is not enough for 
Rawls to say that his proposal is the most effective or most reasonable one in an 
ideal situation. If  the challenge o f social stability originates from a practical 
concern for social order in modem pluralistic society, then moral stability must 
empirically demonstrate its ability to resolve the problem.
Let us examine condition (a) first. We know that stability depends upon the 
overridingness o f the sense of justice which in turn relies on an overlapping 
consensus o f a political conception of justice. In such a consensus, the reasonable 
doctrines endorse the political conception, each from its own point o f view. 
“Stability is possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by 
society’s politically active citizens and the requirements of justice are not too 
much in conflict with citizens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged by 
their social arrangements.” (PL: 134) Rawls’s main idea is that since justice as 
fairness is presented as a freestanding conception without reference to any
32
comprehensive doctrines, citizens can therefore have sufficient motive to endorse 
the political conception derived from their own religious, philosophical and 
metaphysical beliefs. The relation between political values and non-political 
values “is left to citizens individually—as part of liberty o f conscience— to settle 
how they think the values o f the political domain are related to other values in 
their comprehensive doctrine.'’ (PL: 140) Put another way, Rawls expects that 
Christians, Kantians, utilitarians, Platonists, among others, can converge on his 
two principles o f justice. In case o f citizens’ non-political values conflict with the 
requirements o f justice as fairness, the holders of these doctrines are still willing 
to subordinate their interests to the political conception. Moreover, their 
willingness to do so stems from their sense o f justice. This is what a Rawlsian 
conception o f stability requires. For Rawls, then, the success o f stability 
determines the fate of political liberalism because the latter depends on a 
satisfactory answer to the question of “how can the values o f the special domain 
of the political—the values o f a subdomain o f the realm of all values—normally 
outweigh whatever values may conflict with them?” (PL: 139) Rawls’s challenge 
is to offer evidence to affirm this claim.
To warrant this kind of consensus, it is not enough that justice as fairness is 
derived from the public political culture without appealing to, or presupposing any 
comprehensive doctrines. For this is just one end of political liberalism. Another 
end is that it must show how each reasonable citizen from their comprehensive 
perspective individually accepts the priority of justice over their conceptions o f 
the good. In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political 
conception, each from its own point o f view. What Rawls should do is to 
investigate the content of different comprehensive doctrines prevalent in a
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democratic society and then to argue from within such doctrines that they have 
sufficient grounds to support the requirements of justice as fairness. Such a 
consensus cannot be determined by Rawls’s own Kantian theory, which is only 
one among many comprehensive views. Nor can Rawls claim that as a 
philosopher, he can reach a conclusion from an impartial point o f view by taking 
all comprehensive perspectives into account. He must leave the decision to each 
citizen. Surprisingly, Rawls has never made such an attempt. He does not conduct 
any empirical survey to show that justice as fairness is the most reasonable 
candidate for an overlapping consensus. He even admits that his project is just a 
kind o f uncertain speculation. As he puts it, “whether justice as fairness (or some 
similar view) can gain the support o f an overlapping consensus so defined is a 
speculative question.” (PL: 15)
Rawls does not explain why he sets this empirical approach aside. One 
reason may be that this approach is too difficult to realize. It is a daunting, if not 
impossible, task for a political philosopher to examine the moral and 
philosophical premises o f every comprehensive doctrine and then determine 
whether they can converge on a political conception of justice. Besides, another 
factor adds difficulty to this approach. In principle, citizens are identified with 
regard to the comprehensive doctrines that they hold. But in fact, most people are 
not philosophers. Their systems o f belief are always inarticulate, mixed, 
inconsistent and unstable. Consequently, their motivation to act can be 
intermingled with different reasons. In this case, as Hill worries, “even winning 
the allegiance o f the major religions and philosophical theories (for justice as 
fairness) would still not ensure stability; the more or less doctrineless folk need to 
be convinced as well, and they are already averse to philosophical systems o f
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ideas.”17
If  my analysis is plausible, the first condition o f social stability is in doubt 
because no empirical evidence is available to confirm the success of an 
overlapping consensus. Someone may argue that regardless o f the lack o f 
empirical support, it is however certain that justice as fairness as a political 
conception is more stable than any alternative comprehensive doctrines. This 
defence is insufficient at least for two reasons. First, if  the idea o f the political 
conception gives justice as fairness an advantage over other competing theories o f 
justice in this regard, other theories can follow Rawls’s lead and present 
themselves as a political conception as well. For instance, a libertarian political 
conception is conceivable. Rawls actually acknowledges this possibility. 
Therefore, the philosophical debate among different conceptions o f justice cannot 
be resolved simply by appealing to the idea o f a freestanding political conception. 
Second, for the sake o f argument, even if  we agree that justice as fairness is more 
stable than most comprehensive political doctrines, this does not mean that it is 
sufficiently stable in the Rawlsian sense which requires that a conception o f 
justice can generate the sense o f justice from each citizen’s subjective 
motivational set to grant priority to the political values. It may still be a modus 
vivendi.
In order to tackle this difficulty, Rawls attempts to use several model cases to 
demonstrate that these comprehensive doctrines would endorse his political 
conception as a balance o f reasons as seen within each citizen’s comprehensive
17 Thomas Hill, “The Stability Problem in Political L ib e ra lism P a c ific  Philosophical Quarterly 
75(1994), p.342.
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doctrine rather than a pragmatic compromise compelled by circumstances. These 
cases include the religious doctrines that accept the principle of toleration, the 
liberalisms o f Kant and Mill, a mixed partially comprehensive doctrine and 
utilitarianism. (PL: 145, 170). The use o f model cases does not aim to offer an 
empirical proof. But Rawls does hope to demonstrate how an overlapping 
consensus may proceed. 18 Let us take utilitarianism as an example and see if this 
demonstration is successful. Rawls’s argument is as follows:
This utilitarianism supports the political conception for such 
reasons as our limited knowledge o f social institutions generally 
and on our knowledge about ongoing circumstances ... These 
and other reasons may lead the utilitarian to think a political 
conception o f justice liberal in content a satisfactory, perhaps 
even the best, workable approximation to what the principle of 
utility, all things tallied up, would require. (PL: 170)
We can note that the main reason for a utilitarian to accept political 
liberalism is that the liberal arrangement o f the basic structure is approximately 
the best means to maximize utility. He still regards the principle o f utility as the 
highest moral principle. As Rawls acknowledges in A Theory o f  Justice, from a 
utilitarian point o f view, their acceptance o f the priority o f the right is based on a 
contingent fact that “under the conditions o f civilized society there is great social 
utility in following them for the most part and in permitting violations only under 
exceptional circumstances.” (TJ:28/25 rev.) But when circumstances are different, 
utilitarianism may favour another political arrangement. Justice as fairness is only 
instrumentally valuable to the maximization o f total utility. Thus, “while the 
contract doctrine accepts our convictions about the priority o f justice as on the
18 I will give a more detailed examination o f  this argument in Chapter 5.
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whole sound, utilitarianism seeks to account for them as a socially useful 
il lu s io n .” (T J:2 8 /2 5  rev.) Suppose Rawls does not change his attitude toward 
utilitarianism in this regard, it is hard for him to consistently hold that in an 
overlapping consensus, “no one accepts the political conception driven by 
political compromise.” (PL: 171) Utilitarianism is an example to show exactly that 
a reasonable doctrine may not have the right reason to accept the overridingness 
o f the political values. It merely views Rawls’s principles as a modus vivendi. 
Utilitarianism is however not an exception. If  Rawls’s idea o f an overlapping 
consensus succeeds, it seems that most fundamental and controversial disputes in 
political philosophy will be resolved or set aside to the non-political sphere 
because the major competing theories o f justice are all presumed to be able to 
endorse political liberalism as a higher-order principle. Nevertheless, if  it is a 
permanent fact that none o f the reasonable comprehensive doctrines can be 
affirmed by all citizens in a modem democratic society, this situation should apply 
to the sphere of the right as well. History tells us that citizens disagree about what 
is right as bitterly as about what is good.
Furthermore, even if condition (a) is met, moral stability is still not enough to 
ensure a lasting and peaceful social scheme of cooperation. This is because 
condition (b), which holds that the fact o f the motivational priority o f the sense o f 
justice alone will sufficiently account for an enduring and peaceful social scheme 
of cooperation, is untenable if stability is interpreted as the Hobbesian concern for 
social order.
Recall that Rawls’s argument for stability depends upon the overridingness 
o f the sense o f justice. The idea of an overlapping consensus is designed to
37
achieve this goal through gaining the reasoned support o f citizens who affirm 
reasonable, though conflicting, comprehensive doctrines. Once a consensus is 
realized, social stability will necessarily follow. Rawls seems to believe that 
citizens’ effective desire to act justly is indispensable to an enduring social order. 
But the connection between moral and social stability is not necessary. 
Undoubtedly, a wide-spread allegiance to the liberal principles o f justice can 
positively contribute to a stable social cooperation. However, moral motivation is 
just one among many factors to affect social stability. The sustainability o f a 
political regime is also subject to other contingent factors, such as the degree o f 
economic development, religious and political culture, division o f social class, 
and racial and ethnic relations. It is a commonplace in political sociology that 
maintaining a peaceful and harmonious social order requires a state to take 
particular historical conditions into consideration. Different societies face 
different problems, and require different institutions and policies. Reasoned and 
philosophical arguments alone are insufficient to secure a stable order. As Hill 
rightly questions, “the factors which stabilize various societies may in fact have 
relatively little to do with the systems o f ideas that they espouse, and more to do 
with habit, reinforcement, and blind emotional attachment.”19 Klosko makes a 
similar remark:
[Rawls’s] entire treatment of political stability is hampered by 
his failure to examine different factors that contribute to, or 
weaken, this. His emphasis on moral stability above all other 
factors would strike most political sociologists as, at best, an 
unusual claim, lacking either empirical or philosophical
19 Hill, “The Stability Problem in Political Liberalism,T* p.342.
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support.”20
Rawls probably believes that in a well-ordered society the only factor that 
would affect social stability is citizens’ moral motivation. This assumption is, 
however, ungrounded. To conclude, even if social stability is the prime concern o f 
political philosophy, Rawls’s political liberalism fails to show that the majority o f 
citizens would actually give priority to the sense o f justice over their conceptions 
of the good; it also fails to establish the necessary link between moral stability and 
social stability. Furthermore, for the sake o f argument, even if  (2) is valid, I 
believe that the third claim, which holds that social stability is constitutive o f 
justification, is wrong. This is the main concern o f the next section.
4 Social Order and Justifiability
Critics have complained that the later Rawls has changed from a Kantian to a 
Hobbesian by accepting the primacy o f social stability in justification. They rarely 
disagree with Rawls over the source of stabilising force. What they object to is the 
view that a conception o f justice can claim to be justified if and only if  it 
establishes a long-lasting and peaceful scheme o f cooperation. For this amounts to 
saying that political liberalism is justified mainly because it is the most effective 
means to attain social stability. The primacy of social order defines the character 
o f political liberalism. The dispute at issue is whether Rawls truly adopts a 
Hobbesian model o f political justification, and if  he does, whether it is desirable 
for him to make such a shift. To answer these questions, a brief account o f
20 George Klosko, “Rawls's Argument from Political Stability,” Columbia Law Review  94, (1994), 
pp. 1891-92.
39
Hobbes’s view is warranted before we probe into Rawls’s own argument.
Hobbes’s contract theory is a model o f justice as mutual advantage. Hobbes 
portrays human beings as profoundly self-interested individuals.21 People’s sole 
motivation to act is their interest in pursuing and protecting their self interest. 
Furthermore, he takes it for granted that all rational beings have a common 
dominant end to preserve life and avoid violent death. However, in a lawless state 
o f nature conflicts o f interest and the struggle for power define the human 
condition. It is characterized by the war of every one against every one. Without a 
state to enforce laws and constrain individuals’ behaviour, individuals enjoy 
“natural rights” to use all means to protect their lives and to do whatever they 
wish to further their interest. In the state o f nature, people are living in a constant 
struggle for survival. From this perspective, peace and social order are paramount. 
They recognize that it is irrational to stay in the state o f nature. For the 
unconstrained pursuit of their own interest is bound to lead to conflict. The key 
problem, in Hobbes’s view, is: under what conditions can rational self-interested 
individuals come to respect and trust one another, honour and comply with a set o f 
principles so that their long-term interest in security and social order can be 
upheld and sustained? 22 This set o f principles defines what justice is. As 
Freeman aptly puts it, “a just society for Hobbes is nearly identifiable with a 
stable social order. He conceives o f justice as people’s mutual compliance with
21 Hobbes does actually acknowledge that there are some noble characters who give priority to 
justice even over their lives. But they are such a small minority that they do not count politically. I 
am indebted to John Charvet for this point.
22 Hobbes’s view can be seen in Leviathan ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991).
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the norms and institutions needed to establish peaceful social cooperation.”23 The 
concern o f social stability constrains what kind of substantive political principles 
would be agreed in the first place.
The next question is how this conception o f justice can be worked out and 
complied with by self-interested individuals. The general Hobbesian idea is 
essentially that individuals should willingly surrender their rights enjoyed in the 
state o f nature and come to agree on a set of rules of cooperation that reflects the 
balance o f bargaining power o f different parties. It is rational for them to do so 
because complying with the rules can bring more advantages to everyone. This 
accounts for the term “justice as mutual advantage.”24 Moreover, the rules are the 
result of the consent o f individuals from their personal point of view. For Hobbes, 
people are not required to give up their existing self-interest for the sake o f justice 
derived from some impersonal grounds. For in essence, self-interest and justice 
are different sides o f the same coin. What is just is derived from what is good 
judging from their rational point o f view. Strictly speaking, there is no conflict 
between justice and self-interest. They refrain from breaking the rules because 
doing so is more conducive to advancing their long-term interest. As Barry 
succinctly puts it, for justice as mutual advantage, “a set of rules is just i f  general 
compliance with the rules would be more advantageous to everybody (in terms o f 
each person’s conception o f the good) than the alternative o f a ‘state o f nature’ in 
which everybody pursued their conception o f the good without any constraints.”25
23 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice," p.278.
24 It should be noted that justice as mutual advantage refers to a general conception akin to 
Hobbes’s thought. I am not saying that Hobbes exactly holds this view. The most important work 
o f  this approach is David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
25 Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.46.
41
In other words, justice is a result of a practical compromise, or a modus vivendi 
among rational self-interested parties. As a result, social order is contingent on 
circumstances favourable to convergence o f interests. Once the distribution of 
political power shifts, the existing conception of justice is likely to be upset and 
re-negotiations are thereby required so as to reach new terms of cooperation. In 
order to resolve this assurance problem permanently, Hobbes holds that an 
unconstrained sovereign empowered to use the monopoly o f coercive political 
force is needed to guarantee a peaceful social order.
Given these defining features o f justice as mutual advantage, Rawls’s 
conception o f stability can correspondingly be interpreted as Hobbesian in two 
different ways. It is Hobbesian either because Rawls defines the primary goal o f 
justice as equivalent to maintaining peace and social order, or because justice as 
fairness, as a matter o f fact, turns out to be a modus vivendi. These two questions 
are conceptually distinct from each other. We can accept the primacy o f social 
order while believing that a non-modus vivendi social cooperation is achievable, 
and vice versa. In the following I will refute both claims ascribed to Rawls.
I will first examine the problem of modus vivendi. If  we look at Rawls’s 
characterisation o f stability carefully, it is clear that he has no intention to present 
justice as fairness as a contingent balance o f power among essentially conflicting 
interests. Recall that the necessary and sufficient condition o f stability rests on the 
overridingness o f the sense o f justice. The reason for people to adhere to political 
principles stems from their effective moral motivation rather than rationally 
calculated self-interest. “Stability is secured by sufficient motivation o f the 
appropriate kind acquired under just institutions.” (PL: 142-43) A fundamental
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difference between Hobbes and Rawls is their understanding o f human nature. 
Hobbes believes that human beings are essentially egoistic. Their adherence to the 
rules is regarded as rational only to the extent that it can be anticipated to advance 
their self-interest. Rawls, on the contrary, believes that agents have a capacity and 
a desire to act on principles that can be reasonably accepted by free and equal 
citizens in a fair and equal-footing condition. Justice as fairness is a moral 
conception affirmed on moral grounds. Its justification is based on moral reasons 
rather than on the fortunate convergence o f conflicting interests. As a result, 
“those who affirm the various views supporting the political conception will not 
withdraw their support o f it should the relative strength o f their view in society 
increase and eventually become dominant.” (PL: 148)
Critics may continue to argue that regardless of Rawls’s effort to distance his 
project from a modus vivendi, he fails to deliver his promise, to wit, a stable 
well-ordered society secured by the argument o f congruence between the right and 
the good presented in A Theory o f  Justice, or by the argument o f overlapping 
consensus presented in Political Liberalism. Or they may argue that Rawls’s 
understanding o f moral psychology is simply unrealistic. Human nature is too 
crooked to do the right thing. These are vital challenges that I will take up in the 
coming chapters. For the moment it suffices that from Rawls’s own point o f  view, 
a modus vivendi is neither the aim of his project nor a necessary result o f his 
philosophical construction.
We now turn to the second charge, namely whether the concern for stability 
has made Rawls a Hobbesian by accepting the primacy o f social order. Before 
answering this question, I will first offer an account o f why Rawls’s project o f
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political liberalism has been widely perceived in this way as the conventional 
interpretation does, and then point out why this interpretation is unacceptable.
According to Rawls, political liberalism aims to deal with two fundamental 
questions about political justice in a pluralistic society. The first concerns how to 
find the most appropriate conception of justice to regulate social cooperation 
between free and equal citizens regarded as fully cooperating members o f society. 
The second concerns how this conception can gain the allegiance o f citizens and 
therefore ensure the priority of political values over non-political ones. 
Combining the two questions together, the central question o f political liberalism 
is: “how is it possible for there to exist over time a ju st and stable society o f free 
and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (PL:4, my emphasis)
This indicates that Rawls purports to achieve two goals simultaneously in his 
project, to wit, a conception o f justice must be right and feasible. The desirability 
of a conception o f justice is distinct from, and independent of, its feasibility. The 
question o f desirability is concerned with the moral grounds o f a conception of 
justice. Rawls’s answer is that a reasonable conception o f justice must be based on 
an idea o f society as a fair system of cooperation, together with a conception of 
moral persons as free and equal with two higher-order interests in developing their 
moral capacities for a sense o f justice and a conception o f the good. In addition, 
the principles must match our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. By 
contrast, the question o f feasibility is concerned with how a conception o f justice 
can effectively and smoothly apply to the basic structure o f society and generate 
its own force to last over time. It is a practical matter irrelevant to justifiability o f
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a conception o f justice. Thus whether a political principle can be morally justified 
is conceptually different from whether it can be socially stable. It is entirely 
possible that a principle can be regarded as just from a moral point o f view while 
failing to be endurable owing to empirical constraints o f social and political 
conditions. They do not entail each other.
In order to realize these two goals, Rawls attempts to present justice as 
fairness in two stages. At the first stage, two principles o f justice are derived from 
the original position behind the veil of ignorance. The design o f the original 
position expresses Rawls’s ideal o f society as a fair system of cooperation 
between free and equal persons. It represents a neutral and freestanding point o f 
view that does not presuppose or appeal to any conception o f the good. The 
problem of stability only comes about at the second stage where the veil is lifted 
and the principles o f justice have already been on hand. Rawls says that this 
division o f labour ensures that the content o f justice will not be affected by any 
particular comprehensive doctrines. It will not be an outcome of political 
compromise or bargaining. The question o f overlapping consensus arises in the 
second stage because it is designed to resolve a practical issue o f social stability.
Following this account, whether a conception o f justice can be the focus o f 
an overlapping consensus has no impact on its justifiability. For its function is to 
deal with feasibility rather than desirability which has already been settled in the 
first stage. No matter how important social stability is from the practical point of 
view, it is irrelevant to the justifiability o f principles o f justice. In this sense, the 
first stage is normatively prior to the second stage. Habermas has made a fairly 
incisive comment on this point, which is worth quoting in length. He says:
Because Rawls situates the “question o f stability” in the 
foreground, the overlapping consensus merely expresses the 
functional contribution that the theory o f justice can make to the 
peaceful institutionalization o f social cooperation; but in this 
the intrinsic value o f a justified  theory must already be 
presupposed...The overlapping consensus would then be 
merely an index of the utility, and no longer a confirmation of 
the correctness of the theory; it would no longer be o f  interest 
from the point o f  view o f  acceptability, and hence validity, but 
only from that o f  acceptance, that is, o f  securing social 
stability.26
If Habermas’s observation is correct, the overlapping consensus and social 
stability have no relevance to the justifiability o f justice as fairness. However, this 
position is not what Rawls actually holds. In reply to Habermas’s doubt about 
whether the overlapping consensus can add anything to the acceptability o f a 
political conception, Rawls states:
Only when there is a reasonable overlapping consensus can 
political society’s political conception of justice be 
publicly— though never finally—justified ... There is, then, no 
public justification for political society without a reasonable 
overlapping consensus, and such a justification also connects 
with the ideas o f stability for the right reasons as well as of 
legitimacy. (PL:388-89)
This reply has squarely refuted Habermas’s interpretation. What Rawls 
actually holds is that an overlapping consensus is a prerequisite for public 
justification. If a conception o f justice is shown to be unstable, it is not only 
infeasible, but also unjustifiable. It clearly indicates that the supposed distinction
2fi Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use o f  Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism,” pp.121-22, my emphasis.
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between desirability and feasibility is not held by Rawls. Unless a political 
conception is sufficiently stable, the argument is incomplete and “it must be in 
some way revised.” (PL: 141)
If  we follow this account, the concern o f stability has fundamentally changed 
the justificatory structure o f justice as fairness. The arguments presented in the 
original position are no longer self-sufficient to provide full justification for his 
two principles o f justice. It must wait for confirmation o f the overlapping 
consensus at the second stage. The focus has shifted from the first stage to the 
second stage. Why does Rawls make such a big move? The conventional 
interpretation immediately comes on the scene and offers a ready answer: Rawls 
has changed from a Kantian to a Hobbesian. This is in a sense understandable. It 
is well known that the original position expresses a Kantian account o f human 
beings as free and equal moral agents with a higher order interest in realising their 
true nature through fair social cooperation. Now if an overlapping consensus sets 
limits on the principles o f justice derived from the original position, the only 
explanation would be that Rawls has taken the issue o f social order as the primary 
concern o f social justice. Desirability succumbs to feasibility.
If this conventional interpretation is correct, Rawls needs to pay a heavy 
moral cost for his Hobbesian turn. The reason is this: in case there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between desirability and feasibility, the former cannot but 
make a concession. For instance, imagine that the difference principle is shown to 
be unable to gain an overlapping consensus and is therefore unstable in a society. 
What we should do, Rawls would suggest, is not to insist on the correctness o f the 
principle, but rather to “see whether acceptable changes in the principles o f justice
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would achieve stability. (PL:66) This is a concession because justifiability of the 
difference principle has to be adjusted or even sacrificed for the sake o f a practical 
concern for social order. Feasibility sets a constraint on what justice should be like. 
But a socially stable conception of justice may be morally unjustified. In an 
individualist capitalist society, for example, the difference principle could be less 
likely to be the focus of a consensus if  Nozick’s libertarianism is more prevalent 
among reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In this case, libertarianism can claim 
to be more justifiable than justice as fairness because it has a better chance to 
achieve social stability. Rawls would therefore not be able to reject Nozick’s 
entitlement theory by arguing that his conception o f moral personality and o f 
social cooperation is morally unacceptable.
This concession is unacceptable because the quest for social stability has 
overshadowed other moral considerations. We can ask whether it is worthwhile to 
compromise the integrity o f moral principle for a practical constraint, and whether 
it is reasonable to lower the moral standard to cater for social order. If the primary 
task of political philosophy is to justify a morally defensible and attractive 
conception o f justice, bringing social stability into justification will hamper rather 
than strengthen the normative character o f political philosophy. As Ameson 
remarks, “we cannot decide on appropriate proxy measures for the in practice 
unmeasurable qualities we really care about until we decide what we really care 
about. At this stage in our inquiry the appeal to the constraints o f feasibility is 
premature. ”27 Furthermore, even if a political theory can be designed to ensure a
27 Richard Ameson, “Responsibility, Neutrality, and Political Liberalism," (1996), typescript. 
Similar criticisms can also be found in David Copp, “Pluralism and Stability in Liberal Theory," 
The Journal o f  Political Philosophy, 4 (1993): 204-05. Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls:
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lasting social order, it would still be undesirable if its content is unjust in the first 
place. As Freeman aptly observes, “by itself a stable social order, however rational 
it may be, can be o f little moral consequence if  it does not rectify but only 
perpetuates gross injustice.”28 To conclude, if the conventional interpretation of 
Rawls’s conception o f stability is correct, then political liberalism may exactly 
face the criticism Freeman raises. Taking stability as a constraint on justification is 
a setback rather than an improvement in Rawls’s theory.
Someone may try to rescue Rawls from this predicament by saying that the 
discrepancy between the first and the second stage would never happen. A 
political conception o f justice derived from the original position would necessarily 
lead to an overlapping consensus after the veil is lifted. In other words, the first 
stage entails the second stage. But if so, there is no point in Rawls including the 
second stage in the process o f justification. The issue o f an overlapping consensus 
becomes redundant from the point o f view of justification. Moreover, as shown 
above, the reasons to support the principles o f justice at the first stage is 
qualitatively different from the reasons to assure social stability at the second 
stage. Differing from the original position, the argument that takes place in the 
second stage, as Habermas points out, “refers not to the fictional citizens o f a 
justice about whom statements are made within the theory but to real citizens of 
flesh and blood. The theory, therefore, must leave the outcome of such a test o f 
acceptability undetermined.”29 It is undetermined because the outcome depends
A Theory o f  Justice and its Critics, pp. 142-50.
28 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice/' pp.278-79.
29 Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use o f  Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's 
Political Liberalism,” p.121, my emphasis.
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upon the empirical conditions which are out of Rawls’s control. There is no 
ground for Rawls to guarantee an antecedent linkage between the two stages.
Furthermore, a more serious critique, which has already been implicated in 
the above comment, is that the conventional interpretation will make Rawls’s 
account o f the relation between stability and justification conceptually absurd. The 
reason is this. Under the conventional interpretation, Rawls would hold that there 
is no justification o f a conception o f justice without social stability. Having a 
propensity to endure is a constitutive feature o f justice. A justifiable conception of 
justice is by nature stable. However, this connection is not only morally 
undesirable as argued above, but also conceptually absurd. For justice and social 
stability are conceptually distinct from each other. They belong to two different 
categories. If  we treat stability as a condition o f justice, according to Cohen:
It would mean that one could not say such entirely intelligible 
things as “This society is at the moment just, but it is likely to 
lose that feature very soon: justice is such a fragile 
achievement”; or “We don’t want our society to be just only for 
the time being: we want its justice to last”. It would mean that 
Plato was conceptually confused when he argued, on empirical 
grounds, in Book VIII o f The Republic, that a just society was 
bound to lose its justice over time.30
Cohen’s argument looks simple, but fatal to the conventional interpretation of 
stability. Cohen’s point is that treating social stability as a requirement o f justice 
commits a category mistake. In considering fundamental principles o f justice,
30 G  A. Cohen, “Rescuing Justice from Constructivism," typescript, unpublished. The prelude o f  
this long article has been independently published entitled “Facts and Principles," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 31, no.3, (2003), pp.211-45.
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social stability should not be taken into account. What justice is should only be 
argued on moral grounds, but not on empirical pragmatic considerations. This 
does not mean that the problem of stability is not an important issue in political 
philosophy. A stable and lasting social order regulated by a conception o f justice is 
undoubtedly essential to an effective social cooperation. But stability matters only 
at the application level where the fundamental principles have already been 
justified. Whether a political principle is just in theory should be distinguished 
from whether it is stable in practice. It is simply wrong to expect that a just 
principle is necessarily stable. For they are judged by different criteria. This points 
to a conclusion that the concern for social order should have no impact on the 
justifiability o f justice at all. Only after drawing this distinction can it be sensible 
for us to say such things as “a political principle is perfectly just though it is 
fragile and unstable because its requirement may be too demanding or 
uncongenial to the actual social environment.” If the conventional interpretation is 
valid, Rawls would have made a serious conceptual mistake in the first place, and 
the third claim of the conventional interpretation mentioned in the previous 
section will be unsound.
Cohen forces Rawls to face a dilemma here. On the one hand, Rawls claims 
that social stability is a precondition of the justifiability o f a conception o f justice; 
on the other hand, he must acknowledge that under certain circumstances even a 
just society may be less stable than a less just one. But these two claims cannot be 
both valid. If we hold the former, then it is by definition true that a just society is 
stable. This, as Cohen shows, does not make any sense though. Even Rawls on 
occasion concedes that “a just scheme of cooperation may not be in equilibrium, 
much less stable.” (TJ:496/434 rev.) If Rawls holds the latter, he must then forsake
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his claim that stability is a necessary condition o f justification. Then his project o f 
political liberalism would collapse. The conventional interpretation does not show 
promise in resolving this dilemma.
The only way to resolve this dilemma, I believe, is to disassociate moral 
stability from social stability. We should neither regard moral and social stability 
as expressing the same concern for a conception o f justice, nor view moral 
stability as a necessary condition o f social stability. Rather, they should be 
regarded as being concerned with different issues. If  it can be established that 
moral stability has its independent agenda that is essential to political justification, 
it can then allow Rawls to say that political justification must take moral stability 
into consideration while being consistent in holding that a morally stable 
conception o f justice may sometimes be socially unstable in practice.
Once this distinction is drawn, the conventional interpretation should be 
rejected and the above criticism against Rawls can be settled. For instance, 
Rawls’s change to political liberalism need not be interpreted as a move from a 
Kantian conception to a Hobbesian one, and his argument for stability need not be 
viewed as a compromise between feasibility and desirability. The concern o f 
stability itself expresses a moral standpoint. In short, justice is not sacrificed for 
the sake o f social order. Finally, giving moral stability an independent status will 
provide us with a new perspective to understand Rawls’s philosophical enterprise.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented Rawls’s conception o f moral stability and 
sketched out its role in his theory. I have also drawn a distinction between moral
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stability and social stability and shown why it is necessary to do so. There is no 
doubt that for Rawls moral stability is essential to the justification of justice as 
fairness. The difficulty is to explain why this is so. The most puzzling question is 
why Rawls sometimes presents the problem as simply a concern for feasibility 
which is independent o f desirability while stressing that it should be imposed as a 
constraint on justification. It is difficult to reconcile these two conflicting 
accounts.
To resolve this difficulty, I take pains to articulate and then refute a 
conventional interpretation adopted by most critics who ascribe the meaning o f 
stability to a Hobbesian concern for social order. I have argued that viewing social 
stability as a constitutive feature of a conception o f justice is not only undesirable, 
but also conceptually absurd. Facing this consequence, we have two options. The 
first is to continue to uphold the conventional interpretation while finding other 
ways to respond to the criticism. I am pessimistic about this approach. The 
alternative is to search for a new interpretation which can avoid the loopholes o f 
the conventional one and in the meantime offer a more consistent and appealing 
picture to make sense o f the significance o f stability. This is the approach that I 
am going to argue for in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPORTANCE OF MORAL STABILITY
In the last chapter I suggested that moral stability should have its own agenda 
which is distinct from social stability. This chapter aims to vindicate this claim 
and argue for the importance o f moral stability in political justification. It attempts 
to explain what this agenda is and why it matters so much in Rawls’s theory. In 
other words, I purport to affirm his claim that stability is fundamental to political 
philosophy.
The clue to answer this question hinges upon Rawls’s account of the 
motivational priority o f the sense o f justice. I have previously shown that the 
priority o f moral motivation is the necessary and sufficient condition o f stability. 
A stable conception of justice, by stipulation, should be able to “generate in its 
members a sufficiently strong sense o f justice to counteract tendencies to 
injustice.” (PL: 140-41) Furthermore, it depends upon a balance o f motives, that is, 
“the sense o f justice that it cultivates and the aims that it encourages must 
normally win out against propensities toward injustice.” (TJ: 454/398 rev.) In 
other words, the agenda o f stability is about how a theory o f justice can provide 
sufficient moral motives for each rational agent to act in accordance with the 
command o f justice. To understand the significance o f moral stability, we should 
explore the nature o f this priority claim and uncover its relation with moral 
justification.
The structure o f this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 1 will define the 
notion o f “motivational priority o f justice”. Section 2 will discuss the idea o f a
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rational plan o f life which defines a person’s good and provides a teleological 
framework for practical reasoning. After that, in Section 3 ,1 argue that Rawls has 
adopted a reason/motive intemalism which, when combined with prudential 
rationality, will explain why the motivational priority o f justice can only be 
accounted for by showing its regulative status in an agent’s rational plan of life. 
Once this is established, I go one further step in Section 4 to justify the 
importance o f motivational priority by appealing to Korsgaard’s idea o f the 
normative question. Finally, in Section 5 and 6 , 1 respond to two criticisms raised 
by Barry and Sandel respectively, and further demonstrate the distinctive feature 
o f Rawls’s account o f stability.
1 The Motivational Priority o f Justice
To begin with, we need to know what the “motivational priority of justice”, 
or “MPJ” for short, exactly means. MPJ is a claim that doing what justice forbids 
can never be what one has most reason to do.1 Put it another way, it requires that 
it is always rational for an agent to have compelling reasons to do what justice 
commands. Two important points about this claim should first be noted.
First, MPJ is a normative claim about the motivational efficacy of a 
conception o f justice. To support MPJ, a theory of justice needs to provide a 
general account o f human motivational structure, and explain how the moral point 
o f view specified by that theory can have such normative force as to outweigh 
other desires and command people’s compliance. This pertains to practical reason
1 Here I follow Scheffler’s definition o f  the claim o f  overridingness. But while Scheffler is 
concerned with overridingness o f  morality in general, my concern is o f  a particular conception o f  
justice. Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp.52-53.
55
for action. It is a goal that a moral and political theory should aim to achieve. But 
its possibility largely depends on the attractiveness o f the conception of justice in 
question. Substantive arguments are required if  we want to compare two theories 
in terms of their motivational efficacy.
We should therefore not be misled into thinking that moral stability is 
determined by how many people actually act in accordance with principles of 
justice in a society. If interpreted in this way, Rawls’s whole project, as argued in 
the last chapter, can hardly be defended. No one can deny that other things being 
equal, a morally stable conception of justice will make a substantial contribution 
to an enduring social order. When the principles o f justice are widely respected by 
a majority o f citizens, it is indeed a good sign that social cooperation under the 
existing basic structure may last. But this does not mean that a socially unstable 
society necessarily reflects a failure o f moral stability. For there may be other 
factors at work. For example, some people are too egoistic or irrational to follow 
the political principles. If they were rational and reasonable enough, they should 
have granted the priority o f justice over other desires.
My point is that while there is a positive correlation between MPJ and social 
stability, they should not be regarded as expressing the same concern. Social 
stability is concerned with a practical issue o f the feasibility o f a conception of 
justice, while moral stability is concerned with the normative priority o f moral 
consideration in practical reasoning. They are conceptually different from each 
other. Rawls, however, seems to disagree with me. For example, he says,
Since a well-ordered society endures over time, its conception 
o f justice is presumably stable: that is, when institutions are just
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(as defined by this conception), those taking part in these 
arrangements acquire the corresponding sense o f justice and 
desire to do their part in maintaining them. (TJ:454/398 rev.)
This suggests that moral stability results in a socially stable society. But this 
only occurs in an ideal well-ordered society in which the sense of justice is 
deemed the only factor affecting social order. This is only one o f many scenarios. 
It is possible that a morally stable conception of justice may not lead to a 
long-lasting social order for non-moral reasons. Moreover, people do not always 
act in accordance with reason. As Rawls says, “to justify a conception o f justice 
we do not have to contend that everyone, whatever his capacities and desires, has 
a sufficient reason (as defined by the thin theory) to preserve his sense o f justice.” 
(TJ:576/504-505 rev.) It indicates that even if  a conception o f justice is justified 
and therefore rational for people to respect the claim of MPJ, some people could 
still act otherwise because o f their self-regarding interests. Acceptability is thus 
distinct from acceptance. No matter how important social stability is, it should not 
be imposed as a constraint on the desirability o f a conception of justice. Doing 
this will commit a category mistake. I believe that the later Rawls is well aware o f 
the danger of this confusion. That is why he particularly emphasizes that “stability 
means stability for the right reasons. This implies that the reasons from which 
citizens act include those given by the account o f justice they affirm...which 
characterizes their effective sense of justice.” (PL:xlii) This clearly shows that 
what Rawls cares about is not social stability per se. He wants a particular kind of 
stability whose stablizing force is solely derived from moral motivation. Put 
another way, if  a socially stable society did not come about from the right reasons, 
Rawls would not deem it as morally stable. So, his conception o f stability is 
closely tied to the justifiability o f a conception o f justice. It is a property o f a
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conception o f justice.2 Once the distinction is drawn, many charges against 
Rawls’s conception of stability raised in the previous chapter can now be left 
aside, and we can focus on the claim of MPJ.
The second point to be made about the formulation of MPJ is the definition 
o f rationality. MPJ stipulates that it is always rational for an agent to do what is 
just. The criterion o f rationality is, however, full of controversy. There are many 
competing interpretations o f rationality. What is certain is that a rational action 
should not be vaguely described as motivated by some reasons or other. For all 
intentional actions have reasons to support them in this sense. The definition must 
be specific and substantive so that it can provide a clear guideline to judge when a 
claim of MPJ is satisfied. Fortunately, Rawls has offered such an interpretation, 
namely that an act is rational when it can best promote a person’s good in 
accordance with his rational plan o f life which is in turn defined by principles o f 
rational choice and full deliberative rationality. Let us call this prudential 
rationality. As this conception of rationality is essential to Rawls’s argument for 
stability, I will first explain the main ideas o f this conception, and then 
demonstrate its linkage with the claim of MPJ in the following sections.
2 The Idea o f a Rational Plan of Life
First o f  all, Rawls assumes that the very nature o f human action is intentional 
and teleological. By this he means that people are normally motivated to act by 
their goals, desires and plans. They seldom act arbitrarily without any purposes.
2 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), p. 181.
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Everyone has a life to lead, and desires to live well. People are fundamentally 
motivated to act by their conceptions o f the good.3 I take this as the starting point 
for Rawls’s theory. It is related to Rawls’s conception of society as a cooperative 
venture for mutual advantage marked by a conflict as well as by an identity o f 
interests:
There is an identity o f interests since social cooperation makes 
possible a better life for all than any would have if  each were to 
live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict o f  interests 
since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits 
produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to 
pursue their ends they each prefer a larger share to a lesser 
share. (TJ:4/4 rev.)
The major reason for people to participate in social cooperation is that this 
can better promote their interests and ends. Before they start to negotiate the terms 
o f cooperation in the original position, participants are supposed to have their own 
conceptions o f the good. The primary motive for cooperation is to acquire more 
primary goods to advance their rational plans of life. They are not supposed to be 
moved by benevolence or other moral sentiments. If living alone could give them 
a better chance to have a better life, they would have no reason to enter into social 
cooperation and abide by rules o f justice. In this sense, the good is prior to the 
right. For without a sufficient incentive to advance their good, the process o f 
searching for a conception o f justice will not even start off. This explains the idea 
o f justice as mutual advantage.4
3 O f course I am not saying that every agent acts this way in every single action. I think it suffices 
i f  this claim can explain most o f  our actions in normal circumstances.
4 The later Rawls explains that his theory should have been called “justice as reciprocity” while 
‘justice as mutual advantage’ is left for the Hobbesian model o f  social justice. PL: 16-17.
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This model o f cooperation, however, immediately poses a threat to Rawls’s 
theory: if  participants are primarily motivated by self interest, how can the claim 
of MPJ be possible? Why should people be moral if their conceptions o f the good 
are in conflict with the demands o f justice? This is a big problem. The possible 
tension between justice and self-interest and the demand o f priority for the former 
sets the background for the discussion of moral stability. Rawls’s immediate 
answer is that “if  men’s inclination to self-interest makes their vigilance against 
one another necessary, their public sense o f justice makes their secure association 
together possible...the general desire for justice limits the pursuit o f other ends.” 
(TJ:5/4-5 rev.) We can notice that Rawls acknowledges the conflict between 
self-interest and justice. He has no intention to claim that every person is or 
should be a moral saint. It is legitimate for people to pursue their interest. What he 
expects is that the latter can be justified to have priority over the former when the 
conflict arises. To what extent this claim is sound will be discussed later in my 
thesis. My point here is that even if  the sense o f justice is a fundamental desire in 
one’s “subjective motivational set”,5 Rawls does not deny that the desire for one’s 
own good also plays an important role in practical reasoning.
Rawls’s challenge is therefore to argue why it is rational for an agent to give 
priority to justice over his pursuit o f the good. This is the central issue o f moral 
stability. To resolve the tension between justice and self-interest, Rawls argues 
that the sense o f justice must be “desirable from the standpoints o f rational 
persons who have them when they assess their situation independently from the
5 This term is drawn from Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reason,” MoraI Luck, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.101 -113.
constraints o f  justice.” (TJ:399/350 rev.) The moral motive is not by default 
overriding. Its priority has to be justified by showing that acting justly is an 
important good for rational agents judging from their first-person perspective. 
Acting justly is not something externally imposed on an agent. Nor does it 
necessarily contradict our good. Rather, a reasonable conception o f justice should 
be able to show that justice specified by the political principles can be presented 
as constitutive o f our well-being and play a regulative role in our life. Rawls calls 
this the congruence argument. On the one hand, Rawls recognizes the tension 
between justice and self-interest, and on the other hand strives to vindicate that 
this tension is not necessarily unsolvable. With a reasonable political morality and 
a proper account o f reasons for rational actions, the tension can be relieved, and 
the right and the good can be congruent. Congruence is the solution to the claim 
o f MPJ in^4 Theory o f  Justice.
This leads to the question o f what a person’s good is. To answer this question, 
Rawls introduces the idea o f a rational plan o f life into his theory. First, he 
contends that our life is not fragmented and disconnected. Rather, it has a unity 
grounded in a plan of life. As he puts it, “a person may be regarded as a human 
life lived according to a plan.” (TJ:408/358 rev.) This plan o f life provides a 
framework to make sense o f our intentional actions, define our identity, and 
determine the meaning of our good. “A rational plan o f life establishes the basic 
point of view from which all judgments o f value relating to a particular person are 
to be made and finally rendered consistent.” (TJ:409/359 rev.) A person is happy 
“when his plans are going well.” (TJ:409/359 rev.) Moreover, “an individual says 
who he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he intends to do in this 
life.” (TJ:408/358 rev.) It follows from this that most o f our reasons for action can
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be explained as deriving from a desire to form and to execute our plans o f life 
successfully because “the rational plan for a person determines his good.” 
(TJ:408/358 rev.)
The structure of a plan o f life is complex.6 Several features are particularly 
noteworthy. First, a plan can give a sense o f unity to one’s life. This can be 
understood in two dimensions. The first one is horizontal. We make decisions 
everyday. These decisions reflect our preferences for particular ends and interests, 
which in turn provide meaning to our life. Our ends will sometimes conflict with 
each other, and priority has to be established. According to what criteria do we 
make our choice? It depends upon our well-thought-out plans which provide a 
frame of reference to organize our activities and rank different desires so that our 
ends can be fruitfully combined into a coherent scheme of conduct. “In this way a 
family o f interrelated desires can be satisfied in an effective and harmonious 
manner.” (TJ:410/360 rev.) The second dimension is vertical. Our life is 
constituted by the past, the present and the future. The self-identity o f different 
times is united by our plans o f life. The plans render our life a kind o f narrative 
which makes our actions intelligible. An example can illustrate this point. 
Suppose after careful deliberation I determine to live a philosophical life. I want 
to make myself a philosopher. To realize this plan, I will guide my actions with 
this aim in mind. I may do a degree in philosophy, read relevant books, meet 
friends with similar interests, or even mimic an admired philosopher’s life style. 
My whole life will revolve around this end. Desires that are congenial to it will be
6 It is also arguable i f  a person’s life can be described as a plan. See Charles Larmore, “The Idea 
o f  a Life Plan” in Human Flourishing ed. E. Paul, F. Miller & J. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp.96-112.
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encouraged while those disturbing be weeded out. I will even identify myself with 
this ground project.7 In short, these two dimensions interweave, and give my life 
a sense o f continuity and wholeness.
Furthermore, a long-term plan normally consists o f a hierarchy o f specific 
sub-plans which are carried out at different times. However, in reality people may 
not be able to articulate a clear hierarchical structure for their interests and aims. 
Their plans may be mixed and conflicting. That explains why people feel as 
though they were being tom apart by different ends when they come into conflict. 
It is also possible that people do not have a master plan which encompasses all 
sub-plans. A life full o f conflicting plans could be a terrible mess. Or even if  a 
person has a plan, he may be unconscious o f its existence and its regulative force. 
After all having a plan is a matter o f rationalisation o f our life experience. It is a 
complicated construction rather than a natural fact. It involves substantial work o f 
deliberation and self-understanding.
Nevertheless, we should note that a well planned life as such is not 
necessarily more desirable than an unplanned one. The idea o f a plan is formal 
and should not be assessed until its substantive content has been filled in. 
Moreover, as Rawls admits, “it is not inconceivable that an individual, or even a 
whole society, should achieve happiness moved entirely by spontaneous 
inclination.” (TJ: 423/372 rev.) But in most cases and for most people, they see 
themselves as one person leading a life with a conscious plan.
7 The idea o f  ground project can see Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality” in 
M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19.
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Finally, there is a parallel between a plan of life and a conception o f the good. 
For Rawls, a conception of the good refers to a system which defines what is 
valuable in human life. It “normally consists o f a more or less determinate scheme 
o f final ends, that is, ends we want to realize for their own sake, as well as 
attachments to other persons and loyalties to various groups and associations.” 
(PL: 19) It informs our conduct, and gives meaning to our life as a whole. This 
account o f a conception o f the good is basically the same as a rational plan of life 
defined above. That is why Rawls sometimes uses them interchangeably. For 
instance, in explaining the subjective circumstances o f justice, he says that “these 
plans, or conceptions o f the good, lead them to have different ends and purposes, 
and to make conflicting claims on the natural and social resources available.” 
(TJ: 127/110 rev.)
So far we have only discussed the general structure o f a plan of life. But 
under what conditions can a plan o f life be described as rational? This question is 
crucial. Remember that our actions are directed by our good, and our good is in 
turn determined by our rational plan o f life. In other words, the rationality of 
action depends upon the rationality o f a plan o f life. As Rawls expressly points out, 
“a person’s interests and aims are rational if, and only if, they are to be 
encouraged and provided for by the plan that is rational for him.” (TJ:409/359 rev.) 
But unlike Hume, Rawls does not hold that reason can only be used to evaluate 
the effectiveness o f means to realize an end. It can be used to assess our ends as 
well. What Hume advocates is an instrumental conception o f rationality, 
according to which an action is rational when it best satisfies the existing desires 
that we have. Reasoning may enable us to determine the most effective ways o f 
attaining our ends, but those ends themselves are fixed by our desires. Rawls
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differs from Hume by claiming that an action is rational if  and only if  it can best 
promote our good derived from our rational plans of life.8 The existing desires do 
not have to be our good. For we may be irrational in the sense that our existing 
desires are contrary to our deliberate and informed plan o f life. Rawls’s 
conception is what I call prudential rationality.
To establish this conception of rationality, we need to know what a rational 
plan o f life is. Rawls proposes that a person’s plan of life is rational if  and only if 
it can satisfy the following two conditions:
(1) It is one of the plans that is consistent with the principles o f 
rational choice when these are applied to all the relevant 
features o f his position, and (2) it is that plan among those 
meeting these conditions which would be chosen by him with 
full deliberative rationality, that is, with full awareness o f the 
relevant facts and after a careful consideration o f the 
consequences. (TJ:408/358-359 rev.)
A rational plan of life hinges on principles o f rational choice and the 
principle o f deliberative rationality. The former includes the principle of effective 
means, o f inclusiveness and o f the greater likelihood o f success. The latter refers 
to a certain attitude of deliberation which requires the agent to take carefully all 
the relevant facts and possibilities into account and employ the best means to 
realize his most important desires under favourable conditions. In this deliberative 
process, it is also assumed that there are no errors of calculation and the facts are 
correctly assessed. Apart from these principles, Rawls adds one more principle to 
help us determine our rational plan o f life. It is “the Aristotelian Principle” which
K This distinction is borrowed from Scheffler, Human Morality, p.73.
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states that “human beings enjoy the exercise o f their realized capacities (their 
innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is 
realized, or the greater its complexity.” (TJ:426/374 rev.) In short, Rawls’s aim is 
to use these principles o f rationality to define human goods so that it can provide 
justification for primary goods and for our reasons for action.
It is however noteworthy that after lengthy discussion, Rawls concedes that 
although the rational principles can set up guidelines for reflection and narrow 
down the scope o f rational plans, they cannot conclusively tell us how we should 
live. With regard to everyone’s final ends, we may have to choose for ourselves 
from a maximal class o f plans. This is because these principles are quite formal 
and many plans can be compatible with them. They are not substantive enough to 
determine what sorts o f specific ends are most rational. At some point rational 
deliberation will reach its limit, and individuals may have to choose among a 
range o f choices. As Rawls states, “it is clearly left to the agent himself to decide 
what it is that he most wants and to judge the comparative importance o f his 
several ends.” (TJ:416/366 rev.) As a consequence, different people will have 
different conceptions o f the good. “Many things may be good for one person that 
would not be good for another.” (TJ:448/393 rev.)
This kind o f indeterminacy is the nature o f prudential rationality. As our 
discussion proceeds, we will find that this feature of rationality has a great impact 
on the argument for stability. But it is understandable why Rawls holds this view. 
First, it matches our considered judgment that a liberal society should allow 
people to lead their lives in their own way. If  the content o f rational principles is 
thick to such an extent that it provides a definitive determination for our plans, it
will contradict the idea o f freedom of choice. Second, it is unnecessary because 
conceptions o f the good have no influence on the justification o f principles of 
justice. Thus, “there is no need to set up the account o f the good so as to force 
unanimity on all the standards o f the rational choice.” (TJ:447/393 rev.) Rawls 
further concludes that “this indeterminacy is no difficulty for justice as fairness, 
since the details o f plans do not affect in any way what is right or just.” 
(TJ:449/394 rev.)
3 Reason/Motive Internalism
If  my above account is correct, it seems that Rawls intends to hold an 
internalist view concerning motivation and practical reason for action. According 
to Williams, internalism is the view that an agent A has a reason to do 0  if  and 
only if  A has some desires deriving from his subjective motivation set the 
satisfaction o f which will be served by his 0ing.9 Or if we follow Darwall’s 
classification, a reasons/motives internalism model holds that a necessary 
condition o f p 's  being a reason for A to do 0  is that A can have, and under suitable 
conditions would have, some motivation to do 0  by virtue o f a suitable awareness 
o f p.'° Internalism emphasises that there is a close connection between practical 
reason and motivation. As Korsgaard explains, for an internalist, “if  I judge that 
some action is right, it is implied that I have, and acknowledge, some motive or 
reason for performing that action. It is part o f the sense o f the judgment that a
9 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons” in Moral Luck, pp.101-102.
10 Stephen Darwall, “Reasons, Motives, and the Demands o f  Morality: an Introduction,” in Moral 
Discourse and Practice : Some Philosophical Approaches ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, 
and Peter Railton (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.307.
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motive is present.”11 The reason why an action is right provides an agent with a 
motive for doing that action. The capability o f motivation thus sets a requirement 
on practical reason. When the agent is not motivated by a moral judgment, there is 
no point for a third person to say that the agent has a reason to do that action. On 
an externalist theory, by contrast, there is no such connection between reason and 
motive. The reason why an action is right is separate from the motive for doing it.
Rawls does not explicitly lay out which view he holds. It is reasonable for us 
to believe that he is sympathetic to the internalist position though. First o f all, the 
fact that Rawls takes moral stability so seriously itself suggests that moral 
justification is inseparable from the concern o f motivation. As he writes, 
“however attractive a conception o f justice might be on other grounds, it is 
seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to 
engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it.” (TJ: 455/398 rev.) 
We should note that how strong the desire to act justly actually is should not be a 
separate question in establishing a conception o f justice, or to be dealt with after 
its establishment. Rather, the motivating force must be inherent in the conception 
o f justice. A justifiable conception o f justice must be able to provide rational 
agents with sufficient moral motive to act. This is indeed an internalist 
requirement o f justification.
The second evidence comes from Rawls’s account o f the strains o f 
commitment. The strains o f commitment state that the parties in the original 
position should choose a conception o f justice which they can adhere to when the
11 Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason” in Creating the Kingdom o f  Ends (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.315.
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veil o f ignorance is lifted. “They cannot enter into agreements that may have 
consequences they cannot accept.” (TJ: 176/153 rev.) This implies that the rational 
parties will only choose those principles which they can have sufficient motive to 
comply with. But whether they can have such motive depends upon the reasons 
provided by the principles. The source o f commitment is embodied in the 
conception of justice. So, in comparing different conceptions, the parties will 
consider which conception can best promote their fundamental interests and 
which one is psychologically less motivating. This is actually what internalism 
dictates: when the parties agree to endorse a specific conception o f justice, they 
have the accompanying motive to abide by the principles. In other words, if a 
conception o f justice fails to meet the strains o f commitment, it is inherently 
unjustified.
Finally, Rawls clearly objects to modem intuitionism represented by 
R.D.Ross who holds an externalist position. For Ross, our duty is a distinct and 
unanalyzable property which can only be known by rational intuition. But 
knowing our duty does not necessarily entail the motive for performing it. Moral 
knowledge is one thing and motivation another. Ross presumes that people have a 
distinctive sense o f right to fulfil one’s duty. Moreover, this motive is the highest 
and purest desire to respond to our duty, which is not derived from, or dependent 
upon any other desires. Although Ross admits that a moral motive could be 
triggered by what you are told is your duty, “it would be possible to have that 
intuition and not be motivated by it. The reason why the act is right and the 
motive you have for doing it are separable items.”12 Rawls argues that this is
12 Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,’" p.316.
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untenable because it fails to explain why rational agents must have the compelling 
desire to act from the sense o f right if  it is entirely detached from our good. For 
Rawls, “a perfectly just society should be part o f an ideal that rational human 
beings could desire more than anything else once they had full knowledge and 
experience o f what it was.” (TJ:477/418 rev.) Contrary to intuitionism, a 
reasonable conception of justice must answer to our good so that it can motivate 
us to do what is just. Rawls’s objection to extemalism further confirms my claim 
that he is a reason/motive internalist.
It should be noted that the requirement o f internalism has great implications 
for moral justification, that is, the question o f justification cannot be set apart 
from the question o f motivation. A conception of justice should be able to be 
justified from an impartial point o f view, as well as providing an effective desire 
for action. But once this internalist position is combined with prudential 
rationality, it poses a great challenge to Rawls. Before going into this point, let me 
first sum up what I have said so far.
At the beginning, I state that what moral stability aims at is the motivational 
priority of justice, a claim about practical reason for action. This directs us to 
explore the content o f rationality. I then argue that Rawls holds a conception of 
prudential rationality, according to which an action is rational if  and only if  it can 
best promote one’s good defined by his rational plan of life. The internalist 
principle stipulates that nothing can be counted as a reason for an agent to act 
unless it is capable o f motivating him to do so. Putting prudential rationality and 
internalism together, it implies that a political principle can claim to be justified if  
and only if the reasons for the principle can motivate rational agents to act justly,
and this in turn requires that the reasons must be in some ways related to people’s 
rational plans of life. To explain one’s practical reason for adhering to the 
principle o f justice, we need to place his reason in the context o f his plan o f life. 
O f course, like Williams’s account o f a subjective motivational set, a plan of life 
can contain things such as projects, different sorts o f commitments and personal 
loyalties. There is no supposition that the conception o f the good must be egoistic 
in nature. The point is that there is an internal link between moral motive and our 
good.
However, we should note that the internalist requirement does not entail the 
overridingness o f the sense o f justice. It is possible that under certain 
circumstances the motive for a particular conception o f justice may be outweighed 
by other considerations. The claim of MPJ is much more demanding than the 
internalist requirement. It demands that a conception of justice can claim to be 
justified only if the sense o f justice could be regarded by rational agents as the 
most compelling motive for action stemming from their subjective motivational 
set. It must show that it is normally rational for the sense o f justice to take priority 
over other competing desires.
Rawls would, however, confront a serious challenge if  the above analysis 
stands: given that people have different conceptions o f the good in a pluralistic 
society, how can they, as rational agents, commonly agree that insofar as they 
have reason to do what justice demands, moral reasons should always outweigh 
their rational self-interest? How can the sense o f justice be always overriding if  
“the stability o f a conception depends upon a balance o f motives”? (TJ:454/398
rev.)
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Faced with this challenge, the sense o f justice must be shown to occupy an 
essential place in every agent’s rational plan o f life. The moral motive should not 
be understood as something alien to a person’s conception of the good. Rather, it 
is constitutive o f our good. Otherwise, it cannot explain why an agent, from his 
own point o f view, should have such a compelling motive to act on what justice 
dictates. Therefore, to achieve stability, Rawls tells us, “what is to be established 
is that it is rational (as defined by the thin theory of the good) for those in a 
well-ordered society to affirm their sense o f  justice as regulative o f  their plan o f  
l i fe ” (TJ:567/497 rev., my emphasis) Rawls puts his hope on congruence o f the 
right and the good. When the desire to act justly is also regulative o f a rational 
plan o f life, then the sense of justice can be regarded as the most important good 
in one’s conception of the good. In this case, rational people can surely have the 
strongest desire to act justly.
To what extent Rawls’s strategy succeeds need not concern us here.13 The 
foregoing discussion, however, immediately gives rise to a more urgent question, 
that is, why is the claim of MPJ so essential to justification? Does Rawls set 
himself a daunting task which does no good to his whole project? After all, few 
critics share with Rawls the view that moral stability should play such a 
fundamental role in political philosophy. To dispel these doubts, we need to 
explore further the relations between justification and motivation.
4 The Normative Question and Justification
In this section, I shall attempt to offer some arguments to explain why MPJ is
13 This will be examined in Chapter 4.
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integral to political justification. First o f all, it is related to Rawls’s understanding 
o f the nature o f a theory o f justice. According to Rawls, the first and foremost task 
o f political philosophy is to construct a conception of justice to regulate our social 
cooperation. This conception defines our basic rights and duties, and determines 
the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens o f cooperation. They are the 
most fundamental and ultimate principles for the social basic structure. 
Structurally these principles are expected to have lexical priority over other 
interests.
Furthermore, these political principles are normative. They make claims on 
us. They are practical and action-guiding. They prescribe what we ought or ought 
not to do. They command our allegiance. Sometimes moral commands are 
stringent and demanding to such an extent that we have to adjust, or even sacrifice 
our preferences, personal interests and important projects. We also have 
obligations to respect our fellow citizens’ rights and liberties, pay tax and fulfil 
different kinds o f duties, and treat other people as equals. In short, the political 
institutions provide a comprehensive framework for our political world and 
determine the legitimacy o f our social actions.
More importantly, unlike other moral norms, the application o f political 
principles inevitably involves the exercise o f coercive power. The principles are 
embodied in the political and legal system. In a closed and self-contained society, 
citizens have to obey the rules. This does not mean that we do not have freedom 
o f action. Yet even our right to liberties are protected by coercive force. If  
someone violates other citizens’ rights, he will be punished. Undoubtedly, other 
moral norms have normative force as well. When we say, for instance, lying is
morally wrong, it implies that everyone should not lie. When someone does lie, in 
most cases what he suffers is self-blame or public disapproval from others, but not 
legal punishment.
Finally, as Rawls suggests, the basic structure of society has deep influence 
on our life prospects and in fundamental ways shapes our character and way of 
life from the very beginning. It will affect the future o f subsequent generations as 
well.
Since living in a political community and adhering to its principles place 
such powerful normative constraint on us, we must ask why political principles 
should have such claim on us as rational and free agents. The rationality involved 
here refers to prudential rationality defined earlier. A free agent, according to 
Rawls, has two salient features. First, the agent regards himself as a 
self-originating source o f valid claims. It means that people believe their claims 
“carry weight on their own without being derived from prior duties or obligation 
owed to society or to other persons, or, finally, as derived from, or assigned to, 
their particular role.”14 They are independent and autonomous. Their wills are not 
dependent upon anyone else’s, and obligations are self-imposed. As equal moral 
persons in terms o f their moral capacity, they consider themselves as having an 
equal right to make claims on the design o f social institutions. Second, free agents 
are viewed as having the moral power to form a conception o f the good. They 
have the capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a plan o f life. They can 
stand apart from existing desires and critically assess their ends. This is close to
14 Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.330.
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the idea o f personal autonomy. A free person is the one that has second-order 
desires regarding the ordering of his first-order desires.15
Now suppose that I am a rational and free person and fully understand the 
nature of political principles, I put the following question to myself: is it always 
rational for me to act on the requirement o f justice even if it is inconsistent with 
the dictates of my rational good defined by my plan of life? Why must I give 
priority to justice over my ends and interests? This is what Korsgaard calls the 
normative question. It asks where the sources o f moral claims come from, and 
how they can have such normative force to outweigh an agent’s other desires. The 
normative question is the question o f justification. It purports to probe the ground 
o f morality and ask why it can make claims on us. It is worth noting that the 
question must be asked from an agent’s first-person perspective. As Korsgaard 
explains,
The normative question is a first-person question that arises for 
the moral agent who must actually do what morality says...The 
answer must actually succeed in addressing someone in that 
position. It must not merely specify what we might say, in the 
third person, about an agent who challenges or ignores the 
existence o f moral claims.16
The reasons provided for action must be endorsed from the rational agent’s 
own point o f view. A political theory should not only be able to explain, from a 
third-person point of view, why an agent has reasons to do what morality dictates,
15 Further discussion on the second-order desire can see Harry Frankfurt, “'Freedom o f  the Will 
and the Concept o f a Person'’ in The Importance o f  What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), pp. 11-25.
16 Korsgaard, The Sources ofNormativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 16.
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but also be able to convince the agent why it is rational to care about morality, and 
care about it so imperatively. What justification aims to achieve is to convince 
someone in a particular moral position. We want the agent himself to see the 
normative force of a moral argument. Only then can the agent generate sufficient 
motive to comply with the political principles. I think this is another way to 
reiterate the idea of intemalism, which stresses that reasons for action must 
address agents from their own point o f view. This does not mean that the 
justificatory reasons must be partial or agent-relative. Deliberating from the 
first-person perspective sets no prior limit to what kinds o f reason should be 
included in justification. For a rational moral agent, he can in principle make use 
o f any reasons available to justify a political principle, including impartial 
reasons.
It should be noted that the normative question is concerned with the 
rationality o f actions, not with the actual actions o f every agent. No theory can 
claim to be justified if  the necessary condition of justification is that its moral 
commands must be actually accepted by every agent from his own point o f view. 
This is implausible. For different people act differently for different reasons. No 
one or institution could guarantee that every agent would always act for the same 
reason. People can act irrationally. So, the requirement must be that a theory can 
be justified only if  it can motivate every rational agent to act from his own 
perspective. Furthermore, it is also undesirable that the answer to the normative 
question should be ultimately dependent upon the agents’ actual psychological 
motivational systems because it would then dilute the importance o f the normative 
question and would trivialise the real tension between morality and self-interest. 
For according to this view, what I am morally required to do must coincide with
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what I actually desire to do. No conflict exists between the two sides. But this is 
simply untrue. What one is obligated to do can have deep conflict with what he 
currently desires to do. It is exactly because o f this possible conflict that the 
problem o f stability becomes a salient issue.
It is then clear that the question of motivation is inseparable from the 
question o f justification. If there are moral grounds for a conception of justice, 
then it must be rational for us to be motivated to act on those grounds. The 
motivational force o f a conception constitutively determines its desirability. A 
justifiable theory must explain why someone, as a rational and free agent with his 
own rational plan of life, should have reasons to take seriously the standpoint of 
justice. Failing to offer a satisfactory account, justification could not get off the 
ground and the binding force o f justice would be weak and unstable. As Scanlon 
rightly suggests, an adequate moral philosophy should not stop at assuming that 
morality is nothing more than a preference people happen to have. “It must make 
it understandable why moral reasons are ones that people can take seriously, and 
why they strike those who are moved by them as reasons of a special stringency 
and inescapability.”17 This is exactly what moral stability dictates, that is, a stable 
conception o f justice must be able to generate in each rational agent an effective 
sense o f justice to outweigh other desires. The overridingness o f the sense of 
justice is an inherent requirement o f justification. In this sense, as Dworkin rightly 
says, “the search for the foundation o f a political theory, in the sense I have in 
mind, is sometimes described as the problem of finding motivation for the
17 Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond ed. Amartya Sen 
and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 106.
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theory.”18
5 The Status of Impartiality
The claim of MPJ in political justification has been seriously challenged. It is 
argued that it is a mistake to confuse the question o f motivation with that o f 
justification. The task of justification is to pursue truth or search for impartial 
reasons that can be shared by everyone. It is indifferent to the question o f whether 
and to what extent it can have the corresponding motivational force to command 
people’s allegiance. Motivational efficacy should have no impact on the 
justifiability o f a conception o f justice. According to Mendus,19 Barry holds this 
view because he claims that:
My concern is with truth, not with popularity. If I am right, 
justice calls for radical change...But how strong the desire to 
behave justly actually is, when it comes into competition with 
other desires, I leave open. I claim only to tell you what justice 
is; what you do about it, if you believe me, is up to you.20
In another occasion where Barry responds to his critics, he again states that 
“if  somebody is totally unmoved by the elementary thought that I have expressed, 
then of course the theory will not speak to him. But the theory can explain why it 
is justifiable to do whatever is necessary to restrain such people.”21 Does Barry 
pose a valid critique of Rawls? Below I will make a comparison between Rawls
18 Dworkin, “Foundations o f  Liberal Equality,” in The Tanner Lecture on Human Values Vol. XI 
(Salt Lake City: University o f  Utah Press, 1990), p.5.
19 Mendus, Impartiality in M oral and Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), p. 10.
20 Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.l 15, my emphasis.
21 Barry, “Something in the Disputation not Unpleasant ” in Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice ed. 
Paul Kelly (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p.237.
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and Barry, and argue for the necessity o f MPJ in justification.
To begin with, I must say Mendus’s observation is a bit inaccurate. What 
Barry exactly says is that people’s existing motivation has no necessary bearing on 
the justifiability o f a conception of justice. For Barry, the proper task of political 
philosophy is to quest for right political ideals. A political theory has no duty to 
warrant that every citizen must be actually motivated to comply with the 
principles. This is because there are at least two possible reasons to explain why a 
person lacks incentive to act justly. The first is that the person is self-interested, 
irrational, or unreasonable. The second is that the political principle itself is 
unjustified or unreasonably demanding. In the second case, the theory at stake has 
reason to step back to re-examine its arguments. But if  we have good reasons, as 
Barry claims, to believe that our theory is true or right, there is no point in making 
concessions simply because o f the reasons o f the first type o f case. And as a 
matter of fact, people do act irrationally or unreasonably. As Korsgaard rightly 
points out, even in a standard account o f instrumental rationality, an agent might 
choose means insufficient to his given end even though he knowingly understand 
the relevant causal relations in the case. The agent may simply fail to transmit the 
motive force from the operation of means-end reasoning. This is because:
The necessity, or the compellingness, o f rational considerations 
lies in those considerations themselves, not in us: that is, we 
will not necessarily be motivated by them...So a person may be 
irrational, not merely by failing to observe rational 
connections— say, failing to see that the sufficient means are at 
hand—but also by being “wilfully” blind to them, or even by
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being indifferent to them when they are pointed out.22
Once we allow the case o f true irrationality, it is unreasonable to expect a 
political theory to be actually able to motivate all people to do what justice 
requires. A correct formulation should hold rather that a conception o f justice is 
justified only if  it can effectively motivate rational people to act in accordance 
with the principles o f justice. Barry accepts this motivational requirement indeed. 
He makes it clear that any theory o f justice must presuppose an account o f the 
motive for behaving justly. The stipulated account will in turn substantially 
determine the form and content of the principles o f justice. As he remarks, 
“because o f the practical nature o f justice, a theory o f the motivation for being just 
must at the same time be a theory o f what justice is. For the content o f justice has 
to be such that people will have a reason for being just.”23 Take justice as mutual 
advantage as an example. According to this theory, the major motive for agents to 
comply with the rules o f justice is derived from their belief that doing so is in the 
long term a more effective way to promote their conceptions o f the good. Based 
on this motive, a set o f rules is regarded as just if general compliance with the 
rules would be more advantageous to every participant than other alternatives.24 
Justice as impartiality has another story of motivation. It has a different starting 
point. People are not presumed to be moved simply by their wish to advance their 
conception o f the good. Rather, they are motivated by the desire for reasonable 
agreement. Following Scanlon’s path, Barry supposes that it is a widespread fact 
that agents have a desire to act according to rules that could not reasonably be
22 Korsgaard, “"Skepticism about Practical Reason,’' p.320.
23 Barry, Theories o f  Justice (California: University o f California Press, 1989), p.359.
24 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.46.
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rejected by others similarly motivated. They will therefore only accept those rules 
that “no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general 
agreement” as just. Without this moral motive, justice as impartiality cannot get 
off the ground in the first place.
Whether Barry’s argument for justice as impartiality is sound is not my 
concern here. My point is that Barry, like Rawls, takes the problem of motivation 
seriously and views it as inseparable from the question o f justification25 
Notwithstanding this similarity, there are two important differences between Barry 
and Rawls that is noteworthy. First, Barry holds that the impartial motive to reach 
reasonable agreement is a distinct and independent desire which has no 
connection with our conception o f the good. It reflects our moral commitment to 
treat everyone as equals. “The motive is the desire to act justly: the wish to 
conduct oneself in ways that are capable o f being defended impartially.”26 Barry, 
however, argues against the view that the source o f moral motive must in some 
way be related to one’s conception o f the good. For Barry, recognising something 
to be just should itself be sufficient to motivate an agent to comply with the just 
rules. It is unnecessary and undesirable to explain one’s acting justly in terms o f 
the interest of the agent. The impartial motive, by definition, is contrary to the 
partial concern o f one’s conception o f the good. People can simply act out o f a 
sense o f justice. If  the motivation for being just is derived from its long-term 
advantageousness to the self-interest o f the agent, then it inevitably falls into a 
variant o f justice as mutual advantage which is, for Barry, indefensible.
25 Barry makes this point clear in Theories o f  Justice, pp.357-66.
26 Barry, Theories o f  Justice, p.363.
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Rawls is at this point sharply different from Barry. For Rawls, one’s reason to 
act justly cannot be entirely detached from one’s conception of the good. As 
shown above, Rawls holds that our reason for action is dependent upon the good 
defined by our rational plan of life. Therefore, if the sense o f justice cannot be 
properly integrated into the agent’s conception o f the good, it is hard to explain 
why the agent must act in accordance with principles of justice.27 That is why 
Rawls claims that the “doctrine of the purely conscientious act is irrational.” 
(TJ:477/418 rev.) It is irrational because this doctrine presumes that the moral 
motive, as the highest motive, requires us to do “what is right and just simply 
because it is right and just.” It is stipulated not to have any relation with our plans 
o f life. Rawls believes that this view fails to account for our moral and 
psychological experience. It is natural and reasonable for us to have an interest in 
advancing our conception o f the good. If the moral motive is so distinct and 
detached from our pursuit of well-being, why should we, as rational agents, take it 
so seriously? It seems that “the sense o f right lacks any apparent reason; it 
resembles a preference for tea rather than coffee.” (TJ:478/418 rev .)28 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Rawls endorses a Hobbesian conception o f 
justice as mutual advantage. Rawls is an impartialist in the sense that the 
principles o f justice must be agreed by free and equal beings on an equal footing 
in the original position. He also stresses that people are motivated to act by the 
sense o f justice specified by the conception of justice in a well-ordered society. 
What Rawls insists is that the effectiveness o f the sense o f justice should be
27 Influenced by Scanlon, the later Rawls seems to have made some change when he talks about 
the existence o f  principle-dependent desires and conception-dependent desires. See PL/.82-84.
2S For Barry’s defence for the doctrine held by Ross and Prichard, see “John Rawls and the Search 
for Stability”, p.884.
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explained in terms of its regulative role in people’s rational plans o f life. Thus, “in 
the light o f the theory o f justice we understand how the moral sentiment can be 
regulative in our life.” (TJ: 478/418 rev.)
Comparing these two accounts o f moral motivation, I intend to think that 
Barry’s view is more problematic. While Barry agrees that “our account o f the 
nature o f justice cannot be separated from the question o f motivation,” he stresses 
that the motivation for acting impartially is itself sufficient to explain why it is 
rational for agents to conform their conduct to the demands o f justice. For the 
desire to reach informed and reasonable agreement without appealing to personal 
advantage is actually widely shared. Barry therefore concludes that “what I am 
saying is that the desire to be able to justify our conduct in an impartial way is an 
original principle in human nature and one that develops under the normal 
conditions o f human life.” 29 Barry simply supposes that most o f us are 
impartialists.
But this position immediately gives rise to some difficulties. First o f all, how 
would Barry respond to those who do not share his assumption o f moral motive? 
An impartial moral motive is not simply a description o f psychological fact. It 
reflects, as Barry stresses, a fundamental commitment to the equality o f all human 
beings.30 We grant all agents equal right to choose principles o f  justice which 
cannot be reasonably rejected because we have already accepted the notion o f 
equal worth o f human beings. Justice as impartiality commands us to transcend 
our differences in social background and natural endowments, and to treat one
29 Barry, Theories o f  Justice, p.364.
30 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.8.
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another as morally equal. The reason for an agent to endorse the criterion of 
reasonable acceptability must be that he has already made a moral commitment 
that he should not enjoy any special privilege in determining what justice is. As 
Barry remarks, “only on this basis can we defend the claim that the interests and 
viewpoints o f everybody concerned must be accommodated.”31 Thus, the moral 
motive itself embodies a commitment to equality. This commitment, however, 
calls for justification. We need to know the basis o f equality, and why it is rational 
for people with different bargaining power and conceptions o f the good to adopt 
this impartial perspective. Apparently, the answer to this question is crucial to 
Barry’s project. As Mendus succinctly summarizes, the task for political 
impartialism is:
To show why those who are not themselves impartialist might 
nonetheless accept an impartialist political order, why they 
might accept it as genuinely just, and why they might concede 
that its demands take priority over the conflicting values 
endorsed by their own comprehensive conceptions o f the 
good.32
What surprises us is that Barry provides very little discussion on this 
fundamental issue. More accurately speaking, he does not bother with it. He 
simply presumes that most people are generally motivated to act from an impartial 
motive. As he says, people “are actuated solely by a motive that has force with 
almost all o f us to some degree, the desire to act in ways that can be defended to 
others.”33 But how could that be? If  it is an empirical claim, then it is far from
31 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.8.
32 Mendus, Impartiality in M oral and Political Philosophy, p j .
33 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 10.
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clear how many people actually accept this particular conception o f impartialism. 
Countless counter examples suggest that in advanced capitalist societies many 
people do not share Barry’s impartialist sentiment. Above all, no matter how 
prevalent a motive actually is, we still need a justification. In particular, we need 
an answer to the normative question as to why a rational agent has reason to be a 
liberal egalitarian. Unfortunately, Barry simply ignores this question.
Barry then could not dismiss those non-liberal egalitarians as unreasonable 
because this would put his own proposition into question. For the content o f 
reasonableness is essentially characterized by a commitment to equality. Nor can 
he say that the non-egalitarians are necessarily sexist, racist or egoist. For this 
need not be the case. After all the real challenge o f justice as impartiality comes 
from other moral theories. Take Rawls as an example. Rawls’s justice as fairness 
is regarded by Barry as the best-known, the most influential and the most fully 
developed variant o f justice as impartiality. Barry basically concurs with Rawls 
that the distribution o f natural talents and social background are arbitrary from a 
moral point o f view, and these differences should not be counted in determining 
principles o f justice. This expresses the ideal o f moral equality. Yet in the past 
three decades o f dispute about Rawls’s theory of justice, one o f the most 
controversial issues is about the desirability o f this characterisation o f egalitarian 
commitment. It has been seriously questioned by libertarianism, 
communitarianism, and Marxism among others.34
34 For example, Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Michael 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Kai 
Nielsen, Equality and Liberty  (Totowa: Rowman & Allenheld, 1985).
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If Barry wants to defend his liberal impartialism, he must offer substantive 
reasons to account for the moral basis o f equality and explain why rational people 
can have sufficient motive to commit to liberal impartiality. It is not enough to just 
presuppose that we have such a commitment and the corresponding motive. 
Barry’s strategy to disconnect the impartial motive from people’s conception of 
the good makes this task particularly difficult. The reason is that if  impartial 
motivation has no positive connection with people’s plans o f life, it is hard to 
explain why rational people should be convinced o f justice as impartiality, 
especially when the moral demand is in deep conflict with people’s conceptions o f 
the good. Therefore, when Barry distances himself from justice as mutual 
advantage by emphasizing the independence o f the moral motive, he also cuts the 
sense o f justice off from our conceptions o f the good. When being challenged by 
non-impartialists, Barry may say: “you either take it or leave it.” But this is 
exactly what Rawls’s dissatisfaction with the doctrine o f the purely conscientious 
act expresses, namely that “the sense o f right lacks any apparent reason.” 
(TJ:478/418 rev.)
Barry is aware o f this problem. He thus develops another way to defend 
himself by saying that:
The basis o f justice is institutional, I have argued, and 
institutions normally deploy sanctions to provide an additional 
motive for compliance. It is not, therefore, necessary that 
everyone should be moved by a sense o f justice so long as the 
gap can be filled by deliberately created incentives for 
compliance.35
35 Barry, Theories o f  Justice, p.366.
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But this response is o f little help. For if we accept this solution, it is 
equivalent to conceding that justice as impartiality cannot be justified to those 
who lack the impartial motive in the first place. Barry’s recourse to sanction as an 
additional motive for compliance may to some extent resolve the problem of 
social stability at the practical level, but it does nothing to settle the problem of 
moral stability at the justificatory level. It can only apply to those who have 
already accepted the liberal conception of equality. This argument is too limited to 
justify impartialism to free and rational agents.
Now, for the sake o f argument, suppose Barry is right that many people do 
have a desire to act impartially, the story still does not end. For he needs to show 
how this moral motive can be overriding. That a person has a reason to commit to 
impartiality does not mean that it can necessarily take priority over other desires. 
The impartial motive is only one o f the motives in people’s subjective 
motivational set. Granted that we accept the primacy of justice as a theoretical 
requirement, the motivational priority of justice is a substantive one. There is no 
guarantee that simply in virtue o f the role o f justice, a conception of justice 
necessarily takes precedence over other conflicting interests. This brings us back 
to the primary question of moral stability. This is the claim that “the stability o f a 
conception of justice depends upon a balance of motives: the sense of justice that 
it cultivates and the aims that it encourages must normally win out against 
propensities toward injustice.” (TJ:454/398 rev.)
We see that Rawls acknowledges the tension of different motives and seeks a 
way to resolve it. This is not a practical issue about how to ensure compliance 
after the political principles have been justified. Instead, the question at issue is
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about justification itself. If the justification of justice, as Barry himself recognizes, 
is inseparable from the problem of motivation, then the priority o f moral motive is 
a prerequisite for the priority of justice as impartiality. Unfortunately, Barry does 
not offer any substantive argument for this crucial issue. He simply takes it for 
granted:
Self-interest cannot be expected to bring about just institutions 
in general, so it is crucial that the sense o f justice should 
operate there [justification of principles o f justice]. Fortunately, 
all that is often necessary is that those whose own interests are 
not directly affected should support the course o f impartial 
justice. 36
However, this account is truly puzzling. On the one hand, Barry agrees that 
the sense o f justice must be the regulative motive in justification; on the other 
hand, he claims that for this purpose it is enough if  those whose interests have no 
direct conflict with impartial justice will endorse the priority o f the sense of 
justice. But this response does not answer the question at all. The problem of 
motivational priority becomes an issue because there is a conflict between moral 
motive and self-regarding desires. As Mendus rightly describes the problem, the 
real question posed to moral impartialism is:
Expressed in the agent’s self-directed question ‘why should I 
act on the motivation to do what impartial morality dictates 
rather than on the motivation to act partially?’ Since this 
question arises even (indeed especially) for those who accept 
the importance o f impartial demands, it forces us to consider 
the source and extent o f impartialism’s motivational power.37
36 Barry, Theories o f  Justice, p.366.
37 Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, p.3.
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The implication o f the preceding analysis is that the problem of moral 
stability is not a peculiar issue only inherent in Rawls’s theory. It is a normative 
question that every political theory needs to answer. Barry, contrary to Mendus’s 
interpretation, does acknowledge the importance of this question. Nevertheless, 
his solution fails because he simply presupposes the priority o f impartial motives 
rather than justifies it. Rawls’s solution in A Theory o f  Justice, on the contrary, is 
to attempt to link up the moral motive with the conception o f  the good. To justify 
the motivational priority o f justice as fairness, Rawls believes that the sense o f 
justice must be defended as a regulative good in every rational agent’s rational 
plan o f life. As he expressly states,
If  within the thin theory it turns out that having a sense o f 
justice is indeed a good, then a well-ordered society is as stable 
as one can hope for. Not only does it generate its own 
supportive moral attitudes, but these attitudes are desirable 
from  the standpoint o f  rational persons who have them when 
they assess their situation independently from the constraints o f  
justice. This match between justice and goodness I refer to as 
congruence. (398-399/350 rev., my emphasis)
For Rawls, the source of moral motive is not something alienated from our 
good. Rather, it is desirable because it can be understood as a higher-order 
regulative good from our first-person rational standpoint. This congruence 
approach matches very well with the idea o f prudential rationality, that is, rational 
persons have sufficient reasons to act in accordance with the principles o f justice 
because the action itself is the most effective way to promote our fundamental 
interest.
If  we accept the congruence argument as essential to Rawls’s project, it
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creates a strong tension with a powerful interpretation o f Rawls’s theory as a form 
o f Kantian deontological theory which holds that the right is justified in a way that 
does not depend on any particular vision o f the good. The primacy o f justice 
entails liberal neutrality among conceptions o f the good. This view has been most 
famously presented and strongly attacked by Sandel in his seminal work 
Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice. The tension is that i f  congruence is a 
necessary condition for moral stability, and moral stability is in turn a necessary 
condition for the justification o f a conception o f justice, then the motivational 
priority o f the right is inseparable from the good. But for Sandel, this is what 
deontological liberalism squarely opposes. In the following, I will show that 
Sandel’s critique is flawed.
6 Deontological Liberalism and Stability
Let me first explain Sandel’s main thesis. Sandel holds that Rawls’s theory is 
a type o f deontological liberalism. Its core thesis is the primacy o f justice, which 
can be understood in two different but related ways. In its moral sense, the 
demands o f justice outweigh other values. Justice is perceived as the first virtue of 
social institutions. According to this view, “justice is not merely one value among 
others, to be weighted and considered as the occasion arises, but the highest o f all 
social virtues, the one that must be met before others can make their claims.”38 
The claim of justice is overriding. In Rawls’s context, it means that the two 
principles o f justice have absolute priority over our aims, interests, and 
conceptions o f the good in case o f conflict.
38 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice, p.2.
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How can the moral priority o f justice be justified? If  the foundation o f justice 
depends on any particular vision of the good, the proposition that the right has 
priority over the good will hardly be solid. Sandel thus further asserts that the 
primacy of justice implicates a foundational sense which describes “a form of 
justification in which first principles are derived in a way that does not presuppose 
any final human purposes or ends, nor any determinate conception o f the human 
good.”39 Justification o f justice must be neutral among conceptions o f the good.40 
In Sandel’s view, it is this second-order, foundational sense o f primacy that 
distinguishes Rawls’s deontological liberalism from other theories o f justice, 
which in turn leads Rawls to endorse an unencumbered conception of the self. 
Sandel’s whole critique o f Rawls is based on the implausibility and undesirability 
o f this radically unsituated self.
If we follow this interpretation, how would deontological liberalism account 
for the importance o f moral stability and Rawls’s congruence argument? If the 
grounds o f justice are completely detached from human good, where does the 
moral motive originate from when people go back to their real lives? Our 
discussion above has clearly shown that Rawls takes these questions seriously and 
proposes the congruence argument to deal with them. For Rawls, to justify the 
motivational priority of the sense o f justice, the right must be in some way related 
to our good. The motive to act justly is not something independent o f our 
subjective motivational set. Otherwise, agents will lack incentive to endorse the
39 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice, p.3.
40 Rawls him self has never used the term “neutrality’* in 77. But in PL, he discusses different ways 
o f  neutrality and says that his political conception o f  justice is a form o f neutrality o f  aim. See PL, 
pp.l 90-94 for detailed discussion.
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priority of justice.
Sandel owes us an account how his interpretation can make sense o f Rawls’s 
unfailing pursuit o f moral stability throughout his philosophical life. Quite 
surprisingly, Sandel has entirely set aside this important question from his 
discussion. He pays almost no attention to this problem in his book-length critique 
o f Rawls in spite of Rawls’s explicit claim that the whole discussion of Part Three 
o f A Theory o f  Justice is “to prepare the way to settle the question o f stability and 
congruence.” (TJ:395/347 rev.) There are even no entries for “stability” and 
“congruence” in the index o f his work while Sandel quotes heavily from Part 
Three to justify his critique o f Rawls. A reader o f Sandel who has never read A 
Theory o f  Justice may mistakenly think that the problem of stability is not an issue 
at all in Rawls’s theory.
There are several possible explanations for this peculiarity. Sandel may argue 
that the problem o f stability has no importance in justice as fairness. This is 
simply wrong, though, because Rawls makes it clear that stability is a desirable 
feature o f moral conception. “However attractive a conception o f justice might be 
on other grounds, it is seriously defective if  the principles of moral psychology are 
such that it fails to engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it.” 
(TJ: 455/398 rev.) As will be expounded in the next chapter, the concern for 
stability in fact plays an important role in deriving the two principles o f justice in 
the original position. Sandel has no excuse for overlooking this important issue.
Sandel’s second reply might be that the moral primacy o f  justice has already 
entailed the motivational priority o f justice. I f  the principles o f justice are fully
92
justified in the original position, we can then say that it is most reasonable and 
rational for us to act in accordance with them. Moral priority implies motivational 
priority. Justice must trump other values should conflict arise. Therefore, certain 
people’s lack of effective sense o f justice would not affect the integrity o f justice. 
The problem of stability then has no independent moral status.
This explanation is untenable. It is at least not Rawls’s own view. First o f all, 
this account faces a similar problem to Barry’s. The original position undoubtedly 
represents an impartial perspective. It models a conception o f free and equal moral 
persons in the hypothetical contractual situation. But when the veil is lifted and 
people are back to reality, the question o f motivational priority will arise. The 
claim of the primacy o f justice does not entail the priority o f moral motivation. 
For the former is a formal requirement about the role o f justice in social 
cooperation, while the latter requires a substantive account o f how the sense of 
justice is related to our good.
Sandel might retort that as the problem of stability arises only after the veil 
o f ignorance is lifted, it has no place in justification because the principles have 
already been fully justified in the original position. But this is not Rawls’s view. 
The later Rawls particularly stresses that there are two stages in the justification of 
justice as fairness. Though stability arises only at the second stage, “the argument 
for the principles o f justice is not complete until the principles selected in first part 
are shown in the second part to be sufficiently stable.” (PL: 141, footnote 7) 
Justification must take the second stage into account.41
41 In the next chapter, I will argue that this two-stage justificatory structure has already existed in 
A Theory o f  Justice.
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I believe that the only possible explanation for Sandel’s overlooking of the 
stability problem is that it would pose a challenge to his interpretation o f Rawls as 
a deontological liberal holding an implausible account of an unencumbered self. 
To make his charge coherent and consistent, Sandel cannot but argue that the 
justification o f  justice as fairness has no connection to the human good and the 
priority o f motivation. Not doing so would seriously weaken his central thesis. My 
analysis, however, shows that this is not a sympathetic and faithful interpretation 
o f Rawls.
My response to Sandel would, however, create some internal problems. If  
Rawls’s justification has a two-stage structure, what is the proper relation between 
these two stages? If  the first stage justification in the original position has 
excluded any knowledge about people’s particular conception o f the good, how 
can congruence succeed in the second stage? These questions must be answered. 
And when they are, we will have a different picture o f justice as fairness. I will 
assume this task in the next chapter.
94
CHAPTER 3 
THE PLACE OF STABILITY
In the preceding chapter, I have argued that the idea o f moral stability, being 
characterized as the pursuit o f the motivational priority of justice, is essential to 
justification. This chapter will take one more step in investigating the place o f 
stability in justice as fairness. I will focus particularly on the role o f stability 
played respectively in the two stages o f justification.
To anticipate my argument, I am going to make three major claims. First, I 
argue that stability is one o f the main grounds for the principles o f justice in the 
first stage. The concern o f moral motivation has direct bearing on the choice of 
principles in the original position. It is misleading for Rawls to say that stability is 
only a matter concerning the feasibility o f the second stage. Second, I contend that 
the real force moving the parties in the original position to adopt the maximin rule 
actually results from moral considerations. The deliberation o f parties in the 
original position must be guided by moral reasons if  we expect them to adopt the 
maximin rule. The idea o f grounding justification on the rational choice o f 
self-interested persons therefore cannot account for the desirability of Rawls’s 
principles. Finally, I argue that the second stage is also indispensable to the 
justification of Rawls’s principles of justice. Nevertheless, the argument in this 
stage is not to confirm the feasibility o f principles o f justice derived from the first 
stage as Rawls suggests, but to justify the overridingness of moral motivation over 
other desires which cannot be fully answered in the first stage.
With these arguments, I further affirm my claim that moral stability occupies
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a central place in both stages o f justice as fairness. The concern for motivational 
priority is integral to moral justification. The structure of this chapter is as follows. 
In Section 1, I will present an account o f the place o f stability in Rawls’s theory, 
and then refute a representative interpretation proposed by Freeman. This sets the 
background for the development o f my own account. Section 2 will examine 
Rawls’s claim that stability is limited to the second stage because o f the concern 
about envy and special psychologies. I will show that Rawls’s true intention in 
doing so is to produce an ideal environment for rational choice so that his 
principles can be presented as a result o f consent by following the maximin rule. 
The maximin rule is the kernel o f Rawls’s contract theory. This leads us to 
conduct a more thorough examination o f the nature o f contractarianism in Section 
3, where I argue that Rawls’s theory involves two models o f justification, namely 
the reasonable model and the rational model. But since Rawls holds that the 
reasonable is prior to the rational, justice as fairness can hardly be described as a 
contract theory unless the maximin rule itself is an object o f  rational choice by 
mutually disinterested persons. However, there are no decisive arguments for the 
parties to prefer the maximin rule to the principle o f insufficient reason. The 
justification for Rawls’s principles is then open to doubt. To avoid this 
predicament, I suggest that we should endorse a moral argument for the maximin 
rule. The parties are moved by moral reasons rather than egoistic ones to favour 
the conservative decision rule. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to validating this 
rather unusual claim. Section 4 focuses on the lexical priority o f basic liberties 
while Section 5 concentrates on the strains o f commitment and stability. Against 
this background I can finally confirm that stability has already played an 
important role in the first stage in justifying the principles o f justice. Once the first
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stage argument is settled, Section 6 turns to discuss the second stage, in which I 
explain why the second stage o f stability is integral to justification. The last 
section is a conclusion.
1 Two-Stage Justification
This section will first present Rawls’s account o f the place o f stability in his 
theory, and then refute a popular interpretation suggested by Freeman. The 
discussion will set the background for our pursuit o f an alternative interpretation 
o f the status o f stability.
In section 76 o f A Theory o f  Justice entitled “the Problem of Relative 
Stability”, Rawls draws an important conclusion after a lengthy comparison 
between justice as fairness and utilitarianism as follows:
These remarks are not intended as justifying reasons for the 
contract view. The main grounds for the principles o f justice 
have already been presented. At this point we are simply 
checking whether the conception already adopted is a feasible 
one and not so unstable that some other choice might be better.
(TJ: 504/441 rev., my emphasis)
Furthermore, in the last section o f A Theory o f  Justice, Rawls explains that 
his theory consists o f three parts, each of which is intended to fulfil a specific 
purpose. The first part presents a theoretical structure o f the original position from 
which a conception o f justice for the basic structure is derived. Rawls’s principles 
of justice are chosen unanimously by rational parties there. The second part 
discusses what sorts o f social and political institutions should be established to 
fulfil the requirements o f justice, and in what way they match our considered
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judgments better than other rival theories. Finally, the third part is set to check 
whether justice as fairness is a feasible conception. Rawls says:
This forced us to raise the question o f stability and whether the 
right and the good as defined are congruent. These 
considerations do not determine the initial acknowledgement o f  
principles in the first part o f  the argument, but confirm it.” 
(TJ:580/508 rev., my emphasis)
The quotation above gives us an impression that stability is solely concerned 
with the feasibility o f a conception o f justice that has already been independently 
justified on other grounds. The function o f stability is to confirm rather than to 
justify a conception o f justice. In light o f this view, the consideration o f stability 
has no relevance to the justification o f principles o f justice. This impression is 
further strengthened when the later Rawls explains that his theory is divided into 
two stages, and stability is an issue that would only be taken up in the second 
stage. As he states:
Justice as fairness is best presented in two stages. In the first 
stage it is worked out as a freestanding political (but o f course 
moral) conception for the basic structure of society. Only with 
this done and its content— its principles of justice and 
ideals—provisionally on hand do we take up, in the second 
stage, the problem whether justice as fairness is sufficiently 
stable. (PL: 140-41)
This two-stage structure is not a novel idea. It has been repeatedly mentioned 
throughout Rawls’s works.1 The first stage is responsible for working out the
1 For example, see TJ:144/124 rev., 504/441 rev., 530-31/465 rev.; also see Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness: a Restatement (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp.88, 181.
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conception o f justice while the second stage deals with the problem o f stability as 
feasibility. As justification is the first task of political philosophy, stability is 
naturally a secondary issue no matter how important it might be in other respects. 
If we accept this widely held interpretation, explaining why stability is essential to 
justification would be highly problematic.2
But why should stability be limited to the second stage? Freeman provides a 
ready explanation. He suggests that if  social stability is introduced into the first 
stage and we view it as the primary subject o f justice, justice as fairness would 
risk becoming a Hobbesian conception o f justice as mutual advantage. This needs 
explanation. Freeman believes that concern for social stability is a common 
feature of the contractarian tradition. But Hobbes is different from Locke, 
Rousseau and Kant in the sense that he conceives of social stability as the primary 
subject o f justice. “A just society for Hobbes is nearly identifiable with a stable 
social order.”3 Thus, the content o f justice is defined by those norms and 
institutions that can most effectively achieve a stable social order. Moreover, these 
norms are achieved as the result o f a practical compromise among essentially 
self-interested persons. Rawls, following the track of Kant, holds a different view. 
He does not view stability as the first goal o f political justice. For the concern of 
social order alone is insufficient to account for a reasonable moral point o f view. 
As Freeman puts it, ‘"by itself a stable social order, however rational it may be, can 
be o f little moral consequence if  it does not rectify but only perpetuates gross
2 I have examined this issue in Chapter One.
3 Samuel Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls edited by Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.278.
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injustice.”4 Introducing stability to the first stage would compromise the integrity 
o f moral principles. For social stability is not a moral consideration. Freeman thus 
concludes that “a conception o f justice should be worked out beforehand by 
relying on independent moral considerations. Then the question of its stability is 
raised to test the feasibility o f a just society conceived along the lines o f this 
conception.”5 This account seems to perfectly explain why stability should be 
limited to the second stage.
I believe Freeman’s explanation is flawed. First, Freeman’s account is based 
on a wrong assumption that stability only refers to social stability. He fails to 
notice that there is a distinction between social stability and moral stability, and it 
is the latter that concerns Rawls. Once we define the priority o f  moral motivation 
as the first task o f stability, Freeman’s worry can be settled. For Rawls’s 
conception o f stability is itself a serious moral concern. It is an inherent moral 
requirement for a conception o f justice to demonstrate its ability to motivate 
people to act on justice. It is not a purely practical matter at all. Thus there is no 
principled reason why stability must be excluded from justification.
Secondly, Freeman’s account cannot sufficiently explain Rawls’s claim that 
stability is fundamental to political philosophy. If it is merely a practical issue 
concerning how to enforce principles in society effectively, there is no need for 
Rawls to make a philosophical turn to political liberalism. He can simply search 
for some more effective means o f persuasion or enforcement to realize the 
principles independently justified. An unsatisfactory argument for stability in the
4 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f Justice,” p.278.
5 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice,” p.279, my emphasis.
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second stage can hardly be the main cause forcing Rawls to reformulate his 
philosophical argument o f the first stage. Freeman is aware of this explanatory 
difficulty. He clarifies that what Rawls pursues is stability for the right reasons, 
not stability per se.b As Rawls himself expounds, “finding a stable conception is 
not simply a matter o f avoiding futility. Rather, what counts is the kind o f stability, 
the nature o f the forces that secure it.” (PL: 142) Rawls is only interested in a 
particular kind o f stability which must result from citizens’ effective sense o f 
justice. But if  so, it confirms my claim that Rawls’s conception of stability as a 
moral ideal will not compromise the integrity o f political justice even if it is 
introduced into the first stage.
Lastly, Rawls makes it clear that arguments in the second stage are part o f 
justification. Unless a conception o f justice is shown to be stable in the second 
stage, “it is not a satisfactory political conception of justice and it must be in some 
ways revised.” (PL: 141, footnote 7) Besides, in a reply to Habermas’s query about 
whether stability can add anything to the justification of a conception o f justice, 
Rawls also states that “there is, then, no public justification for political society 
without a reasonable overlapping consensus, and such a justification also connects 
with the ideas o f stability for the right reasons as well as o f legitimacy.” 
(PL:388-89) It shows that stability plays an important role in justification. We 
have no reason to believe that Rawls’s restricting stability to the second stage is 
simply for practical considerations.
Why should stability be left to the second stage then? This is a puzzling
6 Freeman, "‘'Congruence and the Good o f  Justice,” p.279.
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question. If  we concur with Rawls that stability is essential to justification, it is 
not clear why it should be ruled out from the first stage. To resolve this puzzle, we 
need to have a better understanding o f Rawls’s intention o f dividing his theory 
into two stages.
2 Special Psychologies and Rational Choice
To begin with, we need to know what exactly the first stage refers to. 
According to Rawls, the first stage “gives the principles o f justice that specify the 
fair terms o f cooperation among citizens and specify when a society’s basic 
institutions are just.” (PL: 133; also see PL:64) Moreover, “these two stages 
correspond to the two parts o f the argument from the original position for the two 
principles o f justice in Theory. In the first part the parties select principles without 
taking into account the effects o f the special psychologies.” (PL: 140, footnote 7) 
This shows that the first stage refers to the original position in which principles of 
justice are chosen by rational parties behind the veil o f ignorance. From a 
contractarian point o f view, a conception o f justice is more justifiable than another 
if it is chosen by mutually disinterested rational parties.
Details o f the first-stage need not concern us for the moment. The thrust is 
whether stability is one o f the considerations affecting the parties’ rational 
decision making. If yes, we could say that it does provide justification for Rawls’s 
principles in the first stage. The answer looks evident. In section 29 o f A Theory o f  
Justice under the heading o f “the Main Grounds for the Two Principles of 
Justice,” Rawls makes it clear that stability, together with the strains o f 
commitment and self-respect, constitute the main grounds for rational parties to
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favour justice as fairness. These factors “help to show that the two principles are 
an adequate minimum conception o f justice in a situation o f great uncertainty.” 
(TJ: 175/153 rev.) With regard to the specific role o f stability, Rawls tells us that “a 
strong point in favour o f a conception of justice is that it generates its own 
support.” (TJ: 177/154 rev.) Later on, this claim becomes even more explicit when 
Rawls states that “other things being equal, the persons in the original position 
will adopt the more stable scheme o f principles.” (TJ:455/398 rev.) This shows 
that stability is indeed an essential criterion to guide parties to compare and 
choose among conceptions o f justice rather than merely confirm a specific 
conception that would have been consented to in advance. Rawls’s claim that 
stability has no place in the first stage is inconsistent with this account.
Rawls replies that this reading has misunderstood the true nature of the 
two-stage procedure in his theory. He explains that the question o f stability is 
concerned with the possible effect o f special psychologies on the conception o f 
justice, an issue which will only be brought to light in the second stage. Owing to 
the importance of this issue, let me quote a paragraph at length in which the later 
Rawls gives a clear account o f this issue:
We split the argument from the original position into two parts.
In the first part, in which the principles o f justice are 
provisionally chosen, the parties assume that the persons they 
represent are not moved by the special psychologies (or 
attitudes), as we called them. That is, the parties ignore persons’ 
inclinations to be envious or spiteful, or to have a will to 
dominate or a tendency to be submissive, or to be peculiarly 
averse to uncertainty and risk...The second part of the argument 
concerns the question o f the stability o f justice as fairness...
Together with the discussion of the special psychologies, the
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second part must take up the question whether in view of the 
general facts that characterize a democracy’s political culture, 
and in particular the fact of reasonable pluralism, the political 
conception can be the focus o f an overlapping consensus. We 
will consider how the question of stability leads to the idea of 
an overlapping consensus on a political conception o f justice.7
Several points on this account are noteworthy. First o f all, the main reason 
for dividing justice as fairness into two parts stems from Rawls’s concern for 
special psychologies, especially the problems of envy and attitudes toward risk. In 
the first part the principles are derived on the supposition that these inclinations 
do not exist. The parties are mutually disinterested and their reasoning is not 
affected by envy or risk aversion. Since stability is set to check whether principles 
can be effectively applied to the basic structure without arousing envies to such a 
degree that social system becomes unworkable in the second stage, it plays no role 
in the first stage. This is not because doing so will lead to a Hobbesian conception 
of justice, but because the circumstance o f  stability, by definition, does not exist in 
the first stage. It is nothing more than a normative division o f labour to deal with 
different issues o f political justification.
Furthermore, the question o f the overridingness o f the sense o f justice is also 
raised in this stage. It leads to the idea of an overlapping consensus. But we must 
note that this issue is different from the concern for special psychologies. A 
conception o f justice, which may reduce people’s envious attitude towards others, 
does not necessarily result in an overlapping consensus. For they address
7 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a Restatement ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 180-81. An almost identical account o f  the two-stage structure, except 
the idea o f  an overlapping consensus, can also be found in TJ: 144/124 rev., 504/441 rev., 
530-31/465 rev..
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essentially different issues. The former is to ask whether a well-ordered society 
regulated by a political conception will generate envy and other attitudes 
unfavorable to cooperation. The latter is concerned with the motivational priority 
of justice in a society o f reasonable pluralism, to wit, how the sense o f justice can 
be accepted by citizens as the regulative desire for their other interests resulting 
from their comprehensive doctrines. Bearing this distinction in mind is crucial 
when we assess how stability makes an influence on justice as fairness.
Now we can return to the question o f why stability is excluded from the first 
stage. This section will only focus on special psychologies. An apparent reason is 
that Rawls does not want envy and risk aversion to affect the parties’ rational 
deliberation. Their sole motive is assumed to that of advancing their conceptions 
of the good by winning for themselves the highest index o f primary social goods. 
They have no interest in comparing their position with others. They do not “seek 
to maximize or minimize the difference between their success, and those of 
others” (TJ: 144-45/125 rev.) Furthermore, as the parties are devoid o f any special 
inclination toward risk, it is therefore rational to adopt the maximin rule as the 
criterion o f rational decision making. They will select the conception whose worst 
outcome is superior to the worst outcome of any other alternative.
The exclusion of special psychologies seems to be closely related to the use 
o f rational choice theory. There are two kinds o f reasons. The first kind is a moral 
one. Rawls explains that if  envy and knowledge o f special psychologies were 
known to the parties, their choice would be affected by accidental contingencies. 
These contingencies should be avoided because they are generally regarded as 
morally undesirable. “The principles adopted should be invariant with respect to
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variations in these inclinations for the same reason that we want them to hold 
irrespective o f individual preferences and social circumstances.” (TJ:530/464-465 
rev.) In other words, they are as morally arbitrary as the differences in natural 
talents and social background. Excluding them from the original position can 
ensure that the agreement is made under reasonable conditions.
Nevertheless, this analogy is problematic. It is understandable that in justice 
as fairness the parties are not allowed to know their place in society or their 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets, for otherwise the ideals o f fairness and 
equality would be compromised. Envy as a psychological inclination does not 
have such negative impact on the parties though. It will not affect the persons’ 
equal status in the original position. Besides, if  envy is arbitrary, so would be the 
assumption o f mutual disinterest. From a moral point of view, it is not clear why 
the latter assumption would be any less arbitrary. So it is doubtful whether the 
exclusion of stability from the first stage can be ascribed to moral considerations.
More importantly, Rawls admits that the problem of envy should not be set 
aside and have its possible implication for a conception of justice neglected. For 
“these inclinations do exist and in some way they must be reckoned with.” 
(TJ:530/465 rev.) What Rawls does is to leave the problem to the second stage 
rather than eliminate the issue entirely from his theory. He even says that if the 
conception o f justice adopted in the first stage is found to arouse envy to such an 
extent that it brings social cooperation to its knees, then “the adoption o f the 
conception o f justice must be reconsidered.” (TJ:531/465 rev.) This indicates that 
Rawls’s treatment o f special psychologies is entirely different from his attitude 
toward the arbitrary distribution o f natural endowments and social positions. Any
moral objection based on the analogy would not be well grounded.
Rawls’s second explanation is that the absence of special psychologies can 
provide an ideal environment for rational choice theory. For it can largely simplify 
the contractual situation and ensure that every person is fully rational in the 
original position. It is thus necessary that “the parties are not swayed by individual 
differences in these propensities, thereby avoiding the complications in the 
bargaining process that would result.” (TJ:530/465 rev.) This is undeniably right. 
If  the parties are moved by different motives, it is almost impossible to reach any 
rational agreement on a conception o f justice. But why should simplification per  
se be such a strong reason to exclude special psychologies from the first stage? 
After all, what we search for is right principles. According to Rawls, however, the 
right principles are exactly those that could be unanimously consented to. 
Excluding “irrational” motives from the first stage is to ensure that the parties 
make their choice as fully rationally as possible. This is crucial because from a 
contractarian point o f view, the question o f justification is settled only if  the 
principles are the result o f collective rational choice. Since envy and risk aversion 
are inimical to rational reasoning, they are therefore kept out o f the first stage. I 
believe this is the major reason for the two-stage design.
Let me elaborate this point a bit further. The basic assumption o f rational 
choice theory is that people are rational. Rationality refers to economic rationality 
which means that a decision is rational if and only if  it is the most effective means 
to realize one’s informed end. It is sometimes also called means-end rationality. 
The end could be a person’s interest, aims, or plan o f life. Since the parties behind 
the veil o f ignorance do not know their conceptions o f the good, their common
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goal is to secure as much primary social goods as possible. Moreover, the parties 
are mutually disinterested in one another’s ends. They are presumed to be 
self-interested maximizers under the constraint o f the original position. As Rawls 
puts it, “the persons in the original position are rational. In choosing between 
principles each tries as best he can to advance his interests.’ (TJ: 142/123 rev.)8 
This assumption o f human motive warrants that principles o f justice will be the 
result o f rational choice.9 In other words, the parties are not moved by 
benevolence. This is not only because benevolence is too demanding or too strong 
as a proper condition for the original position, but also because it would be 
incompatible with the use o f rational choice theory.
Similarly, rational persons are presumed to be free from envy. By definition, 
envy is the propensity to view with hostility the greater advantages o f others even 
though doing this may require us to give up something ourselves. Moreover, when 
other people aware o f our envy, they may take a hostile attitude toward us. As a 
result, “envy is collectively disadvantageous: the individual who envies another is 
prepared to do things that make them both worse off.” (TJ:532/466 rev.) Acting 
out of envy is therefore irrational from the point of view of means-end rationality. 
If  envy was allowed to exist in the first stage, it would complicate the situation of 
rational bargaining and put the possibility o f unanimous consent at risk.
The argument above begs a question: even if the parties are rational, how can 
it be guaranteed that they will prefer Rawls’s principles to other alternatives, in
8 The second sentence o f  the citation is deleted from the revised edition.
9 It is artificial because Rawls says that “the motivation o f  the persons in the original position 
must not be confused with the motivation o f  persons in everyday life who accept the principles 
that would be chosen and who have the corresponding sense o f  justice.” (TJ: 148/128 rev.)
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particular, the principle o f average utility? After all, Rawls admits that if  the 
parties behind the veil o f ignorance adopt the principle o f insufficient reason 
which assigns the same likelihood to all possible positions, it is quite natural for 
the parties to choose the principle o f average utility. (TJ: 165-6/143 rev.) Although 
it is riskier to reject Rawls’s principles in favour o f the principle o f average utility, 
the parties may have a greater chance to gain more benefits should they have no 
aversion to risk. To prevent this, Rawls argues that it is most rational for the 
parties to adopt the maximin rule to guide their choice in the original position. In 
order to achieve this end, no knowledge o f risk is available to the parties. “The 
essential thing is not to allow the principles chosen to depend on special attitudes 
toward risk. For this reason the veil o f ignorance also rules out the knowledge o f 
these inclinations: the parties do not know whether or not they have a 
characteristic aversion to taking chances.” (TJ: 172/149 rev.)
But Rawls seems to be self-defeating here. Does the maximin rule itself not 
reflect a special conservative attitude toward risk? On what grounds should the 
parties be prohibited from the knowledge o f probabilities? In response, Rawls 
admits that the maximin rule is unusual and its application is only rational given 
the unique features o f the original position. (TJ:172/149 rev., emphasis added) We 
now know that the parties’ decision considerably hinges on the plausibility o f 
those unique features. They determine the use of the maximin rule, which in turn 
determines Rawls’s principles to be collectively chosen. The maximin rule plays 
the most important role in justifying Rawls’s principles o f justice. So in the 
coming sections our discussion will revolve around the maximin rule. As the 
discussion proceeds, the role o f stability in Rawls’s justificatory framework will 
gradually become clear. In the next section I will first make an objection to
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Rawls’s own claim that justice as fairness is essentially a social contract theory. 
This objection will carve out some space for my more critical claim that the 
maximin rule actually presupposes a moral argument.
3 The Rational and the Reasonable
It should now be clear that the main reason to exclude special psychologies 
from the first stage stems from Rawls’s belief that rational choice theory is 
indispensable to moral justification. “In a contract theory all arguments, strictly 
speaking, are to be made in terms of what it would be rational to agree to in the 
original position.” (TJ.75/65 rev.) Furthermore, “the theory o f justice is a part, 
perhaps the most significant part, o f the theory o f rational choice.” (T J: 16/15 rev.) 
The question is how Rawls can ensure that his principles would be chosen by the 
autonomous parties. There seems to be a tension between respecting the parties’ 
voluntary choice and deriving the expected principles. On the one hand, Rawls 
purports to present his principles as a result o f consent. In that case, its outcome is 
dependent on the contractors’ rational agreement, but not subject to Rawls’s own 
preference. A certain degree o f indeterminacy is then inevitable. For if  the 
principles are strictly pre-determined by the constraint of the contractual situation, 
the idea o f consent would be redundant. One o f the attractions o f contract theory 
is that it expresses a message o f respect for the autonomy and plurality of 
individuals. As Rawls states, “the merit o f the contract terminology is that it 
conveys the idea that principles o f justice may be conceived as principles that 
would be chosen by rational persons, and that in this way conceptions o f justice
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may be explained and justified.” (TJ: 16/14-15 rev.)10 On the other hand, Rawls 
needs to take every necessary measure to ensure that his preferred principles 
would be the most rational candidates for adoption from the parties’ point o f view. 
To accomplish this, Rawls strives to provide a liberal egalitarian interpretation of 
the original position which best expresses the reasonable conditions imposed on 
the choice o f principles. Rawls’s hope is that the conditions can decisively lead 
the parties to choose his principles o f justice. In his words, “the acknowledgement 
is the only choice consistent with the full description o f the original position.” (TJ: 
121/104 rev.)
How to resolve this tension becomes a big issue for Rawls. The clue lies in 
justifying the maximin rule. If Rawls can show that the original position indeed 
allows room for the deliberation o f different alternatives while the maximin rule is 
the only rational rule for decision making that eventually leads to his principles, 
then Rawls may achieve both ends without compromising his ideal o f 
contractarianism. This is by no means an easy task, given that the tension reflects 
two different models o f justification.
The first model is the application of rational choice theory to moral 
justification. Let us call it the Rational Model. According to Rawls, “in a contract 
theory all arguments, strictly speaking, are to be made in terms o f what it would 
be rational to choose in the original position.” (TJ: 75/65 rev.) Rational choice 
defines what justice is. But if justice is presented as an agreement of
10 O f course I understand that this is a hypothetical rather than an actual contract. What is 
important is that as a contract theory, the decision o f  the parties must be presented as an 
autonomous choice made from their first-person point o f  view.
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self-interested rational choosers, it gives readers a strong impression that it is a 
version of justice as mutual advantage. For there is no motivating force to appeal 
to but one’s self-interest in acquiring the greatest amount of primary social goods. 
The rule for choosing a conception of justice is that it best advances each person’s 
interest."
Rawls however clarifies that this is not an accurate description of justice as 
fairness. This impression merely results from looking at but one o f the elements o f 
the original position. A proper understanding o f justice as fairness should also take 
other conditions into account, especially the veil o f  ignorance which embodies the 
ideals o f freedom and equality. The original position is an intricate design putting 
substantive moral judgments, formal conditions and general knowledge o f human 
society together so as to ensure that rational decision is made under fair conditions. 
As Rawls puts it, “one way to look at the idea o f the original position, therefore, is 
to see it as an expository device which sums up the meaning o f these conditions 
and helps us to extract their consequences.” (TJ:21/19 rev.) Viewing from this 
perspective, the justification of justice as fairness is no longer purely grounded on 
a model of rational choice for mutual advantage. For the decision-making is 
subject to a wider moral constraint which reflects our conception o f moral persons 
as free and equal. The justificatory force is ultimately derived from this 
conception o f the person rather than the rational choice of self-interested parties.
Rawls is surely right that the veil of ignorance has in effect forced every 
rational person in the original position to reason impartially and take the good o f
11 An incisive critique o f  justice as mutual advantage can be found in Barry, Justice as 
Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 28-46.
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others into account. It is not a Hobbesian model of justice based on persons’ actual 
bargaining power. This response falls short o f dispelling doubts though. Even 
under the impartial conditions, Rawls’s contract theory still requires that the 
arguments for his principles are presented as parties’ autonomous choice. From 
the parties’ rational point o f view, their choice can only be justified in terms o f its 
contribution to the advancement o f their interest. Their decision is not grounded 
on any moral consideration. In this sense, justice as fairness does not appear to 
have any big difference from justice as mutual advantage. For example, after the 
veil o f ignorance is lifted and parties’ identities are revealed, there is nothing 
morally wrong or logically inconsistent for a person to reject the principles made 
in the original position and opt for a re-negotiation that can better promote their 
interests. As Dworkin aptly points out, “the fact, therefore, that a particular choice 
is in my interest at a particular time, under conditions o f great uncertainty, is not a 
good argument for the fairness o f enforcing that choice against me later under 
conditions o f much greater knowledge.” 12 The rational choice model o f 
justification cannot explain the binding force o f political principles when people 
come back to their real life.13 This is a great challenge that a contract theory must 
answer. The later Rawls clarifies the role o f rational choice in his theory as 
follows:
These constraints are modeled in the original position and
thereby imposed on the parties: their deliberations are subject,
12 Dworkin, “The Original Position," in Reading Rawls, ed. Norma Daniels (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1975), p.20.
13 Rawls cannot say that the binding force comes from people’s hypothetical agreement because, 
as Dworkin famously points out, “a hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form o f  an actual 
contract; it is no contract at all.” “The Original Position,” in Reading Rawls, p. 18. Barry makes a 
similar critique in Justice as Impartiality, p.59.
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and subject absolutely, to the reasonable conditions the 
modeling o f which makes the original position fair. The 
Reasonable, then, is prior to the Rational, and this gives the 
priority o f  right. Thus, it was an error in TJ (and very 
misleading one) to describe a theory of justice as part o f the 
theory of rational choice, as on pp. 16 and 583...There is no 
thought o f trying to derive the content o f justice within a 
framework that uses an idea o f the rational as the sole 
normative idea.14
Rawls is well aware o f the difficulty of rational choice as the sole basis o f 
justification. His way out is to place more emphasis on the reasonable conditions 
to constrain the rational deliberation. The conditions circumscribe what 
alternatives would be put on the table for choice. More importantly, they embody 
the moral point of view. “In a contract theory, these moral conditions take the 
form o f a description o f the initial contractual situation.” (TJ: 160/138 rev.) In 
response to the question about why people should take any interest in a 
hypothetical contract, Rawls’s answer is that “the conditions embodied in the 
description o f the original position are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if  we do 
not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection.” (TJ: 
21/19 rev.)15 The main grounds for justification lie in the normative prescription 
of the original position rather than the act o f rational agreement. This is another 
model o f justification which places the focus on the side of reasonableness. Let us 
call it the Reasonable Model.
14 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," in Collected Papers ed. Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.401, footnote 20, my emphasis. 
To be fair, the message o f “the reasonable is prior to the rational abounds in TJ (pp. 12/11 rev., 
18-19 /16-17  rev., 21 /19  rev., 120-21/104-05 rev., 446 /392  rev., 5 1 6 /453  rev., 585 /512  
rev.).
15 Rawls repeats the same answer once again at the end o f  TJ. See TJ: 587/514 rev..
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But if  the rational is absolutely subject to the reasonable, and “the 
reasonable” is justified by independent reasons in advance, how much room will 
the original position leave for the rational parties’ deliberation? When justice as 
fairness is no longer part o f the rational choice theory, to what extent can it still be 
called a contract theory? Rawls holds that as a matter of fact there is no room for 
bargaining and deliberation under the reasonable constraints indeed. For instance, 
he states that “the aim of the contract approach is to establish that taken together 
they impose significant bounds on acceptable principles o f justice. The ideal 
outcome would be that these conditions determine a unique set o f principles.” (TJ: 
18/16 rev., my emphasis) And in commenting on the nature o f his argument, 
Rawls stresses that “I should like to show that their acknowledgment is the only 
choice consistent with the full description o f the original position. The argument 
aims eventually to be strictly deductive.''’ (TJ: 121/104 rev., my emphasis) In other 
words, Rawls’s conception o f justice, which is supposed to be the result o f 
unanimous agreement o f a plurality o f rational parties, turns out to be deductively 
determined by the constraints imposed on the original position. There is actually 
no justificatory force deriving from the parties’ choice. More accurately speaking, 
the parties have little autonomy because their decisions are strictly limited by 
external constraints. Though in principle they are free to make any decisions, 
Rawls’s principles are the only candidate consistent with the description of the 
reasonable constraints.
It is then doubtful whether justice as fairness is still a contract theory. In my 
view, a contract theory should at least meet the following three criteria. First, it 
must involve at least more than one party. Second, the principles o f justice must 
be regarded as an outcome of the unforced and informed consent o f the parties.
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Third, the act of consent itself must be able to substantially account for the 
justifiability o f a conception of justice.
The contractarian nature of justice as fairness is in doubt when we consider 
these criteria. First of all, owing to the veil o f ignorance, the parties are ignorant 
of their personal identities. Their differences in social circumstances, natural 
endowment, and plans o f life are intentionally concealed so as to ensure a fair 
negotiating environment. This, in effect, renders every person identical, reasoning 
in the same way. As Rawls reveals, “we can view the choice in the original 
position from the standpoint o f one person selected at random. If  anyone after due 
reflection prefers a conception o f justice to another, then they all do, and a 
unanimous agreement can be reached.” (TJ: 139/120 rev.) Though the original 
position is presented in a contract form, the nature of argument is one-person 
reasoning. There is neither bargaining nor exchange o f views between parties. The 
picture o f a plurality o f persons coming together to deliberate a conception of 
justice for mutual advantage is an illusion. As Barry vividly describes it, “faced 
with identical information and reasoning in an identical fashion, they arrive at 
identical conclusions. We might as well talk o f computers having the same 
program and fed the same input reaching an agreement.”16 As a result, Rawls’s 
contract is a monologue rather than a dialogue.17 It therefore fails to meet the first
16 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.58.
17 It could be argued that the situation a rational contractor is confronted with is that o f  an 
indefinite number o f  similar rational beings whose interests are diametrically opposed to his own. 
His problem is how to secure the largest amount o f  primary social goods for him self in 
circumstances where there are many others with the opposed aim o f  getting all the goods for 
themselves. It is therefore incorrect to say that the situation is a monologue. This is a possible 
interpretation. However, since the most rational thing for each to do in the circumstances is the 
same, the importance o f  plurality o f  persons is reduced to a minimum degree. I am indebted to 
John Charvet for reminding me o f  this alternative interpretation.
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criterion o f a social contract theory.
Furthermore, if  the original position does not have any room for bargaining 
with others, and the so-called agreement is reduced to a one-person deliberation 
selected at random, we have reason to question whether it can be deemed an 
unforced and informed consent among individuals with different conceptions o f 
the good. This does not mean that no constraint should be imposed on a 
contractual situation. As a matter of fact, any contract theory will have its own 
description o f the initial situation, and the description will inevitably constrain the 
choices o f  individuals. But if  a description is so rigid that the result is 
predetermined and the parties have little autonomy to make their choice, it should 
hardly be viewed as a consent-based theory. In this regard, Rawls’s theory does 
not meet the second criterion either because the principles are the result o f 
reasonable constraints rather than the consent o f rational parties.
Finally, given that justice as fairness fails to satisfy the first two criteria, the 
idea o f consent can no longer be said to be essential to justification. For the 
priority o f right implies that the “consent” itself has little justificatory force. What 
ultimately matters is the reasonable conditions that substantially determine the 
content o f political principles. In case there are difficulties in passing the test o f 
rational choice, Rawls will revise the conditions o f the original position to make it 
through.
Based on the above arguments, we can reasonably question whether justice 
as fairness can be called a contract theory. Rawls’s intention is to make a proper 
division o f labour between the reasonable and the rational to justify his principles
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of justice. Both reasonableness and rationality are essential to his project. Without 
the reasonable constraint, rational choice cannot legitimize itself as a moral theory; 
without rational deliberation, the idea of contract becomes irrelevant. Although 
Rawls makes a great effort to strike a balance between them throughout his works, 
the tension remains. Plenty of textual evidence for both models can be found in TJ. 
This explains why critics often have different views about the ultimate grounds 
for the justification of justice as fairness. For example, we can easily understand 
Dworkin’s challenge that the hypothetical contract does not play any substantive 
role in justification, and Barry’s criticism that Rawls’s version o f rational choice 
theory confuses justice as mutual advantage and justice as impartiality. For 
Dworkin and Barry, the element of rational choice behind the veil o f ignorance 
can in principle be put aside without damaging the integrity o f Rawls’s core moral 
principles. What matters fundamentally are those moral reasons that define the 
reasonable conditions o f the original position. Rawls’s acknowledgement o f the 
priority o f the reasonable over the rational actually concedes that the rational 
choice theory only plays a subordinate role in the original position.
Nevertheless, having taken all these arguments into account, Rawls can make 
a final rebuttal. He could argue that the reasonable conditions o f the original 
position are only necessary, but not sufficient, premises to lead to his principles o f 
justice. It is the maximin criterion that determines the parties’ preference for 
Rawls’s difference principle. If  the rational parties did not adopt the conservative 
rule of decision making under the circumstance, Rawls’s whole construction of 
the original position would not work. So in order to ensure that the difference 
principle will be the only choice made by the rational parties, the maximin rule 
must be justified as the unique and most rational rule under that circumstance. If
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this argument succeeds, Rawls can then say that although his theory may not fully 
meet the criteria o f contract theory, the idea of rational choice theory is still 
indispensable to his theory. After all, it can demonstrate that even from a single 
person’s point of view, it is still up to the self-interested agent to decide which 
decision is more rational. Put it another way, the adoption o f the maximin rule 
itself is based on rational choice. It is at this point that some room is left to the 
rational argument. Whether this strategy works, o f course, depends upon the 
validity o f Rawls’s substantial argument for the maximin rule.
Here comes the core question: is it really necessary for the parties to adopt 
the extremely conservative maximin rule in the original position? Many critics 
disagree. For example, Harsanyi argues that it is more reasonable for the parties to 
adopt the principle of insufficient reason, which assigns the same probability to 
each possible place in a situation o f uncertainty.18 If  so, it is highly likely that the 
parties would choose the principle o f average utility rather than the difference 
principle. (TJ: 165-66/143 rev.) Rawls responds that although maximin is not a 
suitable general guide for choices under uncertainty, it is reasonable for it to be 
applied in the original position in which knowledge o f likelihood is impossible 
owing to the veil of ignorance. Nevertheless, the absence o f empirical knowledge 
o f probability does not mean that using subjective probabilities is unreasonable. 
On the contrary, using the maximin rule itself “is equivalent to assigning unity or 
near-unity probability to the possibility that one may end up as the worst-off
18 Harsanyi calls this the ‘equiprobability assumption’. “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a 
Basis for Morality," in John Rawls: Critical Assessment v o l.l, ed. Chandran Kukathas (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2003), p.223.
119
individual in society/’19 Furthermore, there is no obvious reason why the parties 
should be prohibited from having a general knowledge o f their society. After all, 
this kind of general knowledge will not affect the impartiality o f the original 
position. Rawls might say that risk aversion is another crucial factor in favour of 
the maximin rule. Yet this is the result o f excluding the knowledge o f special 
psychologies from the first stage. By the same token critics can question whether 
risk aversion itself is a consistent and rational attitude if one is ignorant o f one’s 
special attitude toward risk.
The pros and cons of the maximin rule have been extensively discussed. 
There seems no decisive reason to say that the maximin rule is the most rational 
strategy under uncertainty. The Bayesian principle o f insufficient reason appears 
to be equally plausible. Rationality itself is not strong enough to support the 
maximin rule. If so, Rawls’s whole project is at risk. Is there any other way to 
justify the maximin rule? I believe there is one. I will simply call it the moral 
argument fo r  maximin. The main idea is that the fact of giving exclusive concern 
to the worst possible outcomes under alternative conceptions o f justice expresses 
a particular moral point o f view. It is not simply an issue of rational choice under 
uncertainty, or o f psychological attitude towards risk. Rather, the parties accept 
the maximin rule because they take that moral point of view seriously. Contrary to 
Rawls’s official account, they are not moved by self-interest. They have a sense of 
justice and strive to put forward moral arguments that other free and equal beings 
can reasonably accept.
19 Harsanyi, ‘'Can the Maximin Rule Serve as a Basis for Morality?” p.225.
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At first sight the moral argument seems unbelievable. For it contradicts the 
central ideas o f contractarianism. According to the standard account, the parties 
accept the maximin rule because it is the safest rule to help them protect their 
interest under the special situation o f uncertainty. They have no incentive to take 
moral considerations into account. Moral reasons are only modelled into the 
reasonable conditions o f the original position, but not directly applied by rational 
contractors. I am well aware that my argument, if sound, would have radical 
implication for justice as fairness. It will fundamentally change the nature of 
Rawls’s theory. But there are some advantages o f this argument.
First, since the parties are led by moral reasoning, the tension between the 
reasonable and the rational will be resolved. The constraint o f the original position 
and the decision-making o f parties form a coherent whole to express the ideal of 
fair cooperation between free and equal persons. It can avoid the charge that 
justice as fairness is a variant o f the Hobbesian conception o f justice as mutual 
advantage because the parties directly appeal to moral reasons to justify their 
choice.
Secondly, this moral argument can fill another gap between people’s 
motivation in the original position and in a well-ordered society. Recall that in the 
original position the parties are presumed to be rational egoists while in the 
well-ordered society they are moved by the sense of justice. To avoid this 
motivational gap, Rawls reminds us that “the motivation of the persons in the 
original position must not be confused with the motivation o f persons in everyday 
life who accept the principles that would be chosen and who have the 
corresponding sense o f justice.” (TJ: 148/128 rev.) But this split o f motivation begs
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a big question: why must it be the case that after the veil o f ignorance is lifted, 
rational persons will act in accordance with the sense o f justice rather than 
self-interest? This brings us back to the basic problem of stability internal to the 
design o f the original position. Although Rawls takes pains to bridge the gap by 
constructing psychological laws to account for citizens’ moral development in a 
well-ordered society, he hardly resolves the problem. If  the principles are 
presented as the result o f consent among mutually disinterested persons, it is 
unreasonable to demand that the motive o f self-interest be replaced by the sense 
o f justice immediately after the veil is removed. It is not about whether they could 
psychologically make such a motivational shift, but whether it is logically 
consistent and morally reasonable to require it. To settle this, either one or the 
other motive has to be adjusted. Since Rawls takes moral stability seriously, a 
reasonable move is to allow the parties to be motivated by their sense o f justice. 
The moral argument can exactly meet this requirement.
It might be argued that the moral argument would make the rational choice 
theory meaningless. Admittedly, introducing moral reasoning into the original 
position amounts to giving up the attempt o f grounding justification on the 
rational agreement o f self-interested individuals. But in my view, apart from the 
said advantages, this interpretation brings no real harm to Rawls. After all, in a 
strict sense justice as fairness cannot be described as a social contract theory. 
Moreover, the standard argument for the maximin rule is too weak to support 
Rawls’s principles. We must search for other ways to justify the reasonableness o f 
the maximin rule if  we are to derive the principles from the framework of the
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original position.20 O f course to what extent this moral argument can make sense 
depends on the reasons offered. In the following two sections, I shall demonstrate 
that this interpretation has already been implied in Rawls’s theory, or so I argue.
4 The First Moral Argument for the Maximin Rule
In this section I will start to illustrate the moral point of view behind the 
maximin rule. My general strategy is to reinterpret Rawls’s arguments and show 
that the parties must appeal to some moral reasons should these arguments make 
any sense to them. Moral reasons are those that can be explained and justified 
with reference to a moral framework.21 This section will first take up the issue of 
lexical priority o f basic liberties.
To begin with, I would like to make a few remarks about Rawls’s account o f 
the maximin rule. Rawls holds that there are three special features o f the original 
position that lead us to favour the maximin rule. First, it is impossible for the 
parties to have any knowledge o f probability. The principle o f insufficient reason 
is therefore inapplicable to the original position. Second, the parties would not 
take the risk o f going for a further advantage when a satisfactory minimum is 
secured. Third, the rejected alternatives have consequences that the parties could 
not accept. In short, “the paradigm situation for following the maximin rule is
when all three features are realized to the highest degree.”(TJ: 155/134 rev.)
20 It is also possible that we give up the idea o f  the original position and find another device to 
justify Rawls’s principles. The reasonableness o f  principles is then independent o f the description 
o f the original position.
21 The precise meaning o f  moral reason need not bother us too much here. It suffices i f  we can 
demonstrate that the reasons for the maximin rule are not solely derived from rational self-interests. 
The reasons can refer to a conception o f  the moral person, an ideal o f  cooperation, or a 
commitment to equality.
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With respect to the first condition, I have already argued that Rawls’s appeal 
to the impossibility o f calculating probabilities and risk aversion is not strong 
enough to turn down the principle o f average utility. But with a more careful 
reading, we will notice that there is another normative reason urging the parties to 
take a conservative decision strategy, that is, “this supposition is plausible in view 
of the fundamental importance of the original agreement and the desire to have 
one’s decision appear responsible to one’s descendants who will be affected by it.” 
(TJ: 169/146 rev.) The parties understand that they are deciding the principles of 
justice which will have a fundamental impact on their life prospects and their 
descendants. It is the significance of choice that urges them to play safe. By 
contrast, the principle o f average utility resulting from the principle o f insufficient 
reason may require them to sacrifice their fundamental interest for the 
maximization o f average utility under certain circumstances. The first condition 
actually depends on the third condition that other non-maximin alternatives have 
some intolerable outcomes.22
The second condition is closely related to the lexical priority o f equal basic 
liberties. For Rawls, one o f the weaknesses o f utilitarianism is that it does not take 
individual right seriously. From the parties’ point o f view, it is said that they are 
not willing to try for greater gains at the expense o f equal liberties. “The 
minimum assured by the two principles in lexical order is not one that the parties 
wish to jeopardize for the sake of greater economic and social advantages.” 
(TJ: 156/135 rev.) Thus, they adopt the maximin rule because it can more safely
22 Scheffler makes a similar observation about this point. “Rawls and Utilitarianism,'’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p.432.
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protect their fundamental interests than alternatives. And these interests should 
never be sacrificed for other advantages. The second condition in effect also 
presupposes the third one that we should not choose those principles o f justice 
which may have unacceptable outcomes when the veil of ignorance is lifted.
Therefore, the first two conditions actually presuppose the third condition. It 
all depends upon a comparison between Rawls’s principles and other conceptions 
o f justice concerning their possible impact on people’s lives. Comparison needs 
criteria. Rawls then proposes a set of criteria and argues that in view of them, the 
parties would prefer his principles to other alternatives because the latter have 
some undesirable consequences that they are unwilling to bear, or the former have 
some advantages that other theories cannot provide. The focus is particularly on 
the comparison between Rawls’s principles and utilitarianism. The central 
argument can be stated as follows: to justify Rawls’s principles is to justify the 
maximin rule; to justify the maximin rule is to justify the criteria o f comparison 
that the parties take seriously. Now what we need to do is to examine these criteria 
and see whether they express some moral ideals. I f  they do, my claim that the 
parties’ reasoning is guided by moral considerations will be validated.
I will first discuss the argument for the lexical priority o f equal basic liberties, 
which is closely related to the second condition aforementioned. Rawls’s first 
principle states that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system o f equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system o f liberty for 
all.” (TJ:302/266 rev.)23 Furthermore, this principle enjoys a lexical priority over
23 This principle has later been revised as “each person has an equal right to a fully adequate 
scheme o f  equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme o f  liberties for all.” (PL:
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the second principle, the principle of efficiency as well as the principle o f utility. 
The right to equal basic liberties can only be restricted for the sake o f liberty. It 
prohibits exchanges of liberties for other economic and social advantages. It 
expresses Rawls’s commitment to individual rights which “even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override.” (TJ:3/3 rev.) But from the point o f view of 
rational persons behind the veil o f ignorance, on what grounds are they willing to 
give an absolute priority to liberties over other primary goods? Why is it not 
rational for them to surrender some o f their basic liberties, perhaps temporarily, in 
exchange for more material goods? To answer this question, we should bear in 
mind that the parties are guided by what they think is best for their own interest, 
not by any antecedent moral ideals or principles of rights. The justificatory 
reasons must be limited to those self-regarding ones.
In the first edition of A Theory o f  Justice, Rawls’s answer is that as the 
conditions o f civilization improve, our interest in exercising liberty will naturally 
increase while the marginal significance o f material goods diminishes. Beyond 
some point, “it becomes and then remains irrational from the standpoint o f the 
original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for the sake o f greater material 
means and amenities o f office.” (TJ:542)24 This is because under favourable 
circumstances, the freedom to pursue our spiritual and cultural interests becomes 
more and more regulative in our plans o f life. People have a fundamental interest 
in determining their conceptions o f the good. Therefore, “the desire for liberty is 
the chief regulative interest that the parties must suppose they all will have in
291) My discussion will heavily focus on Rawls's arguments presented in “’the Basic Liberties and 
their Priority,” originally written for the Tanner Lecture in 1981, and later revised and collected in 
Political Liberalism  as Lecture V III.
24 In the revised edition o f  TJ, Rawls has dropped this account and re-written this part.
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common in due course.” (TJ:543)2S
The core argument for the precedence o f liberties relies on an empirical 
account of human psychology. It presumes that rational persons will have a 
natural desire for the realization of freedom when socio- economic development 
reaches a certain level. But this assumption is doubtful. First o f all, people with 
different characters and desires may have different views about the trade-off 
between liberty and economic interest. As Hart rightly points out, there is no 
ground for saying that a minor surrender o f political liberties for a large increase 
in material welfare at some stage in the development of society is necessarily 
irrational.26 As a matter o f fact, even in advanced capitalist societies, many 
people are willing to sacrifice some of their liberties for the sake o f greater 
material enjoyment.27 Rawls overlooks that our ranking o f different primary 
social goods is affected by a number of social factors such as culture, religion, 
education, and people’s conceptions o f the good. His argument for the absolute 
priority o f liberty is therefore unsatisfactory.
Rawls may reply that under the special condition o f uncertainty o f the 
original position, it is only rational for the parties to opt for the principles whose 
worst consequence would be less undesirable than those of other alternatives.28
25 This sentence has been deleted from the revised edition.
26 H.L.A. Hart, “Rawls on Liberty and its Priority,” in Reading Rawls, p.251. It should be noted 
that liberty is a concept o f matter o f  degree. In many cases it is not an either/or situation between 
liberty and material goods.
27 The political development o f  Hong Kong in the past decade, the city where I am living, is a 
case in point. Although many Hong Kong citizens favour democracy, they are, however, willing to 
make some compromise between political liberties and economic development when Beijing tells 
them that there must be a trade-off between these two goals.
28 This point is raised by Hart, “Rawls on Liberty and its Priority,” p.25I.
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The priority rule o f liberty results from maximin reasoning. But the premise of 
this claim must be that the parties commonly treasure basic liberties as the chief 
regulative interest in their lives, to wit, the exercise of liberties occupies a 
higher-order place in their system of desires. The priority of a value implies its 
supreme significance in one’s value system. Thus, to establish the lexical priority 
o f basic liberties, we had better present the argument as a normative ideal rather 
than a psychological assertion. This is exactly the move Rawls makes in his 
revised edition of A Theory o f  Justice and his later works. He abandons the 
original argument and grounds the priority rule on an ideal conception o f moral 
person.
Rawls re-formulates his arguments by saying that members o f a well-ordered 
society have highest-order interests in realising their two moral powers. These 
powers are the capacity for a sense o f justice and for a conception o f the good. 
The former is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to be motivated by an 
effective desire to act from the principles of justice. The latter is the capacity to 
form, to revise, and to pursue a conception o f what we regard as a good life. 
(PL:302) It is an interest of the highest order in a sense that it is supremely 
regulative as well as effective. This implies that “whenever circumstances are 
relevant to their fulfillment, these interests govern deliberation and conduct.”29 
Rawls then prescribes that the rational parties, as representatives o f moral persons, 
are likewise moved by these interests to secure the development and exercise of 
the moral powers. That being said, the argument for the priority o f liberty
29 Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p .312.
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becomes rather straightforward because the parties are “simply trying to guarantee 
and to advance the requisite conditions for exercising the powers that characterize 
them as moral persons.”30 In other words, what Rawls needs to prove is that the 
basic liberties are necessary conditions to realize people’s highest-order interests. 
Rawls thus remarks that:
The persons in the original position are moved by a certain 
hierarchy o f interests. They must first secure their highest-order 
interest and fundamental aims (only the general form of which 
is known to them), and this fact is reflected in the precedence 
they give to liberty; the acquisition o f means that enable them 
to advance their other desires and ends has a subordinate place.
(TJ:476, rev.)
The argument for the lexical priority o f liberties is then completed. It is 
almost grounded on a deductive argument: the highest-order interest entails the 
priority o f liberties. For example, freedom of conscience and freedom o f thought 
are regarded as necessary conditions to develop people’s capacity for a conception 
of the good.
It is apparent that this argument has fundamentally changed the nature o f 
Rawls’s theory. First o f all, the parties’ motive has been altered. These people are 
no longer moved by first-order interests. Instead, they are stipulated to have a 
common higher-order goal to search for a conception of justice that can realize 
their moral identity most effectively. Their reasoning is guided by a conception of 
moral personality. Rawls expressly acknowledges this paradigmatic shift by 
saying that “these revisions bring out that the basic liberties and their priority rest
30 Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," p .315.
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on a conception o f the person that would be recognized as liberal, and not, as Hart 
thought, on considerations o f rational interest.” (PL:290, my emphasis) If  so, it 
proves my moral argument for the maximin rule. The reason for the parties being 
not willing to sacrifice their liberties for the sake o f material goods is that they 
take the exercise o f moral powers as the regulative desire in their motivational set. 
They have a desire to be a liberal autonomous person.
How about those who do not accept this ideal? Rawls’s reply is that “we 
expect and indeed want people to care about their liberties and opportunities in 
order to realize these powers, and we think they show a lack o f  self-respect and 
weakness o f  character in not doing so.”31 It indicates that in Rawls’s mind the 
account o f highest-order interests is a prescriptive moral ideal rather than an 
empirical description o f the actual desire. The deliberation of parties can no longer 
claim to be morally neutral. The account o f primary goods is also re-interpreted as 
the necessary means to enable human beings to realize their moral powers rather 
than simply to advance their different plans of life. As Rawls puts it in the 
“Preface for the Revised Edition”, “primary goods are now characterized as what 
persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully 
cooperating members o f society over a complete life.” (TJ:xiii, rev.)
Needless to say, how to justify this liberal conception o f the person and the 
accompanying highest-order interest is a big issue. But this is not my concern here. 
My aim is to show that the parties would adopt a moral argument if  they were 
required to use the maximin rule to justify the priority of equal basic liberties. The
31 Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," p .315, my emphasis.
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moral point o f view is embodied in a liberal conception o f the moral person. 
Interestingly, Rawls is reluctant to go that far. For admitting this would make the 
idea o f rational choice meaningless. He thus says that the parties in the original 
position are only rationally, but not fu lly autonomous. The difference is that 
rational autonomy is acting solely from our capacity to be rational and from our 
conception o f the good, while full autonomy includes not only the capacity to be 
rational but also the capacity to act in accordance with the fair terms of 
cooperation. Rawls stresses that although the parties are said to be moved by the 
highest-order interest in developing their moral powers, they are still regarded as 
rational self-interested beings. The priority o f liberty is determined by its 
contribution to the well-being of persons that the parties represent. So, the 
revisionary introduction o f highest-order interests will not affect the division o f 
labour between the reasonable and the rational, and the principles can still be seen 
as a result o f rational agreement. Rawls thus says, “the agreement in the original 
position on the two principles o f justice must be an agreement founded on 
rationally autonomous reasons in this sense.” (PL:307)
However, this defence is unsound. For the justification o f highest-order 
interest in exercising moral powers cannot easily be translated to the satisfaction 
o f self-interest.32 Imagine that Peter is a rational egoist. His sole concern is how to 
gain as much material goods as possible to advance his plan o f life. Peter does not 
deny the importance o f some liberties because they are essential to realize his 
conception o f the good. But differing from Rawls, he does not mind sacrificing a
32 It should be noted that I am not claiming that the exercise o f  moral power is irrelevant to a 
person's well-being.
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minor degree o f his political liberties for a larger sum of economic benefits for 
various reasons. For instance, he may not regard the participation in political 
activity as an essential good. How can Rawls convince Peter that he is irrational to 
hold such a view? Rawls has little to say provided that this is Peter’s deliberative 
and well-informed decision. If Rawls wants to persuade the parties to view the 
development o f moral powers as their regulative goal, he must show that it is 
unreasonable (not irrational) for the parties not to take their moral personality 
seriously.33 The frame o f reference o f reasonableness rests on the desirability o f 
Rawls’s account of the moral conception. As Hart acutely points out, the priority 
o f liberty harbours a latent liberal ideal.34 But ideal is different from interest. 
Whether a moral ideal is well-grounded does not depend on how useful it is to 
advance one’s interest. In Rawls’s case, his conception o f the person is closely 
connected to the notion of fair social cooperation for reciprocity. Again, this 
notion is another ideal which expresses Rawls’s commitment to fairness and 
equality.
To conclude, if the parties are moved by the highest-order interest in realising 
their moral powers, the justifying reason for choice must be moral in nature. The 
acceptance o f the maximin rule is grounded on a conception o f the moral person. 
One may argue that the moral conception does not need to apply to the rational 
parties directly. What we need is to model it into the original position as a 
reasonable constraint. But then it would be absurd that the parties should accept 
the exercise o f the two moral powers as their regulative desire. Moreover, Rawls
33 O f course whether the parties can be convinced by the reasons provided is another matter.
34 Hart, "Rawls on Liberty and its Priority,” p.252.
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makes it clear that “the parties regard themselves as having certain fundamental 
interests that they must protect if they can; and that, as free persons, they have a 
highest-order interest in maintaining their liberty to revise and alter ends.” (TJ: 160 
rev.) My argument therefore stands.
5 The Second Moral Argument for the Maximin Rule
Now I turn to examine the strains of commitment and stability. I will make 
two claims. First, I will show that they are actually the main grounds for the 
principles o f justice in the original position. They provide major support for the 
adoption of the maximin rule in the first stage o f justification. Rawls’s claim that 
the problem of stability will not arise until the second stage is then wrong. Second, 
I will argue that the reasons behind the strains o f commitment and stability 
embody a moral point o f view as well. The parties are actually moved by moral 
reasons to adopt the maximin rule when they consider these issues.
To start with, we need to know how they are related to the maximin rule. The 
strains o f commitment mean that in making their decision the parties will choose 
those principles that they can rely on one another to abide by. “They cannot enter 
into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept.” (TJ: 176/153 
rev.) Stability concerns whether citizens can have a sufficient sense o f justice to 
act in accordance with the principles o f justice. So both issues are concerned with 
the problem of motivation. Rawls stipulates that the rational parties should ask 
themselves whether they have sufficient motives to honour the principles o f 
justice even if  they belong to the least advantaged group when the veil is lifted. 
They must take this burden o f commitment seriously. In view o f the importance of
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these considerations, it is therefore rational for them to prefer the maximin rule to 
other alternatives. Rawls makes this connection particularly clear at the beginning 
o f Section 29, “the Main Grounds for the Two Principles o f Justice”:
The arguments I shall adduce fit under the heuristic schema 
suggested by the reasons for following the maximin rule. That 
is, they help to show that the two principles are an adequate 
minimum conception o f justice in a situation o f great 
uncertainty. Any further advantages that might be won by the 
principle o f utility, or whatever, are highly problematical, 
whereas the hardship if  things turn out badly are intolerable.
(TJ: 175/153 rev.)
As we have shown in the foregoing section, among the three special 
conditions o f the maximin rule, the third condition, namely the rejected alternative 
conceptions o f justice whose consequences the parties could not accept, is the 
most essential and decisive one. Now we can see that the arguments o f strains o f 
commitment and stability are further elaborations o f this condition. They provide 
extra support for the maximin rule. They have a direct and significant bearing on 
Rawls’s principles o f justice. Towards the end o f the discussion in Section 29, 
Rawls even acknowledges that the limited information as to natural endowments 
and social status, the generality o f principle, and universality of application are 
not enough to justify his principles o f justice. They are only necessary, but not 
sufficient conditions. For without the adoption o f the maximin rule, the parties 
may choose the average principle o f utility. Rawls thus concludes that “the 
restrictions on valid undertakings as well as the publicity and finality conditions 
are an essential part o f  the argument fo r  the two principles. I have discussed the
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role of these constraints in connection with the strains o f commitment and 
problem of stability.” (TJ: 183, emphasis added)35 Furthermore, as Scheffler 
observes, the main ideas o f the strains of commitment and stability set out in 
Section 29 are not fully developed until Part III o f Theory o f  Justice. The central 
aim of Part III is to vindicate— through the discussion o f rationality, the laws o f 
moral psychology and the congruence argument and so on— that Rawls’s 
principles would provide a satisfactory minimum, whereas utilitarianism might 
have consequences that the parties would find it difficult to bear. Therefore, 
Scheffler proposes that “the reasons for relying on the maximin rule...are actually 
the subject o f  much o f the rest of the book. In effect, the "maximin argument’ 
functions as a master argument within which many o f the book’s more specific 
arguments are subsumed.”36
If stability is indispensable to the justification o f Rawls’s principles in the 
original position, it is misleading for Rawls to say that it only arises at the second 
stage, and the arguments for stability “are not intended as justifying reasons.” Nor 
is he right to claim that the function of stability is simply “checking whether the 
conception already adopted is a feasible one and not so unstable that some other 
choice might be better.” (TJ:504/441 rev.) On the contrary, stability is one o f the 
determining factors in the parties’ decision. It is one of the “main arguments for 
the two principles” and helps “to show the two principles are an adequate 
minimum conception of justice in a situation o f great uncertainty.” (TJ: 175/153 
rev.) In Section 76 “The Problem of Relative Stability”, Rawls makes a
35 This citation is deleted from the revised edition.
36 Samuel Scheffler, “Rawls and Utilitarianism," pp.435-36, my emphasis.
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comparison between his principles and utilitarianism with reference to stability, 
and claims that “a decision in the original position depends on a comparison: 
other things equal, the preferred conception o f justice is the most stable one.” 
(TJ:498/436 rev.)
It is thus clear that stability plays an essential role in justifying Rawls’s 
principles in the first stage. If this account is right, does it mean that envy should 
also be considered in the first stage? It does not. As I have shown before, the 
problems of envy and psychological attitude towards risk are not the only source 
o f stability. Even if  envy is excluded from the first stage, there could still be other 
reasons for taking stability into account. Otherwise, we cannot explain why the 
parties would take it as an essential ground for the maximin rule. We need an 
account to explain the role o f stability in the first stage. That is the question we 
now turn to explore. The problem can perhaps be put this way: from the parties’ 
standpoint, why would they adopt the strains of commitment and stability as 
normative constraints? According to Rawls, it is related to the formal constraints 
o f finality and publicity respectively. I will discuss them in turn.
The condition o f finality states that the principles adopted in the original 
position is the final court o f appeal in practical reasoning. It specifies the totality 
o f relevant considerations and their appropriate weight, and its requirements are 
decisive. Once the decision is made, there is no second chance for re-negotiation. 
The parties are aware o f this constraint, and try to avoid those principles that they 
can adhere to only with great difficulty. Moreover, Rawls stresses that “when we 
enter an agreement we must be able to honour it even should the worst 
possibilities prove to be the case.” (TJ: 176/153 rev.) Suppose we accept this
burden o f commitment as a necessary condition for justification. Here comes the 
question: why should we view the maximin rule and the resulting difference 
principle as the most appropriate candidate to meet this constraint?
Let us consider the following scenario suggested by Rawls: the parties are 
conducting a pair-wise comparison between the difference principle and the 
principle o f average utility on the distribution o f social and economic advantages. 
Both conceptions accept the priority o f the principle of equal liberties and the 
principle of fair equality o f opportunity. The extreme case o f sacrificing 
someone’s basic liberties for the sake o f a greater good enjoyed by others does not 
exist.37 This qualification can sharpen the comparison and help us see the 
justificatory force o f the strains o f commitment in a clearer way. In this 
circumstance, Rawls argues that the parties would still favour the difference 
principle rather than the principle o f average utility. For the latter is 
psychologically too demanding. Adherence to it may exceed the capacity o f 
human nature. From the point o f view o f the least advantaged, the utility principle 
asks them to view “the greater advantages o f others who have more as a sufficient 
reason for having still lower prospects o f life than otherwise they could be 
allowed.”38 By contrast, the difference principle assures them that inequalities 
will work to their greatest advantage.
At first sight, it is not clear why the principle o f average utility is 
psychologically unbearable. After all, under this scheme their basic liberties and
37 Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion" in Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.228-29.
38 Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion," p.230.
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rights have been firmly secured. Even if it turns out that they are the least 
advantaged when the veil is lifted, they still have a fair chance to improve their 
economic situation because o f the principle of fair equality o f opportunity.39 
Moreover, following the principle of diminishing marginal utility, the parties have 
reason to believe that the principle o f average utility will result in a rather 
egalitarian society. And in case they are not in the class o f the worse-off, their 
economic prospect may be better than under the scheme of the difference 
principle. So it is not extremely risky to adopt the principle o f insufficient reason 
and assign the equal probabilities to each possible position. The utility principle 
may satisfy the strains o f commitment so that the argument for maximin based on 
the strains o f commitment is indecisive.
There is, however, another interpretation o f the strains o f commitment.4" It 
could be argued that although the principle o f average utility may not be 
psychologically intolerable, they are morally unbearable. It is too demanding not 
because the absolute level o f well-being arising from the application o f the 
utilitarian principle is too low to command our respect; nor is it because we may 
have a higher chance to fall into the least advantaged group due to bad luck. 
Strictly speaking, any political principle may require substantial sacrifices o f some 
people for others. From a libertarian point o f view, for instance, the difference 
principle is extremely demanding because it requires people to share one another’s 
fate, and treat the distribution o f natural talents as a common asset. The better-off
39 This consideration can be further strengthened by adding that the parties are all presumed to be 
normal and effective participants o f  cooperation.
40 The following discussion has greatly benefited from Barry's incisive analysis in Justice as 
Impartiality, pp.61-67. But I disagree with Barry on the place o f  strains o f  commitment in the 
original position. I believe that it is a major argument for Rawls’s principle in the first stage rather 
than in the second stage as Barry suggests.
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may feel that they are forced labour for other’s welfare in Rawls’s cooperative 
scheme.41 Furthermore, thanks to the priority of the difference principles over the 
principle o f efficiency, the general level o f well being o f a Rawlsian society may 
even be lower than a utilitarian one. It is thus misleading to explain the strains o f 
commitment in terms o f psychological propensity.
Rawls’s real argument is actually that it is unfair for utilitarianism to require 
someone to sacrifice their life prospects for the greater advantages o f others if  we 
regard each other as equal participants o f cooperation for reciprocity. As he claims, 
“when society is conceived as a system of cooperation designed to advance the 
good o f its members, it seems quite incredible that some citizens should be 
expected...to accept lower prospects o f life for the sake o f others.” (TJ: 178/155 
rev.) They find it unacceptable because they have already accepted a specific 
conception o f society as fair cooperation between free and equal citizens who 
have distinct conceptions o f the good. If  the parties are all strong communitarians 
and view cooperation as a shared project for the common good, they may not find 
utilitarianism as intolerable as Rawls assumes. In other words, utilitarianism is too 
demanding mainly because it fails to take the separateness o f individuals seriously, 
and places unfair burdens on some people in cooperation. It is unreasonable from 
a moral point o f view irrespective o f whether it is psychologically demanding or 
not. It is a moral, but not psychological argument as it can be made sense o f only 
if  the parties have already endorsed a moral commitment to equality and fairness 
in advance.42 The implicit reasons determining what principles can meet the test
41 For example, See Nozick, Anarchy, Slate and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), Chap. 7.
42 Joshua Cohen has an excellent analysis o f  the egalitarian implication o f  the maximin rule in 
“"Democratic Equality," Ethics 99, pp.727-51.
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of the strains o f commitment actually express a particular liberal point o f view, 
which in turn determines why the parties would adopt the maximin rule.
Indeed, Rawls’s article “Some Reasons for the Maximin Rule” published in 
1974 confirms my argument. In response to his critics, Rawls admits that his 
previous arguments for the maximin rule, including considerable risk-aversion, 
less demanding information requirements, greater suitability as a public principles 
and weaker strains of commitment, are not decisive by themselves. There must be 
other more compelling reasons for the maximin rule. He suggests that “the 
aspirations o f free and equal personality point directly to the maximin criterion.”43 
His idea is that since citizens view themselves as free and equal persons, they do 
not endorse any claim that one deserves one’s place in the distribution o f natural 
talents. Furthermore, the distribution o f talents is viewed in some respects as a 
collective asset. It follows that the maximin rule is the most appropriate candidate 
to enshrine this moral ideal. A principle o f justice can claim to be justified if  and 
only if  it could be reasonably accepted by free and equal moral persons, including 
those least advantaged. For every one has an equal power regardless o f their 
differences in social and natural advantages. Rawls thus concludes:
Provided the maximin criterion is satisfied, these relations may 
be preserved: inequalities are to everyone’s advantage and those 
able to gain from their good fortune do so in ways agreeable to 
those less favored. Meeting this burden o f  proof reflects the 
value o f  equality.™
What Rawls calls the compelling reason for the maximin rule turns out to be
43 Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin R ule/’ p.230.
44 Rawls, “Some Reasons for the Maximin Rule," p.231, my emphasis.
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the value of equality. This is obviously a moral argument. Since the maximin rule 
is adopted by the parties themselves to guide their reasoning, they must accept the 
moral argument beforehand.45 In this case, the distinction between the reasonable 
and the rational in the original position is no longer important. The parties are 
moved by a consideration o f equality. If so, Rawls’s principles o f justice are 
deductively derived from his moral premise o f equality, and the idea o f a contract 
between rational self-interested persons becomes redundant.
Now let us turn to the issue o f stability. What interests us is why stability 
would be considered the main ground for the principles o f justice. This question 
has been discussed thoroughly in the previous two chapters. We have already 
known that Rawls’s conception o f stability refers to moral stability which is 
essentially concerned with the motivational priority o f the sense o f justice. But 
from the point o f view o f self-interested parties, why are they interested in this 
question? A natural answer seems to be that social stability can improve 
everyone’s prospect if all comply with the principles o f justice in the well-ordered 
society. Stability matters because it is a social virtue for effective cooperation. But 
this seemingly reasonable answer is not what Rawls holds.
First o f all, Rawls points out that it is not irrational for a person to be a 
first-person and free-rider egoist when they come back to society from the original 
position. “In everyday life an individual, if  he is so inclined, can sometimes win 
even greater benefits for himself by taking advantage o f the cooperative efforts o f
45 One may argue that this argument only applies to citizens in the well-ordered society, but not to 
rational persons in the original position. This does not make sense because the maximin rule is 
only applicable to a special situation like the original position.
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others.” (TJ:497/435 rev.) Acting justly may not be each person’s best interest in 
the real world. The parties should not be surprised by this possible consequence 
because they themselves are solely motivated by self-interest. The sense o f justice 
has no effect on their deliberation. So, as Barry suggests, a more rational policy 
for the parties is to agree on an effective mechanism of enforcement to “prevent 
backsliding and to provide those who accept the principles with assurance that 
others will play their part by, for example, paying their taxes.”46 Stability, in this 
sense, is a purely practical matter. Its sole task is to find means o f persuasion or 
enforcement to ensure compliance with the principles that have been 
independently worked out as reasonable. This is not Rawls’s account o f stability 
though. Rawls expressly indicates that his conception o f stability is closely 
connected to the desirability of a conception o f justice. As he puts it, “finding a 
stable conception is not simply a matter o f avoiding futility. Rather, what counts is 
the kind o f stability, the nature o f the forces that secure it.” (PL: 142) The force of 
stability must originate from a reasonable conception o f justice.
Here comes the critical question: from the standpoint o f rational 
self-interested individuals, why should they impose the normative constraint on 
themselves that a principle of justice will not be justified unless it warrants the 
motivational priority o f the sense of justice? It does not matter for the moment 
whether such a principle can be found. The real challenge lies in explaining why 
these self-interested persons are willing to take the priority of moral motivation so 
seriously. There is a motive inconsistency here. The only possible reason is that
46 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.62.
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the motivational priority is instrumental to social stability.47 This account has 
been rejected by Rawls himself. However, he could not say that we should not 
confuse the motive of the contracting parties with the motive o f citizens in a 
well-ordered society. For what the parties ask is exactly why they should draw this 
distinction and give priority to the sense o f justice in case justice is in conflict 
with their self-interest.
In my view, there is no way to break the deadlock if  the parties remain 
egoistic. An egoist cannot be persuaded to be a moral person by non-instrumental 
reason. If  he wants to be a just person, he must commit to it. So the alternative is 
to change the motive o f the parties from mutual disinterest to a desire to act justly. 
Once this change is made, it would not be unusual for the parties to take moral 
stability as an important consideration for the maximin rule. They care about 
moral stability because they have adopted a moral standpoint that a justifiable 
conception o f justice must be able to offer reasons for the motivational priority o f 
the sense o f justice. As Rawls claims, “justice as fairness is not reasonable in the 
first place unless in a suitable way it can win its support by addressing each 
citizen’s reason.”(PL:143) My argument is also consistent with Rawls’s claim that 
the parties are moved by the highest-order interest in developing their two moral 
powers. Both lead to the same conclusion that the parties should have a moral 
sentiment to reason and to act morally.
Some conclusions o f the previous two sections are in order. First, I have 
shown that stability is indeed a justifying reason for Rawls’s principles in the first
47 I have refuted this account in Chapter 1.
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stage. It offers substantive support for the maximin rule and forms a major ground 
for the principles of justice. Rawls is mistaken to say that stability is merely an 
issue concerning the feasibility of principles carried out in the second stage. 
Second, after examining the arguments for the priority of liberties, the strains o f 
commitment and stability, we can see that Rawls’s principles o f justice are in fact 
grounded on moral reasons. To vindicate the reasonableness o f the maximin rule, 
the parties must appeal to a liberal conception of moral persons as free and equal, 
and as having a higher-order interest in developing their moral power. This 
argument stands to overrule the whole idea o f grounding justification on rational 
choice theory. But I do not think this interpretation will weaken the desirability of 
Rawls’s principles. On the contrary, it can make the argument more consistent and 
powerful. What ultimately matters are those moral ideals behind the principles. It 
is unwise to invoke the rational choice strategy to explain the moral attractiveness 
o f these principles. For this strategy is starkly inadequate in resolving the 
motivational gap, and justifying the regulative priority o f the sense o f justice over 
other desires. Rawls is well aware o f this problem inherent in his rational choice 
argument. This partly explains why he needs the stability argument to bridge this 
gap. The issue o f moral motivation is o f utmost importance in Rawls’s theory.
That being said, my argument leaves a question unsolved. If the stability 
question has already been answered in the first stage, why does justice as fairness 
need the second stage? In particular, if the parties are said to have the highest 
order interest in developing their capacity for a sense of justice, and to take the 
strains o f commitment and stability into consideration in the first stage, what is 
the point o f Rawls adding that “the argument for the principles o f justice is not 
complete until the principles selected in the first part are shown in the second part
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to be sufficiently stable.” (PL: 141, footnote 7) This question puzzles many of 
Rawls’s critics. And a reasonable answer is necessary because the problems of 
congruence o f the right and the good, and o f an overlapping consensus are being 
dealt with in the second stage. In the following sections, we will continue to 
explore the place o f stability in the second stage o f justice as fairness.
6 The Need for the Second Stage
Our discussion will focus on three questions. First, what is the major concern 
o f the second stage? Second, where does the second stage take place? Third, what 
important implications can we draw from the answers to the first two questions?
To begin with, I would like to make two preliminary remarks. First, stability 
in Rawls’s context is always an issue concerning the motivational priority o f the 
sense o f justice. So when Rawls stipulates that we need a separate stage to handle 
the question o f stability, it implies that there must be some important issues 
concerning the priority o f the sense o f justice that the first stage is unable to 
answer fully. What those issues are will be the key to appreciate the role of the 
second stage. Moreover, we should note that the principles o f justice have already 
been established in the first stage. This does not surprise us because this is the task 
o f the parties in the original position behind the veil o f ignorance. Therefore, the 
main concern o f the second stage is not whether Rawls’s principles would be 
chosen by the parties. That question has been settled, and the considerations of the 
second stage “do not determine the initial acknowledgement o f principles in the 
first part o f the argument, but confirm it.” (TJ:580/508 rev.) This feature is even 
further stressed in Rawls’ s later philosophy. He says:
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In the first stage it [justice as fairness] is worked out as a
freestanding political (but of course moral) conception for the 
basic structure o f society. Only with this done and its 
content— its principles o f justice and ideals—provisionally on 
hand do we take up, in the second stage, the problem whether 
justice as fairness is sufficiently stable. ” (PL: 140-141)
Then why should the justification o f justice as fairness need the second stage? 
A straightforward answer is that the problem o f motivational priority o f  justice 
will be resolved only in this stage. As I have thoroughly argued in the preceding 
chapter, a justifiable conception o f justice must demonstrate its ability to motivate 
rational people to give priority to justice over other desires. This is related to 
Rawls’s understanding o f practical reasoning and his internalist position. Rawls’s 
hope is to show that the sense o f justice specified by his principles o f justice can 
be a regulative desire in people’s rational plans o f life even judging from their 
personal perspective. Only if this is done, will citizens living in the well-ordered 
society have sufficient reasons to abide by the principles o f justice. Rawls aims to 
argue for the good of the sense o f justice in the second stage. As he puts it,
We want to know whether having and maintaining a sense o f 
justice is a good (in the thin sense) for persons who are 
members o f a well-ordered society... And if within the thin 
theory it turns out that having a sense o f justice is indeed a good, 
then a well-ordered society is as stable as one can hope for. Not 
only does it generate its own supportive moral attitudes, but 
these attitudes are desirable from the standpoint o f  rational 
persons who have them when they assess their situation 
independently from  the constraints o f  justice. This match 
between justice and goodness I  refer to as congruence. 
(TJ:398-99/350 rev., my emphasis)
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The second stage is set to deal with the problem of congruence. For Rawls, 
“whether these two points o f view are congruent is likely to be a crucial factor in 
determining stability.” (TJ: 567/497 rev.) The idea o f congruence indicates that 
there are two different points o f view in guiding our actions. One is the standpoint 
o f justice; another is the standpoint o f goodness. The former is characterized by 
the arguments o f the first stage. It embodies the idea of fair cooperation between 
free and equal moral persons. It requires us to look at each other from an impartial 
perspective abstracted from our personal identities and conceptions o f the good. 
All participants are morally equal, and therefore have an equal right to decide the 
principles o f justice. They do not look at the social order from their situation but 
take up a common point o f view that everyone can adopt on an equal footing, 
which in turn defines what justice is. This is what Rawls calls the first stage 
argument.
Nevertheless, this standpoint alone cannot fully explain the practical reason 
for our action in real life. When people leave the original position and move to the 
well-ordered society, they will know their distinct conceptions o f the good. 
Without the constraint of the veil of ignorance, many of them may be moved by 
their particular attachments and interests. The standpoint of goodness comes into 
play at this stage. We recognize that the sense o f justice is just one o f the many 
desires in an agent’s subjective motivational set. It does not necessarily override 
other desires in practical reasoning. The priority o f the sense o f justice is not a 
foregone conclusion even in a well-ordered society. It must be substantively 
argued for. Rawls believes that the solution rests on the congruence o f justice and 
goodness. The central idea is to render the desire to act justly regulative in a 
rational plan o f life. There will then be no conflict between the two standpoints;
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citizens will find the sense o f justice desirable even “from the standpoint of 
rational persons who have them when they assess their situation independently 
from the constraints o f justice.” (TJ:399/350 rev.) When the congruence argument 
succeeds, justice as fairness will be as stable as one can hope for.
It is now clear that the function o f the second stage is to ensure the priority o f 
the sense o f justice. Without this stage, the justification is incomplete because the 
impartial standpoint specified in the first stage is not enough to demonstrate why 
it is rational for citizens to give the sense o f justice a definite priority judging 
from their viewpoint o f goodness. As a reason/motive internalist, Rawls holds that 
the priority problem does not “rely on the doctrine o f the pure conscientious act.” 
(TJ: 569/499 rev.) It is against this background that we can understand why Rawls 
says that the considerations o f the second stage are to confirm the initial choice o f 
principles o f justice in the first stage. Its success will show that “our nature is such 
as to allow the original choice to be carried through.” (TJ: 580/508 rev.)
One might demand, legitimately, at this point why, if the question o f stability 
has already been considered by the parties in the original position, it should be 
taken up again in the second stage? Rawls does not give any explicit answer to 
this question. But if my above argument is sound, it is fairly obvious that the 
argument for stability cannot be completed in the first stage. As argued in the 
previous section, the parties take the concern o f stability as the main reason to 
adopt the maximin rule because they know that one defining feature o f a 
well-ordered society is the willingness o f citizens to act justly. Whether a 
conception o f justice can generate its own support therefore becomes an important 
criterion o f their decision. Since a general knowledge o f moral psychology is
available, they can compare the relative stability of different conceptions of 
justice. Yet the decision made after the comparison is not decisive in assuring the 
priority o f the sense of justice. For the viewpoint o f goodness does not enter their 
deliberation. There is no way for them to judge whether the sense o f justice 
characterized by a specific conception o f justice can be a regulative good o f their 
plans o f life. They simply lack such information and perspective. Even if  justice 
as fairness is shown to be more stable than the principle o f utility, it does not 
warrant its motivational priority over other conceptions o f justice. As Rawls 
remarks, “congruence is not a foregone conclusion even in a well-ordered society. 
We must verify it." (TJ:567/497 rev.) Therefore, both stages are essential to 
Rawls’s project.
We can now see that the arguments for stability that appeared in Section 29 
“the Main Grounds for the Two Principles o f Justice” and Section 76 “the 
Problem o f Relative Stability” mainly serve the first stage in determining the 
principles of justice, while the congruence argument of Chapter 9 “the Good of 
Justice” is for the second stage.41* Unfortunately, Rawls himself does not make 
such a distinction; he misleads his readers into believing that stability is only a 
matter concerning the feasibility of principles o f justice in the second stage. It 
ceases to be surprising why so much criticism and misunderstanding surround 
Rawls’s account o f stability.
There is one more point about the necessity of the second stage. Recall that a
4X Schefifler makes a similar observation about the close connection o f  the stability argument o f  
Sections 29 & 76 in justifying Rawls’s principles. He points out that it is misleading for Rawls to 
say that stability is not a justifying reason for his principles. What Schefifler overlooks is the 
two-stage structure and the importance o f  the second stage in Rawls’s theory. See Schefifler, 
“Rawls and Utilitarianism,” p.455.
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motivational gap exists between the original position and the well-ordered society. 
The parties are assumed to be motivated solely by self-interest. To avoid justice as 
fairness being an egoistic theory, Rawls must demonstrate that the parties can 
develop an effective moral motive to comply with the principles o f justice when 
they return to their ordinary life. But this argument cannot be done in the first 
stage. Although the parties know that they will have a sense o f justice in the 
well-ordered society, they do not know how effective it is after their plans o f life 
have been revealed to them. As a result, the second stage argument is necessary to 
bridge the gap.
Having discussed the role of second stage, now we come to another crucial 
question: where does the second stage of stability take place? It seems obvious 
that this stage arises only after the veil of ignorance is lifted and the parties have 
full knowledge o f their conceptions of the good. If persons are still situated in the 
original position behind the veil of ignorance, there is no basis for the congruence 
argument to proceed. Congruence must presuppose the existence o f two 
standpoints. But in the original position, only the standpoint o f justice is present. 
That is why Rawls says that in considering the match of two standpoints, people 
“assess their situation independently from the constraints o f justice.” (TJ:399/350 
rev.) Furthermore, the ultimate concern o f congruence is “whether the regulative 
desire to adopt the standpoint o f justice belongs to a person’s own good when 
viewed in the light o f the thin theory with no restrictions on information.” (TJ: 
567/497 rev., my emphasis) As for explaining the different nature of the two 
standpoints, Rawls reminds us again that “the requisite match exists between the 
principles o f justice that would be agreed to in the absence o f information and the 
principles o f rational choice that are not chosen at all and applied with fu ll
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knowledge.” (TJ:514/451 rev., my emphasis) It is then clear that the argument for 
congruence takes place only after the thick veil is removed. People make their 
decision with full knowledge o f their conceptions of the good. This observation is 
further confirmed by Rawls’s argument for political liberalism. Though the later 
Rawls replaces the congruence argument with the idea o f an overlapping 
consensus, the two-stage justificatory structure remains basically unchanged. 
Therefore, the problem of an overlapping consensus will only be taken up in the 
second stage and in such a consensus, “the reasonable doctrines endorse the 
political conception, each from its own point o f view.” (PL: 134) It indicates that 
people must be allowed to know their conceptions o f the good before they decide 
whether a consensus among reasonable doctrines is possible or not.
We now have a very different picture o f Rawls’s theory. First of all, if the 
congruence argument occurs outside the original position and the second stage is 
indispensable, then the rational choice made in the first stage is no longer final in 
Rawls’s theory. The justifiability o f a conception of justice is not finally 
determined by the choice o f the original position. We must wait and see whether it 
will win the congruence argument, or become the focus o f an overlapping 
consensus. Only when it is shown to do so, will moral stability be secured. In 
other words, a full justification o f justice as fairness must go beyond the original 
position and rely on the success o f the second stage argument for the priority of 
the sense o f justice. Stability in this regard is undoubtedly a decisive criterion for 
the desirability o f justice. This sheds light on the claim that “the argument for the 
principles o f justice is not complete until the principles selected in the first part 
are shown in the second part to be sufficiently stable.” (PL: 141, footnote7) But as 
the second stage goes beyond the original position, Rawls can no longer appeal to
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an impartial and common standpoint to realize moral stability. He must provide 
separate procedure and substantive reasons to justify the overridingness of the 
sense o f justice in the second stage. This is what I am going to examine in the next 
chapter.
7 Conclusion
This chapter has made several important claims which, if  sound, would 
provide a fundamentally different picture of Rawls’s theory o f justice. First, I have 
argued that stability plays an essential role in both stages o f justice as fairness. It 
helps the parties make their decision in the original position on the one hand, and 
accounts for congruence o f the right and the good in the second stage on the other. 
Rawls’s claim that stability is only considered in the second stage is thus 
misleading. Second, I have shown that the second stage is indispensable to the 
justifiability o f Rawls’s principles because the motivational priority can only be 
determined in the second stage. It is therefore incorrect for Rawls to say in A 
Theory o f  Justice that the second stage is only concerned with feasibility without 
any effect on principles derived from the first stage. Unless the principles are 
shown to be stable in the second stage, quoting the later Rawls’s own words, “it 
must be in some way revised.” (PL: 141) Third, I have contended that the idea o f 
contract based on rational choice has only a minor place in Rawls’s theory. The 
grounds for the maximin rule, which embodies Rawls’s ideal o f the moral person 
and of liberal commitment to justification, are actually based on moral reasons. 
The assumption o f mutual disinterest thus weakens Rawls’s moral argument and 
leaves a motivational gap that makes moral stability almost unthinkable. This is 
why I have reservations about the division o f labour between the reasonable and
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the rational, two ideas expressing two incompatible models o f justification. 
Finally, though my arguments raise strong objections to Rawls’s propositions, it 
does not mean that the idea o f stability is unimportant. Quite the opposite, what I 
do is to make the idea of stability more consistent and essential in the complex 
justificatory structure o f justice as fairness. With the place o f stability settled, we 
can proceed to examine the second stage arguments for stability in Rawls’s early 
and later philosophy, to wit, the congruence and the overlapping consensus 
arguments in the coming chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
CONGRUENCE, RATIONALITY AND TELEOLOGY
This chapter sets out to examine Rawls’s argument for congruence. I shall 
first explicate the main ideas o f congruence and then show that its main ground 
lies in a Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness. I argue that this interpretation 
has turned Rawls into a liberal perfectionist within a classical teleological 
framework. This position is, however, inconsistent with Rawls’s desire-based 
conception of deliberative rationality. For this conception o f rationality does not 
warrant that rational persons would necessarily accept a Kantian conception of the 
good. I shall conclude that it is this internal inconsistency which makes Rawls’s 
argument for congruence fundamentally flawed and accounts for his philosophical 
turn to political liberalism.1
This is a long chapter, not only in pages. The whole essay consists o f eight 
sections, which are arranged as follows. Section 1 will introduce the main idea o f 
congruence and shows its connection to moral stability. Since the need o f 
congruence has been challenged by Barry as based on a misunderstanding o f 
Ross’s doctrine o f the purely conscientious act, Section 2 sets out to compare 
Ross’s doctrine with Rawls’s theory o f practical reason for action. I argue that 
deeply influenced by Foot, Rawls believes that the good o f the sense of justice is 
required to justify the motivational priority of justice. In Sections 3 and 4, I start
1 As Rawls explains, “to understand the nature and extent o f  the differences, one must see them as 
arising from trying to resolve a serious problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact 
that the account o f  stability in Part III o f  Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole. 1 
believe all differences are consequences o f  removing that inconsistency. Otherwise these lectures 
take the structure and content o f  Theory to remain substantially the same." (PL:xvii-xviii)
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to examine Rawls’s free-rider argument and social union argument for congruence. 
I shall argue that both arguments fail. The free-rider argument fails because an 
egoist would not act on moral reasons. The social union argument fails because 
Rawls’s account o f social union is insufficient to establish a shared final end for 
the priority o f the sense o f justice. What Rawls ultimately relies on is the Kantian 
interpretation argument, which is the focus o f Section 5. Through careful 
exposition, I shall argue that this interpretation is a type o f perfectionism 
grounded in a conception o f human nature as free and equal rational being. 
Moreover, my discussion about the second-order conception of personal 
autonomy in turn brings out an important distinction between neutral freedom and 
good freedom primarily suggested by Sidgwick in his commentary on Kant’s 
moral philosophy. In Section 6 ,1 suggest that the Kantian interpretation embodies 
both conceptions o f freedom. However, these conceptions are internally 
incompatible with each other, and the pursuit o f congruence requires Rawls to 
keep only the conception of good freedom. In Section 7, I shall show that the 
conception o f good freedom has further revealed the Kantian interpretation as a 
classical teleological theory. The dichotomy between modem teleology and 
deontology obscures the teleological nature of Rawls’s theory. Lastly, in Section 8, 
I maintain that there is an inconsistency between Rawls’s teleology and his 
account o f deliberative rationality, which results in the failure o f congruence. My 
argument shall then shed light on Rawls’s later development o f political 
liberalism.
1 The Idea o f Congruence
To begin with, I shall recapitulate the main ideas o f congruence. Congruence
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refers to the convergence o f two distinct standpoints, namely the standpoint of 
justice and the standpoint o f goodness. The former is defined by principles chosen 
in the original position o f equality by free and rational individuals under the 
reasonable constraints, while the latter is defined by the successful execution of 
people’s plans o f life consistent with the criteria o f deliberative rationality. As 
rational moral beings, we are guided by both standpoints in practical reasoning. 
The moral standpoint dictates us to do what justice requires while the rational 
standpoint moves us to realize our informed desire. They form the basis from 
which “institutions, actions and plans of life can be assessed.” (TJ: 567/496-497 
rev.) Both standpoints are legitimate, prescriptive and action-guiding.
Nevertheless, these standpoints do not always coincide with each other. An 
action which is right is not necessarily truly good for a rational agent. When the 
standpoints diverge from each other, the question o f why it is rational for a person 
to act justly arises. According to Foot, if  we cannot commend justice to people as 
a good, then “justice can no longer be recommended as a virtue.”2 As a result, the 
motivational priority o f justice will be unfounded. The existence o f two 
standpoints and the possibility o f conflict between them set the background for 
congruence.
To argue for the overridingness o f the sense o f justice, Rawls suggests that 
under certain ideal condition, these two perspectives can converge. In that case, 
rational persons would have sufficient motive to abide by principles o f justice. 
The basic question o f congruence, according to Freeman, is this:
2 Philippa Foot, “Mora! Beliefs” in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
p. 125.
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Is it rational in a well-ordered society of justice as fairness for 
persons to affirm individually, from the point of view 
deliberative rationality, the principles o f justice they would 
rationally agree to when they take up the public perspective of 
justice?3
Rawls’s answer is that in a well-ordered society regulated by justice as 
fairness, the sense o f justice will be perceived as a regulative good by rational 
people. In such a society, Rawls believes that:
Not only does it generate its own supportive moral attitudes, but 
these attitudes are desirable from the standpoint o f rational 
persons who have them when they assess their situation 
independently from the constraints o f  justice. (TJ:398-399/350 
rev., my emphasis)
Thus congruence is a decisive factor in determining stability. It represents a 
harmony between the moral life and the good life. The demand o f justice is not 
regarded as an external constraint imposed on a rational free agent. Instead, it is 
presented as an important part o f a conception o f the good life. Congruence 
expresses a distinctive ethical view that practical reasons for action must stem 
from one’s conception o f the good. To establish the priority of the sense o f justice, 
we need to show how it can occupy a central place in an agent’s “subjective 
motivational set.”4 This view has been seriously challenged by Barry. Barry 
believes that the idea of congruence has in effect denied the claim that recognising 
something to be right is sufficient to motivate right action.5 Put another way, an
3 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice/' in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.285
4 This term is borrowed from Williams, M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981), pp. 101-13.
5 Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability," Ethics 105, (1995), p.884.
157
agent would not do what is right simply out o f a sense o f duty. Barry suggests that 
Rawls’s view stems from his rejection o f the doctrine o f the pure conscientious act 
held by Ross, according to which “the highest moral motive is the desire to do 
what is right, and just simply because it is right and just, no other description 
being appropriate.” (TJ:477/418 rev.) Having rejected this peculiar doctrine, 
according to Barry, “Rawls commits himself in Chapter 9 o f A Theory o f  Justice 
to the ancient doctrine that no act can be regarded as rational unless it is for the 
good o f the agent to perform it.” 6
Barry argues that Rawls makes an apparent mistake here because the desire 
to act morally for the sake o f justice is a widespread disposition in society. People 
simply fulfil their duty out of their sense o f duty and not for some independently 
defined good. Furthermore, the idea o f congruence is unnecessary and absurd. It is 
unnecessary because Rawls need not rely on it to solve the problem of stability. In 
Chapter 8 o f A Theory o f  Justice, Rawls has already shown that following the 
three laws o f moral psychology people will develop an effective sense o f justice to 
do what justice requires. Barry believes that this widely shared moral disposition 
is good enough to maintain a stable society without recourse to the demanding 
congruence argument. Rawls’s claim is absurd because it will dissolve an 
important distinction between the right and the good in our practical reasoning, to 
wit, that we are capable o f doing something right while believing that what 
morality forbids is good for us. Barry offers an example to illustrate this point:
Suppose that I form the view that it would contribute to my
good to take a trip around the world, and that I then find that
6 Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” p.885.
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this would cost more than my resources permit...Instead of 
simply concluding that I cannot justly take the trip (while 
continuing to believe that taking it would be for my good), I am 
told by Rawls that I must somehow persuade myself that it 
would not be for my good at all. For only that thought can 
motivate me to refrain from taking the trip unjustly i f  the 
opportunity should arise. This is the absurdity into which Rawls 
is led by his rejection o f “the doctrine o f the purely 
conscientious act.”7
Barry thus concludes that the whole idea of congruence is grounded on a 
mistake. It can be set aside without causing any damage to Rawls’s theory as a 
whole. It follows that it is also a mistake for Rawls to turn to political liberalism.8 
I think Barry’s criticism is unfair to Rawls. Through a careful analysis o f Ross’s 
doctrine and Rawls’s view of practical reason for action in the next section, I shall 
show that there is indeed a need for congruence.
2 The Need for Congruence
The doctrine o f the purely conscientious act is concerned with the nature and 
source o f the motivational power of moral obligation. Ross claims that the 
goodness o f morally good actions must arise from a certain kind o f motive which 
is connected with a certain type or types o f character. This kind o f motivation is 
our sense o f duty. It is stipulated as something distinct from, and superior to, other
7 Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability," p.889, my emphasis.
8 In the last sentence o f  his long article, Barry concludes that “Rawls’s sweeping recantation is 
uncalled-for, and that the failure o f  Political Liberalism  does not discredit A Theory o f  Justice. I 
believe that, as time goes on, A Theory o f  Justice will stand out with increasing clarity as by far the 
most significant contribution to political philosophy produced in this century. Only one thing 
threatens to obscure that achievement: the publication o f  Political Liberalism .” “John Rawls and 
the Search for Stability," p.915.
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desires o f any kind.9 Only so will the necessity o f moral obligation and the 
supreme worth of conscientious actions be warranted. Where does this moral 
motive stem from? From our pure practical reason! The recognition o f an act as 
one’s duty can by itself motivate us to act:
There is no more mystery in the fact that the thought o f an act 
as one’s duty should arouse an impulse to do it, than in the fact 
that the thought o f an act as pleasant, or as leading to pleasure, 
should arouse an impulse to do it.10
Ross contends that this desire to do our duty need not presuppose Kant’s 
metaphysical view about human beings’ phenomenal and noumenal nature. Rather, 
it simply springs from our possession o f reason. As he puts it, “it is only natural 
that there should arise a desire, itself springing from our rational apprehension o f 
principles o f duty, not to be the slave o f low desires but to regulate our life by 
these principles.”11 A purely conscientious act proceeds from “a desire fo r  a 
specifically distinct object, not for the attainment o f pleasure nor even for the 
conferring o f it on others, but just for the doing o f our duty.”12 Ross stresses that 
the word “purely” specifies the distinct nature o f singleness o f this desire.13 This 
is essentially a Kantian account o f the moral motive. A morally good action must 
be done from a sense o f duty, which is detached from other inclinations or a
9 At this point, Ross disagrees with Kant that apart from the sense o f  duty, there are other desires 
resulting from our nature as rational beings. He thus says that “we can agree with him [Kant] in 
thinking that the sense o f  duty is the highest motive, without following him in putting all other 
motives on the same dead level.” Foundations o f  Ethics (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1939),
p.206.
10 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1930), 
pp.l 57-58.
11 Ross, Foundations o f  Ethics, p.206.
12 Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 158, emphasis added.
13 Ross, Foundations o f  Ethics, p.207.
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person’s happiness. “An action from duty is to put aside entirely the influence of 
inclination and with it every object of the will.”14 There is no relation between the 
moral motive and the good. So, a rational agent should comply with the moral law 
even if  it infringes upon all his inclinations and interests. Thus the priority o f the 
sense o f duty is purely based on the nature of practical reason.
It should be noted that it is this particular Kantian position that Rawls 
describes as the doctrine o f the purely conscientious act, but not Ross’s more 
general doctrine o f moral intuitionism.15 He raises this issue not because he has a 
primary interest in Ross’s intuitionism, but because he wants to make a 
comparison o f this doctrine with his own view of moral motivation so that the 
distinctive feature o f congruence and its indispensability to justice as fairness can 
be seen.lfi
What is wrong with Ross’s account o f moral motive then? Rawls offers the 
following explanation:
It would seem then, that the doctrine of the purely conscientious 
act is irrational.. .Ross holds that the sense of right is a desire 
for a distinct (and unanalyzable) object, since a specific (and 
unanalyzable) property characterizes actions that are our duty.
The other morally worthy desires, while indeed desires for 
things necessarily connected with what is right, are not desires
14 Kant, Groundwork o f  the Metaphysics o f  Morals collected in Practical Philosophy, tran. & 
edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.55.
15 Rawls has clearly indicated his reference to this view in his discussion. (TJ: 477/418 rev., 
footnote 15)
16 Rawls has never used the term “intuitionism” to describe Ross's theory. He refers intuitionism 
to such a doctrine that “there is an irreducible family o f  first principles which have to be weighted 
against one another by asking ourselves which balance, in our considered judgment, is the most 
just." (TJ:34/30 rev.)
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for the right as such. But on this interpretation the sense o f  right 
lacks any apparent reason; it resembles a preference for tea 
rather than coffee. Although such a preference might exist, to 
make it regulative o f the basic structure o f society is utterly 
capricious. (TJ:477-78/418 rev., my emphasis)
At first sight it is unclear why this doctrine is irrational and capricious. If  we 
agree with Barry, there would be nothing wrong to hold that recognition of 
something as just can give rise to a sense o f duty. Mendus tries to defend Rawls 
by saying that what Rawls specifically objects to is the concept o f goodness (or 
rightness, or justice) as simple and unanalysable. 17 It is the rather peculiar 
account o f moral motivation o f rational intuitionism. Barry’s charge is thus 
harmless because Rawls could agree with him on the relation between motivation 
and practical reason in general.18 Nevertheless, this defence is not o f much help 
because it cannot explain why Rawls would uphold the demanding requirement o f 
congruence. Barry, for instance, may argue that what Rawls should do is simply to 
accept a Scanlonian account o f the moral motive, and abandon the project o f 
congruence. Besides, we should note that Rawls’s complaint is that Ross’s 
doctrine is irrational. He acknowledges that such a motive may exist. What he 
argues against is that it should be taken to be the regulative motive of the basic 
structure. So, more attention should be paid to the problem o f rationality.
To judge whether an act is rational, we need to know Rawls’s theory o f 
rationality. Rawls holds a conception o f deliberative rationality, which stipulates
17 Mendus, “The Importance o f  Love in Rawls’s Theory o f  Justice,” British Journal o f  Political 
Science, 29, (1999), p.62.
18 Freeman deploys the similar strategy to respond to Barry. Freeman, “Congruence and the Good 
o f  Justice,” p.282.
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that an act is rational when it can best achieve what an agent wants most after 
informed deliberation. The agent’s rational desire ultimately determines his 
practical reason for action. This is what Parfit called a desire-based theory.19 One 
o f the distinctive features of this theory is that rationality itself cannot decide what 
an agent should most want. Therefore, “knowing that people are rational, we do 
not know the ends they will pursue, only that they will pursue them intelligently.” 
(PL:49, footnote 1) Regardless of this, Rawls makes a further assumption that we 
all live according to a plan o f life. A person’s rational plan o f life determines his 
good. A plan is rational if, and only if:
(1) it is one o f the plans that is consistent with the principles o f 
rational choice when these are applied to all the relevant 
features o f his situation, and (2) it is that plan among those 
meeting this condition which would be chosen by him with full 
deliberative rationality, that is, with full awareness o f the 
relevant facts and after a careful consideration of the 
consequences. (TJ: 408/358-359, rev.)
So, an act is rational if and only if  it is the most effective way to realize what 
the agent most wants, namely, the plan of life that he will adopt with full 
deliberative rationality. It implies that a rational agent will only have a motive to 
act on principles that is beneficial to his plan o f life. When the question “why 
should I be just” is raised, the answer hinges considerably on whether acting justly 
can be conceived as a good to the rational agent.20 “The desire to act justly is not, 
then, a form of blind obedience to arbitrary principles unrelated to rational aims.”
19 Derek Parfit, “What We Could Rationally Will," The Tanner Lectures on Human Value, (Salt 
Lake City: Humanities Center, University o f  Utah, 2002), p.342, retrieved from
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/volume24/parfit_2002.pdf
20 At this point, as Rawls acknowledges, his view is greatly influenced by Foot. See Foot, “Moral 
Belief/' pp. 125-30.
163
(TJ:476/417 rev.) To the contrary, Rawls argues:
A theory should present a description o f an ideally just state of 
affairs, a conception o f a well-ordered society such that the 
aspiration to realize this state of affairs, and to maintain it in 
being, answers to our good and is continuous with our natural 
sentiments. (TJ:477/417 rev., emphasis added)
We may now understand why Rawls thinks that the motivational assumption 
o f the purely conscientious act is irrational. For the doctrine fails to provide any 
further justification to rational individuals that they have a duty to give absolute 
priority to the moral sentiment over other desires. It supposes that an agent should 
have the highest moral motive to do what is right and just simply because it is 
right and just. The desire to fulfil our duty is completely detached from the desire 
to realize our interest. When a person asks himself why it is rational for him to 
fulfil his duty even if  there is a strong conflict between moral command and his 
conception o f the good, Ross’s reply is that “the truest answer I can find is that I 
do it because, then at least, I desire to do my duty more than I desire anything 
else.”21 For Rawls, this answer is question-begging. It lacks any normative force 
to establish its motivational authority.
Justice is a virtue concerning what we owe to other people. It may require us 
to sacrifice our greatest interests for the sake o f other’s rights. Unlike other 
actions that would bring pain, boredom and loneliness, the desire to act justly 
could hardly give sufficient reasons for action by itself. As Foot remarks, “ ‘it is 
unjust’ gives a reason only if  the nature of justice can be shown to be such that it
21 Ross, Foundations o f  Ethics, p.206.
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is necessarily connected with what a man wants.”22 Foot believes that there are 
two types o f desires for actions. The first type can directly motivate us in a certain 
way because it can satisfy some o f our basic wants that are ultimately related to 
our well-being. In this case, no further justification is required. Avoiding pain is 
such an example.23 On the contrary, the second type needs further reason to 
trigger our action. The sense o f justice belongs to this type. Rawls shares this view 
with Foot:
The desire to act justly is not a final desire like that to avoid 
pain, misery, or apathy, or the desire to fulfill the inclusive 
interest. The theory o f justice supplies other descriptions of 
what the sense o f justice is a desire for; and we must use these 
to show that a person following the thick theory o f the good 
would indeed confirm this sentiment as regulative of his plan of 
life. (TJ:569/499 rev., emphasis added)
For Rawls, the “other descriptions” are mainly related to how an individual, 
consistent with desire-based deliberative rationality, can confirm the sense o f 
justice as par o f their good. He does not believe that rationality has such power 
that it is able to dictate that people should have a pure moral motive to comply 
with the principles o f justice regardless o f their conception of the good. The sense 
o f justice is not that type of desire. If  some people have it, it is irrational. His point 
is that a just person who lives his life from the perspective o f justice can do this
22 Foot, “Moral B e lie f” p.127.
23 This point is famously illustrated by Hume in the following paragraph. “Ask a man why he uses 
exercise; he will answer, because he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires 
health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your enquires farther, and 
desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, 
and is never referred to any other object.” Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding 
and Concerning the Principles o f  Morals, ed. L.A.Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975), Appendix 1, V, p.293.
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only if  he builds the priority o f justice into his conception of the good.24 It is for 
this reason that Rawls finds the doctrine o f the purely conscientious act irrational, 
and congruence necessary to stability. Rawls not only rejects Ross’s specific 
account o f the moral motive, but also disapproves o f a general claim that the sense 
o f justice detached from our good can effectively motivate rational individuals to 
act.
We may also think about this question from the perspective of the 
circumstances o f justice. Rawls presumes that society is a cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage. All members are supposed to have a fundamental interest in 
advancing their conceptions o f the good. Their primary motive to participate in 
cooperation is to realize their good. This explains why they have conflicting 
claims about distributive justice. Rational individuals are not expected to act from 
a pure sense o f moral duty. To what extent they can develop an effective moral 
motive largely depends upon whether the principles o f justice concerned can 
effectively promote their good. Therefore, the real problem of congruence is about 
“what happens if  we imagine someone to give weight to his sense o f justice only 
to the extent that it satisfies other descriptions which connect it with reasons 
specified by the thin theory o f the good.” (TJ:569/499 rev.)
Given what I have argued in this section, Rawls’s project is not as 
unnecessary and absurd as Barry perceives. On the contrary, the quest for 
convergence is a necessary step to achieve moral stability. Before we go on to 
assess Rawls’s substantive argument for congruence, an ambiguity concerning the
24 I thank John Charvet for clarifying this point.
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definition o f the good must be settled. Rawls repeatedly reminds us that when he 
talks about the good o f the sense o f justice, the good must be understood in a thin 
sense. This is a puzzling reminder. We know that the main purpose o f the thin 
theory o f the good is to define primary goods in the original position. Primary 
goods are those things that rational individuals, whatever they are, desire as 
prerequisites for carrying out their plans o f life. These things include rights and 
liberties, income and wealth, opportunity, and self-respect. Nevertheless, the sense 
of justice does not belong to this list. Moreover, the thin theory is mainly used in 
the original position. After the veil o f ignorance is lifted, people will deliberate 
according to the full theory o f the good in connection with deliberative rationality 
and their plans of life. Now since congruence takes place in the second stage 
where people have full knowledge o f their situation with no restriction on 
information, it is unreasonable to suppose that people would still be guided by the 
thin theory in judging the goodness o f the sense o f justice. Barry, for example, has 
put the following question to Rawls:
Given that the problem, as Rawls conceives it, is one o f offering 
a reason for real people to “affirm their sense o f justice,” it is 
surely correct to specify that they should have full information.
But then why should they throw away the information about 
their own distinctive conceptions o f the good (their “thick” 
conception) and restrict the question to one the answer to which 
is going to be the same for everyone?25
This is a good observation, and Rawls’s position is ambiguous. For example, 
he explicitly states that “when we come to the explanation o f the social values and 
the stability o f a conception o f justice, a wider interpretation o f  the good  is
25 Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability," pp.885-86.
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required.” (TJ:398/350 rev., my emphasis) He also says that the real problem of 
congruence is whether a rational person would adopt the standpoint o f justice as a 
regulative good viewed “in the light o f the thin theory with no restrictions on 
information.”(TJ:567/497 rev., emphasis added) If  rational individuals have 
already known their conceptions o f the good, it is implausible to expect them not 
to use the full theory o f the good to assess their situation.
In my view, the only plausible explanation is that even though the knowledge 
o f conceptions o f the good is available to people, the thin theory should still be 
used to show that it is rational for every person to desire the sense o f justice as his 
regulative good. It is thin in the sense that it is good for all rational plans of life. 
Therefore, “the plan o f life which does this is his best reply to the similar plans o f 
his associates; and being rational fo r  anyone, it is rational fo r  a l l” (TJ:567/497 
rev., my emphasis) The claim of rationality applies to every one. The real 
challenge is, given desire-based rationality and the fact o f pluralism, whether 
Rawls can provide convincing arguments to vindicate this ambitious claim. This is 
what we are going to examine in the rest o f this chapter.
3 The Free-Rider Argument
In Section 86 “The Good of the Sense o f Justice”, Rawls provides three 
major arguments to justify congruence o f the right and the good. I will call them 
the Free-Rider, the Social Union, and the Kantian Interpretation Arguments 
respectively. These arguments are different in nature. I will examine the first 
argument in this section while dealing with the other two in the coming sections.
The free-rider argument is concerned with the psychological cost o f  being a
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free-rider in a well-ordered society regulated by a public conception o f justice. 
Rawls contends that an egoist free-rider will suffer from loss o f spontaneity and 
naturalness if  he plans a systematic course o f deception and hypocrisy. He must 
keep on hiding himself even from those around him. Thus, the supposition that 
acting unjustly is more profitable than doing justice is dubious.26
This argument is weak. First o f all, it is inconclusive. For whether a 
free-rider egoist would comply with principles o f justice depends upon his 
rational calculation o f cost and benefit in different circumstances. It is possible 
that even if  an egoist knows that he has to pay some psychological cost, he will 
still choose to act unjustly in case free-riding will win him even greater benefits. 
There is nothing irrational for him to take advantage o f the cooperative efforts of 
others. Rawls’s reply is that the price o f free-riding is particularly high in a 
well-ordered society where most other people act on, and from the sense o f justice. 
(TJ: 570/499 rev.) But this is empirically questionable. For an egoist who does not 
care about the value o f spontaneity and naturalness, cheating may scarcely upset 
him or his life. For this argument to stand, Rawls needs a much stronger account 
to show that spontaneity is essential to any rational plan of life, and that any act o f 
deception would substantively hamper one’s conception o f the good. But Rawls 
cannot make such a claim about free-riders because he concedes that sometimes 
“acting fairly is not in general each man’s best reply to the just conduct o f his 
associates.” (TJ:497/435 rev.)
Why does Rawls want to justify the good o f justice to a free-rider egoist?
26 Rawls here basically follows Foot's argument in “Moral Argument/’ p. 129.
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This seems unnecessary because Rawls makes it clear that his argument is not 
trying to show that in a well-ordered society an egoist would act from a sense of 
justice, nor even that he would act justly because so acting would best advance his 
ends. Rather, he assumes that members of that society already possess a sense of 
justice. What we are concerned with is “the goodness o f the settled desire to take 
up the standpoint of justice.” (TJ:568/498 rev.) However, an egoist will only work 
for his own interest. Even if on some occasions he acts on the principle o f justice, 
it is merely a coincidence. An egoist will not act on moral reasons. For “having 
these reasons is inconsistent with being an egoist.” (TJ:568/497 rev.) So, even if  
free-riders’ self interest is congruent with justice, it is for the wrong reason.
4 The Social Union Argument
The social union argument rests on the Aristotelian Principle and the idea of 
society as a social union. The thrust is that participating in the life of a 
well-ordered society is a great good. And “to share fully this in this life we must 
acknowledge the principles o f its regulative conception, and this means that we 
must affirm our sentiment o f justice.” (TJ:571/500 rev.) This argument does not 
address itself to egoistic free-riders by appealing to pragmatic reasons. It is 
grounded on the intrinsic value o f community and the social nature of human kind. 
Rawls takes the idea o f social union seriously and places much emphasis on our 
social nature. He aims to show that justice as fairness presupposes neither an 
atomistic self nor a private society. For Rawls, congruence depends in large part 
upon whether a well-ordered society achieves the good o f community.
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(TJ:520/456 rev.) 27 He explains his argument as follows:
What binds a society’s efforts into one social union is the 
mutual recognition and acceptance o f the principles o f justice; it 
is this general affirmation which extends the ties o f 
identification over the whole community and permits the 
Aristotelian Principle to have its wider effect. Individual and 
group accomplishments are no longer seen as just so many 
separate personal goods. Whereas not to confirm our sense of 
justice is to limit ourselves to a narrow view.
(TJ:571 -72/500-501 rev.)
The Aristotelian Principle is defined as follows: “other things equal, human 
beings enjoy the exercise o f their realized capacities (their innate or trained 
abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the 
greater its complexity.” (TJ:426/374 rev.) So, we have a natural desire to prefer 
exercising our higher activities and engaging in complex activities for their own 
sake. Rawls takes this as a basic principle o f motivation to account for many of 
our major desires. Surprisingly, he offers little argument to prove it. He simply 
presumes that “complex activities are more enjoyable because they satisfy the 
desire for variety and novelty o f experience, and leave room for feats o f ingenuity 
and invention.” (TJ:427/374 rev.)2li This account is however insufficient to 
explain the complexity o f human motivation. As a matter o f empirical fact, people
27 This argument is not taken seriously enough by critics. For example, Barry does not mention 
this argument at all in his “John Rawls and the Search for Stability/’ Although Freeman has 
touched upon this issue, he only interprets it as a “simplified argument from the Aristotelian 
principle” without discussing its connection with the idea o f  social union. “Congruence and the 
Good o f  Justice,” pp.291-92.
28 Rawls’s another argument is that the principle is supported by an evolutionary explanation. But 
he immediately acknowledges that “the evolutionary explanation, even if  it is correct, is not o f  
course a justification for this aspect o f our nature. In fact, the question o f  justification does not 
arise.” (TJ:432/379 rev.) It is not easy to make sense o f  this statement. For without sufficient 
support, how can Rawls claim that this principle o f  motivation is a “natural fact”, and explain 
many o f  our reasons for action?
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may not choose to engage in a more complex activity because o f the limit o f their 
talents, the training cost, the toughness o f the activity, and the recognition of the 
value o f this activity by their associates. Many factors affect a rational agent’s 
choice. Rawls actually admits this possibility. He agrees that a man whose only 
good is counting blades o f grass should not be regarded as irrational i f  this is a 
choice that he would choose with deliberative rationality and regard as a final end 
regulating the schedule o f his actions. As a result, “the correctness o f the 
definition of a person’s good in terms o f the rational plan of life for him does not 
require the truth of the Aristotelian Principle.” (TJ:433/380 rev.) If  this is the case, 
why would Rawls still appeal to this principle?
Rawls’s contention is that the Aristotelian Principle plays an important role 
in accounting for our considered judgments o f value. It is then rational for persons 
to realize and preserve those complex capabilities, and give them a prominent 
place in their plans o f life. The Aristotelian Principle is part o f the background to 
the specification o f our good and explains our desire for the exercise o f certain 
capacities. If  this argument succeeds, Rawls can then put forth a further claim that 
the exercise o f the sense o f justice is generally experienced as a good. As Freeman 
remarks, “this capacity admits o f complex development and refinement. Since all 
have a sense o f justice in a well-ordered society, it is rational for each to develop it 
as part o f his or her plan o f life.”29 The principle will then provide direct support 
for congruence because we have a natural desire to realize our moral capacity.
However, this argument is implausible. First, as demonstrated above, there is
29 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice/’ p.291.
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no conclusive argument to support the claim that a rational plan o f life must meet 
the Aristotelian Principle. The argument at most describes a natural tendency o f 
human motivation, but not an invariable pattern of choice. Second, human beings 
have different kinds o f mature capacities. Which capacity they choose to exercise 
depends upon their conceptions of the good. The Aristotelian Principle itself 
cannot account for why rational individuals should have a desire to develop their 
sense o f justice. Rawls admits this difficulty because he agrees that “by itself the 
principle simply asserts a propensity to ascend whatever chains are chosen. It does 
not entail that a rational plan includes any particular aims, nor does it imply any 
special form of society.” (TJ:430/377-378 rev.) Thus the principle falls short o f 
affirming the central place o f the sense o f justice in people’s rational plans o f life. 
Finally, even if  people have an interest in exercising the sense o f justice, it does 
not entail that they will give priority to the sense of justice over other capacities. 
As Freeman rightly asks, “what is to prevent my giving weight to my sense of 
justice only according to its relative intensity and subordinating it to stronger 
dispositions, weighting off my concern for justice against other final ends in 
ordinary ways?”30 The Aristotelian Principle itself is insufficient to provide 
support for congruence. Rawls needs a stronger argument to show that exercising 
the sense o f justice is not just a good, but a common regulative good embedded in 
every rational plan of life. This is indeed what Rawls intends to offer. The 
Aristotelian Principle just sets the background for the idea o f the well-ordered 
society as a form of social union.
Rawls starts his argument with a comparison between the notion o f private
30 Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice,” p.292.
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society and o f social union. The idea o f private society has three major features. 
First, people have competing or independent private ends which are not 
complementary to each other. Second, people are not moved by a desire to act 
justly. They are egoistic beings. What they care about is how to gain the largest 
share o f resources through the most efficient arrangement. Finally, given the first 
two features, people view institutions as a means or even a burden to realize their 
interests. Social cooperative schemes are not thought to have value in themselves. 
A Hegelian civil society or a competitive market is a paradigm description of such 
a society. Obviously, a private society has no capacity for moral stability. Its 
maintenance o f social order will have to heavily rely on coercive power. Rawls 
claims that a well-ordered society is not a private society because its members are 
presumed to have an effective sense o f justice. More importantly, thanks to the 
sociability o f human beings, a well-ordered society is a form of social union:
The social nature o f mankind is best seen by contrast with the 
conception o f private society. Thus human beings have in fact 
shared fina l ends and they value their common institutions and 
activities as good in themselves. We need one another as 
partners in ways o f life that are engaged in for their own sake, 
and the successes and enjoyments o f others are necessary for 
and complementary to our own good. (TJ:522-23/458 rev., my 
emphasis)
The idea o f society as a social union consists o f three features. (1), it has a 
shared final end guiding members’ actions; (2), social institutions are regarded as 
good in themselves; and (3) all participants find great satisfaction in the 
realization o f shared ends. When a society possesses these features, it is a social 
union. The idea o f social union is grounded on a rather self-evident fact about 
human beings: no one can fully realize his potentialities and capabilities as he
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wishes because o f natural and social constraints. Each individual at a time can 
only participate in and achieve perfection of a particular activity. The complexity 
o f activities inevitably limits the expression o f powers of an individual. Therefore, 
we cannot but make choices about what kinds of ability and interests we want to 
pursue. Nevertheless, we need not regret the incompleteness. This is because 
“through social union founded upon the needs and potentialities o f its members 
that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of 
the others.” (TJ:523/459 rev.) By mutual cooperation, members enjoy one 
another’s perfections o f different kinds o f talents. We may call this a tacit division 
o f labour for a common project. Members develop their faculties in activities that 
they have chosen so as to realize the rich powers o f all in their joint performance. 
Their ends are not competing and independent o f one another. Rather, they are 
often complementary. Living in a social union enriches our life and increases our 
satisfaction.
It is surely right that the complementarity o f the good is important to 
everyone. What is unclear is how it can lend support to the congruence argument. 
For instance, a free-riding egoist can appreciate the good resulting from the 
realization o f the potentialities o f the others. O f course, an egoist’s end is 
complete and independent. But he can recognize that his realization o f his final 
end may involve instrumental dependence on the ends o f others so that the 
attainment o f his end cannot be separated from the ends of others.31 The question 
o f whether a rational individual can be motivated to act justly is different from the 
question o f whether we need one another to realize a totality of human capacities.
31 I thank John Charvet for pointing out this to me.
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The latter has no bearing on the former. An instrumentalist view o f society seems 
compatible with the notion of social union. Rawls denies this in holding that only 
in a social union will people have a common end that informs their action. Rawls 
uses games as an analogy to demonstrate this salient point. He says:
[W]e can easily distinguish four sorts o f ends: the aim of the 
game as defined by its rules, say to score the most runs; the 
various motives o f the players in playing the game, the 
excitement they get from it, the desire for exercise, and so on, 
which may be different for each person; the social purposes 
served by the game which may be unintended and unknown to 
the players, or even to anyone in the society, these being matters 
for the reflective observers to ascertain; and then finally, the 
shared end, the common desire o f  all the players that there 
should be a good play o f  the game. This shared end can be 
realized only i f  the game is played fa irly according to the rules, 
i f  the sides are more or less evenly matched, and i f  the players 
all sense that they are playing well. But when this aim is 
attained, everyone takes pleasure and satisfaction in the very 
same thing. A good play o f the game is, so to speak, a collective 
achievement requiring the cooperation o f all.
(TJ:525-26/460-61 rev., my emphasis)
Rawls holds that, like games, social unions have their shared ends and 
members will have a regulative and effective desire to realize them. I do not think 
this argument can support congruence. First o f all, given that there are different 
sorts o f ends in a game, it is dubious how the priority o f the shared ends over 
others is warranted. Many games are competitive by nature. Winning the game 
and gaining the reward are often players’ strongest motive to take part in a 
competition. O f course, this desire is not necessarily incompatible with the desire 
to play a good game. Even if  one loses, he may still find great enjoyment in 
jointly performing a good game. However, in case two ends come into conflict, it
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cannot be said that the common end will prevail by default. Rawls may reply that 
the pleasure drawn from the shared end far exceeds that from other ends. The 
validity of this claim, however, can only be judged on a case by case basis. Even 
in the same game players may have different levels o f  enjoyment. It is simply not 
the case that when the shared end is realized, all participants will find satisfaction 
in the very same thing with equal degrees.
Furthermore, the priority o f the shared end cannot be justified by claiming 
that the shared end makes members’ good complementary to one another and thus 
brings a great deal of pleasure to each participant. This is essentially an 
individualistic argument. For the appeal of social union is largely ascribed to its 
instrumental benefit to individuals’ separate ends. Before they join a union, 
members are supposed to have their distinct plans o f life. Rawls does not describe 
the shared end as an independent social entity imposed on members. For that will 
violate the principle o f the separateness o f persons. To what extent the shared end 
is honoured relies on members’ subjective endorsement. As Rawls himself 
acknowledges, “whether individuals have a shared end depends upon the more 
detailed features of the activity to which their interests incline them as these are 
regulated by principles o f justice.” (TJ:526/461 rev., my emphasis) In this case, 
the notion o f social union is a weak conception o f community whose value 
ultimately depends on its contribution to individuals’ pre-given conceptions o f the 
good. The social union is a form of association that people can freely join for 
mutual benefit through cooperation. So, like other ends, the motivational force of 
the shared end is the outcome, rather than the precondition, o f our choice.32
32 Note that I am not saying that the shared end is determined by our choice. This seems too good
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This weak conception o f community is sharply different from a constitutive 
conception according to which “community describes not just what they have as 
fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in a 
voluntary association) but as attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but 
a constituent o f their identity.”33 Rawls denies this communitarian ideal of 
community. One reason is that only the weak conception is consistent with 
desire-based rationality and the idea o f the free person with a moral capacity for a 
conception of the good. A constitutive conception o f community would limit our 
freedom to form, to revise, and to pursue our conceptions o f the good. Thus, 
regardless o f his emphasis on the value o f social union, Rawls would not want to 
adopt a constitutive conception o f community.
My discussion has so far focused on the general account o f social union and 
has shown its insufficiency to prioritize the shared end over others. We now turn 
to examine the idea o f a well-ordered society as a social union o f social unions. 
According to Rawls, a well-ordered society manifests two essential features of 
social union, namely, “the successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared 
final end of all the members o f society, and these institutional forms are prized as 
good in themselves.”(TJ:527/462 rev.) Why these two features? Rawls’s answer 
explains as follows:
In much the same way that players have the shared end to 
execute a good and fair play o f the game, so the members o f a
to be true. It is possible that there is a final shared end o f  a social union even though a number o f  
members do not have any interest in it. Since our concern is the motivating force o f  the shared end, 
we need not worry about this possibility here.
33 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), p.150.
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well-ordered society have the common aim of cooperating 
together to realize their own and another’s nature in ways 
allowed by the principles of justice... and when everyone acts 
justly, all find satisfaction in the very same thing. (TJ:527/462 
rev., emphasis added)
Participating in social cooperation matters because it is an effective means to 
realize each member’s nature, which in turn brings them great satisfaction. Our 
common interest is to express our nature. To make this argument succeed, two 
questions must be answered: first, why should our nature be understood in this 
way? Second, why should the successful implementation o f a just basic structure 
be necessary condition of realising our nature? Rawls’s answer is grounded on 
what he calls the Kantian interpretation o f justice as fairness. Whether this 
interpretation is well justified will be scrutinized in the next section. However, if 
the value o f social union depends on a higher-order interest in realising our nature, 
then the idea o f social union itself would appear not to have independent 
justificatory force.
This does not mean, however, that the well-ordered society is only 
instrumental in satisfying our independent ends. For Rawls insists that when the 
idea o f social union is applied to the basic structure as a whole, social institutions 
will be regarded as good in themselves by members. Does this imply that 
institutions are still valuable in themselves even if  a majority o f members 
disrespects them for whatever reason? This does not make any sense. What Rawls 
means must be that living in a just society and doing what justice requires are 
necessary conditions o f the realization of our nature. Since this is our final end, 
the good o f well-ordered society will not serve any further ends. If  so, the real 
force of congruence comes primarily from the Kantian interpretation o f human
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nature rather than any distinct feature o f social union.
In this and the previous sections, I have discussed the free-rider and the 
social union arguments for congruence. The free-rider argument fails because we 
can never provide sufficient reasons to convince an egoist that being a just person 
is always good for him. The social union argument is not sound because neither 
the Aristotelian Principle nor the idea of social union are sufficient to show the 
good o f granting priority to the sense o f justice. When the idea o f social union is 
applied to the well-ordered society, it is clear that its shared final end is based on a 
Kantian conception o f human nature. Since the Kantian interpretation is the most 
fundamental argument for stability, the rest of this chapter will be devoted to it.
5 The Kantian Interpretation and Liberal Perfectionism
The central idea o f the Kantian interpretation o f justice as fairness is that 
rational persons would have a regulative desire to express their nature as free and 
equal rational being. The idea is primarily derived from Kant’s conception o f the 
moral person and the notion o f autonomy. Rawls holds that justice as fairness can 
be interpreted as the most adequate expression o f this Kantian ideal. It provides 
the strongest reason for rational agents to uphold justice because acting justly is 
itself a regulative good judging from the rational point of view. In the following 
discussion, I will first explicate this interpretation and then argue that it has 
presupposed a form of perfectionism.
It would be instructive to begin with an examination of how the right and the 
good are congruent with each other under the Kantian interpretation o f human 
nature. According to Rawls:
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Acting justly is something we want to do as free and equal 
rational beings. The desire to act justly and the desire to express 
our nature as free moral persons turn out to specify what is 
practically speaking the same desire. When someone has true 
beliefs and a correct understanding o f the theory o f justice, 
these two desires move him in the same way. They are both 
dispositions to act from precisely the same principles: namely, 
those that would be chosen in the original position. (TJ:572/501 
rev.)
Having explained the possible convergence o f two desires, Rawls continues 
to argue for its regulative priority:
The desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational 
being can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles o f right 
and justice as having first priority. This is a consequence o f the 
condition of finality: since these principles are regulative, the 
desire to act upon them is satisfied only to the extent that it is 
likewise regulative with respect to other desires. It is acting 
from this precedence that expresses our freedom from 
contingency and happenstance. Therefore, in order to realize 
our nature we have no alternative but to plan to preserve our 
sense o f  justice as governing our other aims. This sentiment 
cannot be fulfilled if it is compromised and balanced against 
other ends as but one desire among the rest. (TJ:574/503 rev., 
emphasis added)
Rawls’s argument can be formulated as having the following thirteen steps.
(1) According to the Kantian account o f human nature, we are 
essentially free and equal rational beings.
(2) Rational beings have a fundamental desire to express their 
nature.
(3) The realization o f one’s nature is a supreme good for a
rational person.
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(4) The necessary and sufficient condition of realising one’s 
nature is to act on principles o f justice which are chosen under 
conditions that fully represent one’s nature as free and equal 
rational being.34 This is because “to express one’s nature as a 
being o f a particular kind is to act on the principles that would 
be chosen if  this nature were the decisive determining element.” 
(TJ:253/222 rev.)
(5) The original position is designed to fulfil the task in (4). As 
a device o f representation, it specifies conditions in which 
principles o f justice are chosen by rational free persons in an 
initial situation o f equality without being affected by their social 
position or natural endowments.
(6) Since Rawls’s principles o f justice would be chosen by free 
and equal parties in the original position, acting from these 
principles is therefore the most effective way to express their 
nature.
(7) The desire to apply and to act from the principles o f justice 
is called a sense o f justice. (TJ:567/496-497 rev.)
(8) Taking the above premises together, it can be concluded that 
“acting justly is something we want to do as free and equal 
rational beings. The desire to act justly and the desire to express 
our nature as free moral persons turn out to specify what is 
practically speaking the same desire.” (TJ: 572/501 rev.)35
(9) Thus it is rational for an individual to affirm his sense of 
justice because the realization o f his nature is a supreme good
34 Rawls uses “to express one's nature” and “to realize one’s nature” interchangeably to refer to 
the same meaning.
35 Similarly, after rejecting the doctrine o f  the purely conscientious act as irrational, Rawls asserts 
that “for one who understands and accepts the contract doctrine, the sentiment o f  justice is not a 
different desire from that to act on principles that rational individuals would consent to in an initial 
situation which gives everyone equal consideration as a moral person. Nor is it different from 
wanting to act in accordance with principles that express men’s nature as free and equal rational 
beings.” (TJ:478/418 rev.)
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in virtue of (3).36
(10) Furthermore, the condition of finality requires that the 
principles o f justice chosen in the original position must be 
regulative and overriding. The primacy of justice is assured by 
this formal condition.
(11) Since the principles of justice are regulative, the desire to 
act upon them must also be regulative. If the sense o f justice is 
compromised and balanced against other ends as but one desire 
among the rest, we fail to fully realize our nature. For “how far 
we succeed in expressing our nature depends upon how 
consistently we act from our sense o f justice as finally  
regulative.” (TJ:575/503 rev., emphasis added)
(12) Therefore, it is always rational for individuals in a 
Rawlsian well-ordered society to give first priority to the sense 
o f justice as a result o f congruence.
(13) Finally, congruence is verified and justice as fairness is 
shown to be the most stable conception of justice.
We can note that the whole argument is grounded on a particular 
interpretation o f human nature. If  the argument holds true, justice as fairness will 
be as stable as one can hope for. There will be no disharmony between the right 
and the good. A well-ordered society regulated by justice as fairness is not only 
reasonable from the impartial perspective o f the original position, but also 
desirable from the first-person rational point o f view. If one is rational enough, he 
will recognize that being a just person is exactly what he most desires to be. The 
congruence argument has a deep appeal because it offers an answer to the
36 Freeman holds that this is a result o f  the Aristotelian Principle. Nevertheless, according to 
Rawls, our good is determined by the satisfaction o f  our rational desires. Since the expression o f  
our nature is a rational desire, it is not necessary to appeal to the Aristotelian Principle to affirm its 
value. Freeman, “Congruence and the Good o f Justice," pp.293-94.
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question o f why a rational person would have sufficient reason to act morally.
It should be noted that this Kantian conception o f human nature points to a 
perfectionist position. According to Rawls, perfectionism is a type o f 
ideal-regarding principle which directs society to arrange institutions and to define 
the duties and obligations o f individuals so as to realize an ideal independently 
specified. (TJ:325-26/285-286 rev.)37 Thomas Hurka, a prominent perfectionist 
philosopher, also defines perfectionism as such a doctrine that “the good consists 
at bottom in developing one’s ‘nature’, or realizing a ‘true selF: certain properties 
are central to one’s identity, and one’s good consists in developing these properties 
to a high degree.”38 Furthermore, perfectionism is based on an objective theory o f 
the good. The realization of good in a life makes that life better independently o f 
how much it is wanted or enjoyed.
The Kantian interpretation o f justice as fairness seems to fit the definition o f 
perfectionism perfectly. It prescribes an objective conception o f human nature as 
free and equal rational being; it holds that a justifiable conception o f justice must 
be able to express our nature as fully as possible; it even stipulates that acting in 
accordance with justice is a constitutive good with the highest priority. At some 
point, Rawls accepts this characterisation o f his theory. For instance, he remarks 
that “a certain ideal is embedded in the principles o f justice, and the fulfilment o f
37 Rawls holds that there are two variants o f  perfectionism. In the first, it is the sole principle o f  a 
teleological theory which aims to maximize the achievement o f human excellence; in the second, 
the principle o f  perfection is only one standard among several in an intuitionist theory. 
(TJ:325/285-286 rev.) This indicates that maximization is not a defining feature o f  perfectionism. 
What is crucial is the role o f human excellence played in a theory. I will elaborate this point in 
more detail later.
38 Thomas Hurka, “Perfectionism” in E. Craig ed., Routledge Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy, 
(London: Routledge, 1998), retrieved from http://www.rep.routledge.com/articIe/L070SECT5.
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desires incompatible with these principles has no value at all. Moreover we are to 
encourage certain traits of character, especially a sense of justice.” (TJ:326-27/287 
rev.) Despite this, Rawls insists that “perfectionism is denied as a political 
principle.” (TJ:329/289 rev.) Justice as fairness at most occupies “an intermediate 
position between perfectionism and utilitarianism.” (TJ:327/287 rev., emphasis 
added)
Rawls offers two arguments to defend his position. First, he stresses that his 
ideal conception o f moral personality does not invoke “a prior standard o f human 
excellence.” (TJ:327/287 rev.) This explanation is dubious. If justice as fairness is 
founded on a prior conception o f human nature, it will entail a prior standard of 
excellence. The standard is to realize our nature as free and equal rational being as 
fully as possible. It determines how the original position would be designed and 
what kind o f principles would be chosen; rational citizens are also expected to 
have a higher-order interest to develop their moral capacity for a sense o f justice 
and for a conception o f the good. “For this sentiment reveals what the person is.” 
(TJ:575/503 rev.) In this regard Rawls is undeniably a liberal perfectionist.
Rawls’s second argument is that any principle o f perfection would be 
rejected by contractors in the original position because it fails to provide a firm 
basis for the equal liberties in a pluralistic society. Although contractors are not 
cognizant o f their particular moral and religious interests, they are aware that they 
will be devoted to different conceptions o f the good in a well-ordered society. Any 
perfectionist principle will be incompatible with equal basic liberties for all. So, 
they would not “risk their freedom by authorizing a standard o f value to define 
what is to be maximized by a teleological principle o f justice.” (TJ:328/288-289
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rev.)
The validity o f this argument is based on an assumption that the principle of 
equal liberty itself does not depend upon any perfectionist ideal. This assumption 
is disputable though. It should be recalled that the reason for the contractors to 
give top priority to liberty is mainly that they regard themselves as free and equal 
rational beings. For Rawls, the principle o f equal liberty is the only alternative 
compatible with our nature, and “to express one’s nature as a being o f a particular 
kind is to act on the principles that would be chosen if  this nature were the 
decisive determining element.” (TJ:253/222 rev., emphasis added) The original 
position serves as a mediating idea to represent our nature as free and equal. Our 
differences in social class and natural endowment are excluded from the original 
position because they would vitiate our nature as autonomous equal beings. To act 
on principles derived from these factors is to act heteronomously. (TJ:252/222 rev.) 
Similarly, the fact that we affirm a particular ideal does not give us a good reason 
to expect others to accept a conception of justice in that ideal’s favour because it 
is incompatible with our capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception o f the 
good. This explains why the contractors are to be ignorant o f  their philosophical 
and religious worldviews. All the above clearly shows that in setting up the 
original position, the Kantian ideal has already been incorporated in its description. 
It plays a decisive determining role in deriving Rawls’s principles of justice. In 
this sense what the original position represents is not a neutral point o f view. 
Rather, it embodies a distinctive liberal conception o f the person. ‘T he parties 
conceive o f themselves as free persons who can revise and alter their final ends
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and who give priority to preserving their liberty in this respect/’ (TJ:475, rev.)'9 
My claim that Rawls is a liberal perfectionist is thereby sustained.
That being said, it may be argued that Rawls’s perfectionism is a 
second-order ideal that can accommodate a variety of first-order substantive 
conceptions o f the good. The Kantian ideal encourages people to develop their 
capacity as autonomous rational agents through choosing their own ways o f life. 
But it will not privilege any particular conception of the good at the ground-floor 
level. As Barry puts it, “anything could be regarded as good (in a second-order 
way) so long as the person who conceived it as good (in a first-order way) had 
arrived at this conception in a way that satisfied the requirements o f autonomy.”40
This defence, if  valid, seems to have the advantages o f two worlds. On the 
one hand, it can admit that liberalism is grounded on a particular interpretation of 
human nature; on the other hand, it can avoid direct competition with other 
conceptions o f the good by positing itself in a higher-order position. Many liberals 
hold this position. Kymlicka, for example, believes that this is the moral 
foundation o f Rawls’s theory. Moreover, the value o f personal autonomy does not 
lead to perfectionism. In contrast, state neutrality is required to respect people’s 
self-determination.41 I am not convinced by this account. Nor do I believe that 
this is a proper interpretation of Rawls. In the rest of this section, I will argue that
39 The most fundamental change in the revised edition o f  A Theory o f  Justice is the re-definition o f  
the parties in the original position as having a common higher interest in developing their two 
moral powers -- their capacity for a sense o f  justice and their capacity for a conception o f  the good 
-- in order to secure the priority o f  basic liberty. This indeed confirms my claim that the derivation 
o f  the principle o f  liberty depends upon a perfectionist account o f  human nature and the 
corresponding human interest. SeeTJ: xii, rev.
40 Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.l 29.
41 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.207.
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even Kymlica himself has adopted a theory o f liberal perfectionism.
According to Kymlicka, the starting point of liberalism is that we all have an 
essential interest in leading a good life. However, leading a good life differs from 
leading the life we currently believe to be good. For our belief about value could 
be mistaken. We may misunderstand our real interest or misjudge the value o f a 
particular activity. It follows that we should be able to stand back from our 
existing ends and deliberate whether our plan o f life is really worth pursuing. This 
does not mean that one who believes that he is in a better position to know what is 
good can impose his view on another person because “no life goes better by being 
led from the outside according to values the person does not endorse.”42 This is 
what Kymlicka calls “endorsement constraint.” No matter how good a way of life 
may be from a third-person perspective, it cannot make a person’s life better if it 
is not accepted by that person from inside, according to his beliefs about value. In 
Kymlicka’s view, the endorsement constraint is applicable to most valuable forms 
o f human activity.43 As a consequence, leading a good life requires two 
pre-conditions:
One is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with 
our beliefs about what gives values to life; the other is that we 
be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of 
whatever information, examples and arguments our culture can
42 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p.203.
43 Kymlicka, however, admits that sometimes short-term state intervention is justifiable if  we 
accept that “one way to get people to pursue something for the right reasons is to get them to 
pursue it for the wrong reasons, and hope that they will then see its true value.” Therefore, “the 
endorsement constraint argument, by itself, cannot rule out all forms o f  state perfectionism.” Once 
this qualification is granted, the liberal objection to perfectionism is no longer as strong as it 
primarily claims. Contemporary Political Philosophy, p.233.
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provide.44
These conditions justify the value o f self-determination. Kymlicka then 
claims that this account manifests Rawls’s conception o f the free person. A free 
person is characterized as capable o f forming, revising, and rationally pursuing a 
conception o f the good.45 In a nutshell, free persons “think o f themselves not as 
inevitably tied to the pursuit o f the particular final ends they have at any given 
time, but rather as capable o f revising and challenging these ends on reasonable 
and rational grounds.”46 Rawls further stipulates that free persons are moved by a 
higher-order interest to exercise this distinctive power o f self-determination. It is 
higher-order in a sense that it is supremely regulative and effective. It governs our 
deliberation and conduct whenever circumstances are relevant to its fulfilment.47 
Why should we have such a regulative desire to preserve this capacity? Kymlicka 
argues that Rawls’s answer must be that we have an essential interest in leading a 
good life.48 Nevertheless, the commitment to self-determination does not lead to 
perfectionism. On the contrary:
Rawls argues that this account o f self-determination should lead 
us to endorse a ‘neutral state’— i.e. a state which does not 
justify its actions on the basis of the intrinsic superiority or 
inferiority o f conceptions o f the good life, and which does not 
deliberately attempt to influence people’s judgments o f the 
value o f these different conceptions.49
44 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p .l3.
45 Another feature is our capacity for a sense o f  justice, the capacity to understand, to apply, and to
act from the public conception o f  justice. (PL: 19)
46 Rawls, “'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.309.
47 Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” p.312.
48 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 12.
49 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p.205.
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The connection between self-determination and neutrality is thereby 
established. Kymlicka calls this conception o f neutrality justificatory neutrality.50 
This claim of neutrality, I believe, is misleading. By definition, a conception o f the 
good normally consists o f a more or less systematic account o f what is valuable in 
human life. It provides a framework through which we can rank our preferences 
and give meaning to our life. It guides our action. According to Rawls, Kant and 
Mill’s liberalism are examples o f comprehensive conceptions o f the good because 
they appeal to autonomy and individuality respectively to inform our thought and 
conduct as a whole. (PL: 37, 78)
In view of this, it is fair to say that Kymlicka’s self-determination-based 
liberalism has presupposed a conception o f the good. For instance, he has 
repeatedly borrowed support from Mill to vindicate the importance of autonomy 
in leading a good life.51 He also objects to Rawls’s political liberalism by arguing 
that the value o f autonomy should not only be limited to the political sphere. 
Rather, it should govern human thought and action generally.52 Kymlicka’s 
message is clear: forms o f life are truly valuable for us only if  we perceive them 
as ones we endorse, or would endorse in a reflective and critical manner. To lead a 
good life, we must regard ourselves as autonomous beings who can freely and 
rationally question our beliefs. A liberal should deem exercising our capacity for 
self-determination a regulative interest, and respect for independence and 
individuality. Although autonomy allows a wide range o f choice o f different
50 Another conception o f  neutrality is called “consequential neutrality” which requires that the 
state should seek to help or hinder different life-plans to an equal degree. Kymlicka, “Liberal 
Individualism and Liberal Neutrality” in Communitarianism and Individualism  ed. Shlomo Avineri 
and Avner de-Shalit (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.l 66.
51 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp.9-19.
52 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 160.
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substantive views o f the good life, it shapes our life in a fundamental way.
This liberal ideal is an object o f reasonable disagreement though. It is not 
even widely shared in Western democratic societies. Kymlicka admits that there 
are many existing non-liberal minority groups who do not give priority to 
self-determination over their religious belief and cultural practice. The later Rawls 
is also well aware that many people living in a democratic society may not value 
autonomy at all:
They may have, and often do have at any given time, 
affections ,devotions, and loyalties that they believe they would 
not, and indeed could and should not, stand apart from and 
evaluate objectively. They may regard it as simply unthinkable 
to view themselves apart from certain religious, philosophical 
and moral convictions, or from certain enduring attachments 
and loyalties. (PL:31)
This indicates that in Rawls’s mind, self-determination-based liberalism 
embodies a perfectionist conception o f the good. Kymlicka is thus wrong to claim 
that self-determination requires state neutrality. Kymlicka counters that even 
though a liberal society encourages rational assessment and revisions o f one’s 
ends, it does not compel people to lead a particular form of life. Hence, “even if  
this view o f autonomy conflicts with a religious minority’s self-understanding, 
there is no cost to accepting it for political purpose.”53 Nevertheless, this is 
merely Kymlicka’s wishful thinking. The court case Winsonsin vs. Yoder which 
Kymlicka cites is a good example. The Amish community requests the 
government to allow them to withdraw their children from school before the age
53 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p . l60.
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of 16 in accordance with its religious doctrine. Kymlicka argues that this kind o f 
internal restriction is unacceptable because it violates children’s personal 
autonomy. But from the Amish point o f view, they are paying a heavy cost for 
living in a liberal society. Liberal autonomy is not as neutral as Kymlicka claims. 
As Barry rightly points out, this second-order conception of the good as autonomy 
actually requires that “only those conceptions that have the right origins—those 
that have come about in ways that meet the criteria for self-determined 
belief—can form a basis for activity that has value.”54
We can now conclude that if  Kymlicka’s interpretation o f justice as fairness 
is right, then Rawls is a perfectionist instead of a neutralist. 55 However, this 
second-order conception has great difficulty in justifying congruence o f the right 
and the good. This difficulty involves two incompatible conceptions o f freedom 
stemming from Kant’s moral philosophy. The following section will focus on this 
issue.
6 Neutral Freedom and Good Freedom
The notion o f self-determination stipulates that we should be free to 
deliberate and to choose our ways of life. It manifests a conception o f personality 
as free agency. According to Frankfurt, the very concept o f a person consists in 
having desires o f the second order about first-order desires. Unlike animals, 
persons can form the second-order volitions and make choices according to their
54 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p . l32.
55 Rawls expressly approves Kymlicka's interpretation as “on the whole satisfactory” although 
“modulo adjustments that may need to be made to fit it within political liberalism as opposed to 
liberalism as a contemporary doctrine.”(PL:27) This confirms my claim that both early Rawls and 
Kymlicka have adopted a comprehensive liberal conception o f  the good.
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will.56 A free agent has the capacity for reflective self-evaluation o f his desires 
and beliefs. In view of this, freedom o f choice enables us to manifest our identity 
as free agent. Rawls endorses this conception o f agency when he stresses that a 
free person is able to form, examine, and revise his conception o f the good. Since 
persons have the capacity to make free and rational choice, they are presumed to 
be responsible for their ends.57
This conception of agency seems to imply that our freedom is equally 
manifested in choosing between good and evil, as much as in choosing different 
conceptions o f the good. The upshot is that we choose in accordance with our 
second-order volitions. Self-determination itself does not prescribe what we 
should choose. We cannot conclude that a good voluntary action expresses a 
greater degree o f freedom than an evil one. Sidgwick calls this “Neutral 
Freedom”— “freedom exhibited in choosing wrong as much as in choosing 
right.”58
This conception of freedom poses a serious challenge to Rawls’s congruence 
project: If congruence depends upon a person’s higher-order interest in expressing 
his nature as free being, and if  the exercise of freedom is neutral between right 
and wrong, how can the desire to express freedom necessarily move the rational 
person to honour the regulative priority of justice? Does he not equally realize his 
nature when he chooses to act unjustly after informed deliberation? As Sidgwick
56 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance o f  What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp. 11-25.
57 Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Collected Papers, pp.369-70.
58 Sidgwick, The Methods o f  Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), seventh edition, 
p.513.
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famously puts it, “the scoundrel must exhibit and express his characteristic 
self-hood in his transcendental choice o f a bad life, as much as the saint does in 
his transcendental choice o f a good one.”59 Following the neutral conception, 
freedom of choice and compliance with justice as fairness do not appear to 
necessitate each other. Nor can Rawls say that people who act unjustly are unffee. 
In short, the commitment to neutral freedom (or self-determination) does not 
result in congruence.
One possible way to resolve this difficulty is to appeal to a more “positive” 
conception o f freedom. This conception must be able to provide resources for 
Rawls to say that abiding by principles o f justice is the only way to realize our 
nature as a free person. A person is free in proportion as he realizes his nature. 
Therefore, although people have neutral freedom to make their choice, they 
realize their true freedom  by acting on moral principles which express that 
designated end. This conception is what Sidgwick calls “GoocP’ or “Rational 
Freedom”, according to which freedom consists in one’s obedience to rationality, 
or moral laws based on pure practical reason.60 A person is heteronomous if he is 
moved to act by his non-rational desires.
When Sidgwick draws this distinction between neutral and good freedom, he 
is talking about Kant’s moral philosophy. He suggests that both conceptions can 
be found in Kant. When Kant has to connect the notion o f freedom with that of 
moral responsibility and free will, he refers to neutral freedom. When he intends 
to prove the possibility o f unconditional obedience to moral law as such without
59 Sidgwick, The Methods o f  Ethics, p .516.
60 Sidgwick, The Methods o f  Ethics, p.512.
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the intervention of sensible impulses, and to exhibit the independence o f reason in 
influencing choices, he refers to Good Freedom.61 Sidgwick points out that these 
two conceptions are incompatible with each other. One cannot be described as free 
in making choices while being unfree in making wrong decision. The conditions 
o f exercising neutral freedom and good freedom are entirely different. To avoid 
this paradox, Sidgwick argues that Kant must drop either of them to make his use 
o f freedom consistent.
Rawls is well aware of Sidgwick’s critique of Kant. (TJ:254-56/224-225 rev.) 
Surprisingly, I find him following Kant in employing both conceptions o f freedom 
in his theory. We have already seen that in justifying the priority o f the principle 
o f liberty and responsibility for our choice, Rawls’s conception o f the free person 
is defined by neutral freedom. We are free when we choose our ends. But in his 
response to Sidgwick’s criticism against Kant, Rawls turns to the conception o f 
good freedom. He says:
Kant’s reply [to Sidgwick] must be that though acting on any 
consistent set o f principles could be the outcome of a decision 
on the part of the noumenal self, not all such action by the 
phenomenal self expresses this decision as that o f a free and 
equal rational being. Thus if  a person realizes his true self by 
expressing it in his action, and he desires above all else to 
realize this self, then he will choose to act from principles that 
manifest his nature as a free and equal rational being. 
(TJ:255/224 rev.)
Rawls does not deny that both conceptions of freedom appear in Kant’s 
theory. However, he stresses that although we can freely choose and act on any
61 Sidgwick, The M ethods o f  Ethics, p .513.
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consistent principles, these principles do not equally express our true self as free 
and equal beings. Only when we act from those that manifest our nature can we 
become truly free. Since our nature is independently defined, this conception of 
freedom must refer to good freedom. For Rawls, his principles o f  justice are the 
most adequate option consistent with our nature because it is the result o f 
agreement in the original position:
The parties qua noumenal selves have complete freedom  to 
choose whatever principles they wish; but they also have a 
desire to express their nature as rational and equal members of 
the intelligible realm with precisely this liberty to choose, that 
is, as beings who can look at the world in this way and express 
this perspective in their life as members o f society.. .Thus men 
exhibit their freedom , their independence from the 
contingencies o f nature and society, by acting in ways they 
would acknowledge in the original position. (TJ:255-56/225 
rev., emphasis added)
Both conceptions o f freedom are mentioned in the above paragraph. Rawls’s 
main argument can be summarized as follows.
1. We are by nature free and equal rational beings.
2. We have a regulative desire to realize our nature.
3. The parties o f the original position have complete freedom  to 
choose whatever principles o f justice they wish. (Neutral 
Freedom)
4. They would choose Rawls’s principles because they could 
most fully express their nature as free beings. (Good Freedom)
5. Therefore, acting unjustly is acting in a manner that fails to 
exhibit our true self as free being in the well-ordered society. In
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this sense, an unjust person is an unfree person.
To make this argument valid, Rawls needs to demonstrate that the parties in 
the original position must have a common desire to choose Rawls’s principles to 
express their good freedom even though they have complete neutral freedom to 
choose. The crucial question is whether both conceptions o f freedom can 
coherently exist in this argument. First o f all, if  we adopt the conception o f neutral 
freedom, there seems no necessary connexion between freedom of choice and the 
derivation o f Rawls’s principles. The very idea o f free choice implies that people 
can make different choices for different reasons. Even in the highly restricted 
original position, as some critics have pointed out, the parties may have reason to 
choose the principle of average utility.62 O f course Rawls would argue that the 
acceptance o f his principles “is the only choice consistent with the full description 
o f the original position. The argument aims eventually to be strictly deductive.” 
(TJ: 121/104 rev., my emphasis) But if so, the idea o f contract becomes redundant 
and the claim that people have freedom to choose is a fraud. By the same token, 
there is no ground for Rawls to claim that people are unfree if  they decide to act 
on non-Rawlsian principles after the veil is lifted. Therefore, (4) and (5) cannot be 
inferred from (3).
If  we look at Rawls’s argument more closely, we will notice that the 
conception o f neutral freedom plays no substantive role in the argument. Even if 
we drop (3) , (4) and (5) can still be derived from (1) and (2). The whole argument
62 For example, John Harsanyi, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A 
Critique o f  John Rawls’s Theory,” in John Rawls: Critical Assessment vo l.l, ed. Chandran 
Kukathas (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), pp.216-38. Also see my discussion in the 
previous chapter.
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is actually based on the conception o f good freedom. Rawls’s main idea can be 
put as follows: since we have a higher-order desire to express our nature as free 
being, we will only act on a conception of justice that can manifest our good 
freedom most fully. Rawls’s principles are thus deductively derived. If  there is any 
difficulty in reaching this conclusion, Rawls could simply modify the description 
so that the parties would “choose” his principles unanimously.
We now see that the two conceptions o f freedom cannot be used consistently 
in the same argument. Rawls faces the same critique as Sidgwick directed against 
Kant. In particular, in his argument for congruence, Rawls must adopt the 
conception o f good freedom. For if people manifest their freedom through acting 
on any principles they choose, there is no way to justify the good o f the sense o f 
justice. What Rawls needs to establish is that the exercise o f the sense o f justice 
must embody a shared final end, namely the realization o f our nature as free being, 
which is a higher-order good that every rational agent has reason to pursue. But if 
the realization o f human nature becomes a common end, does it not imply that 
justice as fairness is a teleological theory? This claim sounds implausible because 
it is well known that the aim of A Theory o f  Justice is to develop a deontological 
conception o f justice as fairness to replace utilitarianism which is the most 
prominent representative o f teleological theory. However, I believe that this claim 
not only makes sense, but also properly accounts for Rawls’s later philosophical 
turn to political liberalism. In the following section, I will defend this claim.
7 Justice as Fairness as a Teleological Theory
A teleological theory consists o f two components: “the good is defined
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independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which 
maximizes the good.” (TJ:24/21-22 rev.) It is important to note that the good is 
referred to non-moral, independently identifiable value. This is because, according 
to Frankena, to allow “the moral quality or value o f something to depend on the 
moral value o f whatever it promotes would be circular.”63 Teleological theories 
then make the right dependent on the non-morally good. In order to know whether 
something (an action, a policy, or an institution) is just, one must first know what 
is good in the non-moral sense, and whether the thing in question can maximize, 
or is intended to maximize the good. These non-moral goods can be variously 
identified with happiness, pleasure, human excellence, knowledge etc. We can 
then have different teleological theories such as ethical egoism, perfectionism, 
hedonism and utilitarianism. What they commonly share is the idea o f the 
maximization o f the good. Rawls further thinks that this is the deepest appeal o f 
teleological theories because it seems to embody the idea o f rationality. “It is 
natural to think that rationality is maximizing something and that in morals it must 
be maximizing the good.” (TJ:24-25/22 rev.) By definition, deontological theory 
is the very opposite o f teleology in that it neither specifies the good independently 
o f the right, nor interprets the right as maximizing the good. (TJ:30/26-27 rev.) 
Rawls believes that justice as fairness meets the requirement o f deontology in 
these two respects.
Rawls agrees with utilitarianism about the definition o f the good as the
63 Williams Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973), second edition, 
p. 14. It is J. H. Muirhead who first uses the teleological/deontological division to describe all 
ethical theories; see his Rule and End in Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932). Rawls 
does not use the term “non-moral good," but he stresses that the goodness o f  things is a separate 
class which is judged without referring to what is right. (TJ:25/22 rev.)
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satisfaction o f rational desire, or the satisfaction of rational plans o f life. 
(TJ:408/358-359 rev.) What he objects to is the utilitarian claim that the 
satisfaction o f any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into 
account in deciding what is right. This is unreasonable because not all desires are 
legitimate. Racial discrimination in a mainly white society, for instance, may 
bring a lot o f pleasure to the white. However, this kind o f pleasure should not be 
given equal weight to other preferences in the utility calculations because it 
violates minorities’ rights. No matter how much satisfaction is derived from those 
desires, they have no moral weight whatsoever. A reasonable political morality, 
Rawls argues, should incorporate the concept o f right as prior to that o f the good. 
It follows that the principles o f justice put limits on which satisfactions have value. 
They should impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions o f one’s good 
from the outset. Hence, “in justice as fairness one does not take men’s 
propensities and inclinations as given, whatever they are, and then seek the best 
way to fulfil them.” (TJ:31/27 rev.) This is the first reason why justice as fairness 
is a non-teleological theory. The second reason is that the idea o f maximization 
does not play any role in justice as fairness. Although the parties in the original 
position want to secure as many social primary goods as possible, they would 
choose a principle o f equal liberty and restrict social and economic inequalities to 
the greatest benefits o f the least advantaged. So, “there is no reason to think that 
just institutions will maximize the good.” (TJ:30/27 rev.) Since both essential 
features o f teleological theory do not apply to justice as fairness, it is therefore 
identified as a deontological theory.
Rawls’s characterisation o f teleology and deontology has been widely 
accepted. His criticism of utilitarianism implies that all kinds o f teleological
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theories are doomed to failure. However, I believe this is mistaken. Rawls’s 
Kantian argument for congruence is actually a type o f teleological theory which 
need not face the difficulties o f utilitarianism. I want to make two points to 
support this claim. First, I will show that Rawls’s argument is grounded on a 
teleological account of human nature which makes the concept o f the good prior 
to that o f the right. Second, I will argue that the idea of maximization is not a 
defining feature of teleological theories. In other words, a conception o f justice 
grounded on a certain ideal o f human nature without adopting the maximizing 
principle is still a teleological theory. Justice as fairness is such an example.
To validate my first point, Rawls’s argument is stated as follows:
1. The good is defined by the satisfaction o f rational desire.
2. It is rational for us to have a higher-order desire to express 
our nature as free and equal rational beings. (TJ:574/503 rev.)
3. To express our nature as a being of a particular kind is to act 
on the principles that would be chosen if  this nature were the 
decisive determining element. (TJ:253/222 rev.)
4. Rawls’s two principles o f justice would be chosen by the 
parties in the original position which characterizes our nature as 
free and equal rational beings.
5. Therefore, acting in accordance with the principles o f justice 
is something that we have a regulative desire to do. The desire 
to act justly and the desire to express our nature turn out to be 
the same desire. So, acting from our sense o f justice is a 
regulative good for rational persons. (TJ:572/501 rev.)
This argument noticeably depicts a teleological outlook. What is right is
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defined by the full expression o f our nature. Our nature is our telos. It can only be 
fully realized and perfected through the effective exercise o f the sense o f justice. 
This should not surprise us because we have already seen that Rawls is a 
perfectionist according to the Kantian interpretation, and perfectionism is a type 
o f teleology. 64 There are some distinct features of Rawls’s teleology which allow 
Rawls to avoid those difficulties faced by utilitarianism.
First, Rawls’s theory can avoid the problem of illegitimate preferences. It 
does not hold that the satisfaction o f desires stems from the same source, and 
therefore ranks equally without any independent discrimination. Rather, it takes 
the desire to realize our nature as a qualitatively different desire. As Rawls puts it, 
“in order to realize our nature we have no alternative but to plan to preserve our 
sense of justice as governing our other aims.” (TJ:574/503 rev.) It is a 
higher-order regulative desire. When other desires are in conflict with the sense o f 
justice, the latter has absolute priority. Since the sense o f justice is characterized 
by Rawls’s principles o f justice, so any preferences that violate the principle o f 
equal liberty will be disallowed at the very beginning.
Moreover, the calculation o f the greatest sum o f satisfaction does not have 
any place in deciding what is right or wrong in Rawls’s case. The principles o f 
justice are justified by its realization o f freedom and equality. The possibility that 
the loss o f  freedom for some is justified by a greater good shared by others will 
not arise because a right to equal liberties is grounded on the Kantian conception
M Rawls holds that there are two variants o f  perfectionism. The first one is that it is the sole 
principle o f  a teleological theory; the second one is that it is one o f  several principles in an 
intuitionist theory. The principle o f  perfection is balanced against others by intuition. 
(TJ:325/285-286 rev.)
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of the person. This conception takes the separateness o f individuals seriously. 
However, this is not a deontological view as Sandel describes: “it describes a form 
o f justification in which first principles are derived in a way that does not 
presuppose any final human purposes or ends, nor any determinate conception of 
the human good.”65 For according to the Kantian interpretation, justice as fairness 
is justified by appealing to a particular vision of human telos. Rawls repeatedly 
reminds us that his whole theory is grounded on a conviction that we have a 
higher-order interest to realize our free nature. His principles o f  justice are 
constructed to represent and realize this fundamental interest.66 The primacy o f 
justice is founded on a final human end. Once the overriding interest in realising 
our nature is granted, a teleological theory warrants the priority o f justice.67
Sandel argues that this kind o f teleological liberalism will put the primacy o f 
justice at risk. For “where the right is instrumental to the advancement o f some 
end held to be prior, the denial of liberty for some may be justified in the name of 
an overriding good for others.”6* This concern brings out the second contrast 
between Rawls’s teleology and utilitarianism. As Frankena describes it, 
utilitarianism regards the right simply as a means to promote an independent and 
non-moral good. Virtuous or right actions are merely instrumental to the
65 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice, p.3.
66 For instance, in the revised edition o f  Theory o f  Justice, Rawls remarks that “the basic rights 
and liberties and their priority are there said to guarantee equally for all citizens the social 
conditions essential for the adequate development and the full and informed exercise o f  their two 
moral powers— their capacity for a sense o f justice and their capacity for a conception o f  the 
good— in what I call the two fundamental cases.” (TJ:xii, rev.) This idea has been fully elaborated 
in his “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Collected Papers, pp.303-58.
67 Sandel actually admits that it is possible to establish the moral priority o f  justice without 
recourse to deontology. Mill's liberalism is a case in point. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  
Justice, p.3.
68 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice, p.l 8.
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maximization o f the good. When the claim of right conflicts with the aggregation 
o f non-moral good, the former ought to give way to the latter. Rawls rejects this 
view by stating that acting justly is constitutive to the perfection o f human nature. 
The desire to be a just person and the desire to express one’s nature move a person 
to act in the same way. Doing what justice requires is not something separated 
from our good. On the contrary, it is an intrinsic value essential to our well-being. 
So, the problem of sacrificing the right for the good will not happen in Rawls’s 
case because doing so is irrational.
Someone may ask if there is such a great contrast between Rawls’s 
proposition and utilitarianism, whether it is proper to label both o f them as 
teleological theories? Korsgaard suggests that they are teleological in a different 
sense. Rawls’s position is closer to classical teleological ethics represented by 
Aristotle while utilitarianism is a type of modem teleological theory. Although 
both share the same view that the good is realized through virtuous action, 
“classical teleologists argue that virtue is identical with the best state o f a human 
being, while modem ones argue that virtue promotes an independent, nonethical 
good.”69 Rawls belongs to the classical camp because first, acting justly is 
constitutive to the perfection of human nature, and second, the realization o f our 
nature is experienced as a moral good. Korsgaard is unsatisfied with Frankena and 
Rawls’s differentiation o f ethical theories into teleological and denotological, and 
assigning classical Greek theories along with utilitarianism to the first category 
and Kant’s theory to the second. For this widely accepted distinction has not only
69 Christine Korsgaard, “Teleological Ethics," in E. Craig ed., Routledge Encyclopedia o f  
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), retrieved from http://www.rep.routIedge.com/article/L103. 
Although Korsgaard does not mention Rawls in this essay, I believe that her account o f the 
classical view provides a reasonable interpretation o f  Rawls’s congruence argument.
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obscured the fundamental difference between classical and modem teleological 
theories, but also neglected the similarity between Kant and classical theory.70 
Following Korsgaard’s categorisation, there is no doubt that Rawls is a classical 
teleologist.
It may also be argued that even if justice as fairness gives priority to the 
concept o f the good, it is still deontological because it denies the idea o f 
maximization. Nevertheless, it is wrong to view maximization as a defining 
feature o f teleology. Extending the principle o f rational choice for one man to 
society as a whole, and pursuing the greatest net balance o f satisfaction summed 
over all the individuals is a feature o f utilitarianism, but not o f teleology. Other 
teleological theories need not adopt this requirement. Take Aristotle as an example. 
For Aristotle, happiness (eudaimonia) is what rational agents ultimately desire. To 
lead a happy life depends on the realization o f our distinctive human function as 
rational being through the practice o f virtues. But the idea o f maximization does 
not play any role in his thought. Although a political community must provide a 
congenial environment to enable citizens to lead a good life, it has no duty to 
maximize different kinds o f virtue among citizens. Nor does Aristotle hold that we 
should compromise someone’s good for the sake o f the greater happiness o f others. 
There is no such maximizing formula in judging when an action is virtuous or not.
There are at least three reasons to explain why a teleologist need not accept 
the concept o f maximization. The first is concerned with the source o f value.
70 A major collection o f  essays offering a serious challenge to the traditional distinction about 
ancient and modem ethics can be found in S. Engstrom and J. Whiting (eds.) Aristotle, Kant, and  
the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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Maximization presupposes that all values can be measured in accordance with a 
common scale. Their qualitative difference is thus entirely neglected because they 
are supposed to be reducible to the ultimate good. This is value monism that 
utilitarianism presumes. However, this meta-ethical view about value is 
questionable. For a teleological pluralist who believes that values are ultimately 
incommensurable, the very idea o f maximization does not make any sense in the 
first place. He could argue that while there is a diversity of intrinsically valuable 
goods, they can only be realized in their distinct spheres according to their internal 
logic.71 When there is conflict between different types o f reason, no conclusive 
reason is available that one reason is necessarily outweighed by another because 
o f the lack of a common commensurable criterion.
The second reason is related to the nature o f value. According to Rawls’s 
understanding o f teleology, once a good has been independently defined, what we 
should do is to promote it as far as possible. Rationality dictates that we ought to 
prefer the better to the lesser, and ought to do what is best. What is best is to 
maximize the good. But there are some goods to which the idea o f maximization 
may not appropriately apply. Friendship, for instance, is unquestionably an 
important good for our life. Should we have a duty to maximize friendship then? 
Provided that we should, this statement can be understood in two different ways. 
It could mean either that we should make every effort to make as many new 
friends as possible, or that we should perfect our relationship with existing friends. 
These two ways to promote friendship are not conceptually incompatible with
71 For different accounts o f  value pluralism, see Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 171; Thomas Nagel, M ortal Questions, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), pp. 128-41; Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990).
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each other. We can do both at the same time. But they connote very different 
senses o f “more is better.” The first way only takes numbers into account. If we 
care about the quality o f friendship, what we should do is perhaps to devote more 
time and love to our friends, and pay more attention to their needs. From a 
utilitarian point o f view, there is nothing wrong with betraying one’s friends for a 
much larger number o f new friends if  this can boost the net balance o f one’s 
happiness. Friendship, however, cannot be exchanged this way. It is absurd to 
demand that a person should give up a special relation with his friend at any time 
when the sums come in from the utility network. What is at stake is not the 
accuracy o f the calculation, but the calculation’s distortion of the very nature of 
friendship. True friendship involves loyalty, trust and commitment which cannot 
be overridden by utilitarian calculation.72 In this case, a teleologist need not 
accept maximization as a necessary means to promote the goodness o f 
friendship.73
Finally, Rawls’s account o f human nature has a built-in element to counter 
the trend o f maximization. We know that Rawls’s major complaint about 
utilitarianism is that it does not take seriously the plurality and separateness of 
individuals because it conflates the desires o f all persons into a coherent system. 
As a consequence, the loss of freedom for some is morally justified by a greater 
good shared by others. However, since Rawls views freedom and equality as an 
essential property o f our nature, we have a fundamental interest in protecting our
72 This is similar to Williams’s critique o f  utilitarianism as an attack on a person’s integrity. See 
“A Critique o f  Utilitarianism” in Utilitarianism: For and Against ed. J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp.l 16-7.
73 1 am indebted to Tang Siu-fu and Tang Wai-sang for this point.
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equal liberties in deciding the principles o f social cooperation for reciprocity.74 
Maximization is unacceptable because it will impair our identity as free and equal 
beings. In Rawls’s case, therefore, it is exactly because we have a regulative 
desire to realize our nature that we will not adopt the concept of maximization.
To conclude, my above argument shows that maximization o f the good is not 
a defining feature of teleology. What is essential to a teleological political theory 
is that it justifies principles o f justice with reference to some final purpose or the 
realization o f human nature.75 This is the main reason I ascribe Rawls’s argument 
for congruence to a view of classical teleology. If  my argument is valid, the 
widely accepted dichotomy of teleology and deontology then collapses. Here we 
come to the last concern o f this chapter: can this teleological theory offer a 
successful argument for congruence which is consistent with desire-based 
deliberative rationality?
8 The Difficulty o f Congruence
In this section, I will show that there is a deep tension between teleology and 
the desired based rationality. This tension results in the failure o f congruence and 
urges Rawls to recast his theory as a political conception of justice.
The primary aim of congruence is to vindicate the good o f  the sense o f 
justice from the point o f view of prudential rationality so that the priority o f moral 
motivation can be secured. A conception of justice is sufficiently stable if  “from
74 It is, however, quite strange for Rawls to say that equality is an essential property o f  human 
beings. It should be a comparative concept concerning the relations between persons.
75 Korsgaard, “Teleological Ethics.”
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the standpoint of the individual, the desire to affirm the public conception of 
justice as regulative of one’s plan of life accords with the principles o f rational 
choice.” (TJ:577/505 rev.) More importantly, when rational individuals judge the 
desirability of the sense o f justice, they “assess their situation independently from 
the constraints o f justice.”(TJ:399/350 rev.) Putting congruence in the context of 
the Kantian interpretation, what Rawls strives to establish is that it is always 
rational for members in a well-ordered society, who have full knowledge o f their 
conceptions o f the good, to regard acting justly as a supremely regulative good 
because doing so can effectively express their nature as free and equal rational 
being. Stability is grounded on a combination of rationality and teleology.
The crucial question is whether deliberative rationality can have such 
normative force as to lead individuals to accept and act upon Rawls’s account of 
human nature. We know that a plan o f life is rational when it satisfies what we 
most want after informed deliberation. Our good is determined by the plan o f life 
that we would adopt with full deliberative rationality. Thus an individual would be 
acting rationally if  he would be doing what, all things considered, he wants to do 
most. This is a desire-based means-end conception o f rationality. Whether an 
action is rational depends on whether it is the best means to satisfy our given 
fundamental desires. However, rationality itself cannot dictate which end we 
should have in the maximal class o f ends. The end is the result o f our choice. 
Given that persons are left free to choose, it is inevitable that “individuals find 
their good in different ways, and many things may be good for one person that 
would not be good for another.” (TJ:448/393 rev.) It is a permanent feature o f 
modem society that rationality is coexistent with a plurality o f conceptions o f the 
good.
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This account of rationality poses a serious challenge to Rawls: if people do 
not care about justice after careful and informed deliberation, there is no ground 
for him to further argue that it is rational for them to do so. The internal logic of 
desire-based rationality restrains Rawls from asserting the universal acceptance of 
the sense o f justice as a higher-order end that rational agents would share. Rawls 
is on the horns o f a dilemma. On the one hand, rationality cannot determine what 
common final ends all o f us ought to have. People’s ends are inevitably diverse in 
a free society. On the other hand, to support his argument for stability, Rawls 
needs to show that people will commonly endorse the sense o f justice as a 
regulative good embedded in their plans o f life. A deep tension exists between 
pluralism and the priority o f the sense o f justice. In order to justify congruence, 
Rawls has taken the second horn by arguing that regardless o f their different aims 
and desires, rational people have a shared higher-order end to realize their nature 
as free and equal rational being. This desire has absolute priority over other 
desires. As Rawls explains,
Therefore, in order to realize our nature we have no alternative 
but to plan to preserve our sense o f justice as governing our 
other aims. This sentiment cannot be fulfilled if  it is 
compromised and balanced against other ends as but one desire 
among the rest. (TJ:574/ 503 rev.)
When Rawls appeals to this teleological account o f human nature, he o f 
course believes that he is making an objectively true statement. Thus to act upon 
his principles is equivalent to realising our most fundamental good. It is rational 
for people to adopt a Kantian conception o f the good to lead their life. Rawls later 
patently acknowledges this assumption:
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This is the premise that in the well-ordered society o f justice as 
fairness, citizens hold the same comprehensive doctrine, and 
this includes aspects o f Kant’s comprehensive liberalism, to 
which the principle of justice as fairness belong. (PL:xlii)
Having acknowledged this assumption, however, it is inconsistent with 
deliberative rationality and the fact of pluralism. After all, “it is rational for 
members o f a well-ordered society to want their plans to be different.” 
(TJ:448/393 rev.) There is no way to expect that rational people would commonly 
accept the same Kantian worldview in a well-ordered society. Rationality parts 
company with teleology. The real problem is not that Rawls’s account o f human 
nature is unconvincing, or that Rawls overlooks the fact o f pluralism. It is rather 
that desired-based rationality is unable to support teleology in a pluralistic society. 
This internal inconsistency has left little room for congruence. Surprisingly, after 
going to great lengths, Rawls concedes the bounds of rationality by saying that:
To justify a conception of justice we do not have to contend that 
everyone, whatever his capacities and desires, has a sufficient 
reason (as defined by the thin theory) to preserve his sense of 
justice. For our good depends upon the sort of persons we are, 
the kinds o f wants and aspirations we have and are capable of.
It can even happen that there are many who do not find a sense 
o f justice for their good. (TJ:576/504-05 rev.)
This is equivalent to admitting that for those who do not accept the Kantian 
conception o f person, we cannot recommend the sense o f justice as a good to 
them since they do not have sufficient reason to do what justice requires. They 
may still comply with justice for prudential reasons. But they will not deem the 
sense o f justice a regulative good o f their plans of life. In other words, without 
endorsing the Kantian interpretation of human nature, there is no other reason to
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justify the goodness o f justice. The possibility o f congruence is subject to a rather 
bold assumption that the majority of people would accept a Kantian conception of 
the good. In a liberal society where people have different kinds o f wants and plans, 
Rawls’s hope for congruence is fundamentally unrealistic.
What then might Rawls say to those who do not find it a good for them to act 
justly? O f course Rawls could not dismiss them as irrational. There is no room for 
Rawls to make such a claim. Against all expectations, Rawls’s answer is that
It is, o f course, true that in their case just arrangements do not 
fully answer to their nature, and therefore, other things equal, 
they will be less happy than they would be if  they could affirm 
their sense o f justice. But here one can only say that their nature 
is their misfortune...Under such conditions penal devices will 
play a much larger role in the social system. (TJ:576/504 rev.)
This charge against those rational non-Kantian people is inconsistent with 
Rawls’s conviction o f justice. I f  their failure in recognising the good o f the sense 
o f justice grows out o f their unfortunate nature, why should they be responsible 
for that? According to Rawls, one’s natural endowment is the outcome o f the 
natural lottery, and is arbitrary from a moral point o f view. We know that this is 
the main moral ground for his difference principle. Following this logic, those 
suffering from unhappiness owing to a nature not o f their choosing should not be 
penalized. On the contrary, they are even entitled to some kind o f compensation.76
Furthermore, as I have thoroughly demonstrated in the first chapter of this
76 Matt Matravers has raised this issue in Justice and Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 145-47.
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thesis, Rawls’s retreat to penal devices to ensure strict compliance has confused 
the distinction between moral stability and social stability. What Rawls aims to 
achieve is the motivational priority o f the sense o f justice. If this project fails and 
a certain portion o f members lack sufficient motive to act in accordance with 
justice as fairness, the employment o f coercive force is necessary to secure social 
stability according to Rawls. However, in this case the use o f state power for 
social stability actually indicates the failure o f moral stability. The pursuit of 
congruence is not a means to social stability, but an independent consideration for 
the desirability o f justice as fairness. When Rawls concedes that there are no 
sufficient reasons to convince every rational individual to see the good of the 
sense o f justice, it is not a practical matter, but a matter concerning the 
justifiability o f justice as fairness. The later Rawls is fully aware o f this 
distinction:
To clarify the idea o f stability, let us distinguish two ways in 
which a political conception may be concerned with it. In one 
way we view stability as a purely practical matter.. .As long as 
the means o f persuasion or enforcement can be found, the 
conception is viewed as stable. But, as a liberal conception, 
justice as fairness is concerned with stability in a different way.
Finding a stable conception is not simply a matter o f avoiding 
futility. Rather, what counts is the kind o f stability, the nature of 
the forces that secure it. (PL: 142)
Only against this background can we understand why the later Rawls stresses 
that the problem of stability is fundamental to political philosophy and why an 
inconsistency internal to Part III o f Theory o f  Justice has urged him to make basic 
readjustments o f his whole enterprise. “All differences are consequences of 
removing that inconsistency.” (PL:xviii) For example, Rawls has totally dropped
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the Kantian interpretation and the idea of congruence in Political Liberalism. 
While he retains the theory o f deliberative rationality, he has introduced the idea 
o f reasonableness to constrain the use o f rationality. The idea o f an overlapping 
consensus is proposed as a replacement for congruence in justifying stability for a 
democratic society characterized by reasonable pluralism. Therefore, to evaluate 
Rawls’s later philosophical development, the most important frame of reference is 
to consider whether his political liberalism can provide a better justification for 
moral stability. This is what I am going to do in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE LIMITS OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
In the previous chapter, I have argued that a tension between rationality and 
the Kantian interpretation o f justice as fairness has failed the congruence 
argument for stability. In order to resolve this tension, Rawls makes a 
paradigmatic shift to political liberalism, and rests stability on the idea of an 
overlapping consensus. Rawls believes that a freestanding liberal political 
conception o f justice will be endorsed by a plurality o f reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines from different perspectives. The priority o f political values is secured by 
the consensus. This chapter sets out to examine the plausibility o f this approach. I 
shall raise my doubts about whether a political conception o f justice can win 
sufficient support of comprehensive doctrines.
It should be noted that this chapter does not aim to offer a comprehensive 
evaluation of political liberalism. My discussion will only focus on a specific 
question: to what extent will a political conception of justice provide sufficient 
reason for a rational agent, who may hold a non-liberal conception o f the good, to 
accept the priority o f justice? This is the central question o f political liberalism. Its 
answer will determine the degree o f stability o f a conception of justice. What I 
provide is basically an internal critique. I will not challenge the desirability o f 
justice as fairness as a political conception from outside. My major concern is 
whether Rawls’s dividing our values and motives into two distinct parts is a wise 
way to solve the problem of moral stability. My argument will show that it is not a 
right direction. This will then pave the way for my idea of potential congruence, 
the main theme of the last chapter.
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This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 introduces the basic 
ideas o f political liberalism and shows how the problem of stability is tackled by 
the idea o f an overlapping consensus. Section 2 examines Rawls’s first argument 
for the possibility o f political liberalism which is concerned with the greatness of 
political values. I contend that this argument is insufficient to establish the priority 
o f political values over non-political ones. Section 3 takes up the second argument 
that justice as fairness as a political conception will be the focus o f an overlapping 
consensus. I shall use Kantianism and utilitarianism as examples to demonstrate 
the difficulties o f this approach in justifying the overridingness o f political values. 
Finally, section 4 focuses on the idea o f burdens o f judgment and argues that it 
presupposes a moderate scepticism which will substantially undermine political 
liberalism.
1 The Idea o f a Political Conception of Justice
In Political Liberalism , Rawls states that the idea o f an overlapping 
consensus is primarily designed to replace the Kantian interpretation o f justice as 
fairness to resolve the problem of stability in face o f the challenge o f reasonable 
pluralism in modem society. It is for this reason that he transforms justice as 
fairness into a freestanding political conception. (PL:xlii-xliii) It is, therefore, a 
good idea to start with an analysis o f the internal relation between an overlapping 
consensus and stability.
According to Rawls, a conception o f justice would be signalled as the focus 
o f an overlapping consensus when it is endorsed by citizens who affirm 
fundamentally different and opposing, though reasonable, comprehensive
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doctrines. The term “overlapping” denotes convergence on a conception o f justice 
from different perspectives for different reasons. Rawls thus says:
In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the 
political conception, each from its own point o f  view. Social 
unity is based on a consensus on the political conception; and 
stability is possible when the doctrines making up the 
consensus are affirmed by society’s politically active citizens 
and the requirements o f justice are not too much in conflict with 
citizens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged by their 
social arrangement. (PL: 134, emphasis added)
Some salient features arising from this idea are noteworthy. First o f all, in 
reaching a consensus, citizens need not abandon their reasonable conceptions o f 
the good. They decide for themselves how the political conception is related to 
their comprehensive worldviews. It is their autonomy to “view the political 
conception as derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, 
their other values.” (PL: 11) The motivating reason for obedience varies from 
person to person depending on their philosophical and religious beliefs. In this 
sense, political liberalism is more tolerant and flexible than other theories o f 
justice.
That being said, political liberalism demands that citizens give precedence to 
political values over non-political values in case of conflict. This requirement of 
priority is a key issue o f political liberalism. For Rawls’s theory presumes a 
dualism between the point o f view o f the political conception and the many points 
o f view of comprehensive doctrines. As Rawls puts it, “citizens’ overall views 
have two parts: one part can be seen to be, or to coincide with, the publicly 
recognized political conception o f justice; the other part is a (fully or partially)
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comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in some manner 
related.” (PL:38) Both political and non-political parts are important in citizens’ 
lives. On the one hand, as citizens, they participate in political activities and 
affirm the values o f political justice. They will also use political values to judge 
political institutions and social policies. On the other hand, they have their 
non-political aims and commitments. These commitments give shape to a person’s 
way o f life. They may constitute what Williams called a person’s ground project 
which provides “the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives 
him a reason for living.”1 Rawls fully acknowledges the existence o f these two 
independent standpoints. Our political identity defined by our moral powers as 
free persons are distinct from our non-political identity defined by our ends and 
projects.
Once our life is divided into two parts, the possibility o f radical conflict is 
also there. When this happens, how the political values can overrule non-political 
ones becomes a salient problem. This is a difficult but extremely important issue 
that political liberalism must face. Political liberalism must give reasons to 
convince citizens that they should honour the demand o f justice even if  doing so 
may sacrifice their fundamental interests. The priority must be given to political 
values even from a citizen’s comprehensive point o f view. Rawls sets a daunting 
task for himself. On the one hand, he takes reasonable pluralism seriously and 
accepts a desire-based view of practical reason that motivational force for actions 
must stem from one’s comprehensive doctrines; on the other hand, he aims to
1 Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality” in M ora/ Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p.13.
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justify the priority of political values. Rawls believes that the problem will be 
solved by constructing a political conception o f justice that can be the focus o f an 
overlapping consensus among reasonable conceptions of the good.
A political conception of justice has three distinctive features. First, it is a 
moral conception worked out for the basic structure o f modem constitutional 
democracy. The basic structure refers to a society’s main political, social and 
economic institutions. (PL: 11) Second, a political conception is presented as a 
freestanding view, meaning that “it is neither presented as, nor as derived from, 
such a [comprehensive] doctrine applied to the basic structure o f society, as if  this 
structure were simply another subject to which that doctrine applied.” (PL: 12) It 
involves no wider commitment to any general and comprehensive moral ideals.2 
Rather, it presents itself as a module that fits into and can be supported by various 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Third, the content of a political conception is 
“expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public 
political culture of a democratic society.” (PL: 13) These ideas are supposed to be 
widely shared and independent o f any particular comprehensive doctrine. Among 
them, the most fundamental idea is that of society as a fair system o f cooperation 
among free and equal citizens. Rawls hopes that a political conception o f justice 
may be developed out of these shared ideas, and therefore gain the support of an 
overlapping consensus.
The central ideas o f political liberalism can be summarized as follows. A 
conception o f justice is stable when the motivational priority o f the sense of
2 A moral conception is general i f  it applies to a wide range o f subjects. It is comprehensive if  it 
includes a wide range o f  values and virtues in human life. (PL: 13)
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justice is affirmed. Given the permanent fact of reasonable pluralism o f modem 
societies, a just and stable order is possible only if the basic structure is effectively 
regulated by a conception o f justice that can claim to be the focus o f an 
overlapping consensus. To realize this goal, the conception o f justice must present 
itself as freestanding without depending on any comprehensive doctrines. Rawls 
contends that justice as fairness should be presented as a political conception in 
terms of its scope and the source o f justification. Two puzzling questions 
immediately follow. First, how can a political conception present itself as
freestanding while being understood as part of, or derivable within, a
comprehensive doctrine? Moreover, what kind o f justificatory force would an 
overlapping consensus add to a freestanding political conception that has already 
been justified by appealing to values implicit in the public culture?3 In reply to 
these questions, Rawls clarifies that justification o f justice as fairness should be 
understood as consisting of two stages:
In the first stage it is worked out as a freestanding (but of
course moral) conception for the basic structure of society. Only
with this done and its content— its principles of justice and 
ideals—provisionally on hand do we take up, in the second 
stage, the problem whether justice as fairness is sufficiently 
stable. Unless it is so, it is not a satisfactory political conception 
o f justice and it must be in some way revised. (PL: 141)
There is an internal division of labour between the two stages. In the first 
stage citizens are ignorant of their conceptions o f the good, and can only consider
3 For example, Samuel Scheffler has pointed out the ambiguity o f Rawls’s account o f  the first 
question while the second question has been raised by Jurgen Habermas. See Scheffler, 
Boundaries and Allegiances (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 138-39; Habermas, 
“Reconciliation through the Public Use o f  Reasons: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism,” Journal o f  Philosophy, 92 (1995), pp. 119-22.
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those political values implicit in the public culture. These values are then 
modelled into the original position from which Rawls’s principles o f justice are 
derived. Since citizens make their decision behind the veil of ignorance and will 
only take political values into account, the content o f justice will not favour any 
comprehensive doctrines. It is freestanding in this sense. Rawls calls this stage pro 
tanto justification. But the process o f justification is unfinished because the 
political values are only part of citizens’ overall view. While the political 
standpoint plays an essential role in elaborating a political conception of justice 
for fair cooperation, it is not by default overriding relative to one’s comprehensive 
doctrine. It may be overridden by citizens’ comprehensive doctrines once all 
values are counted. (PL:386) Its precedence depends on how it is related to a 
citizen’s comprehensive value system.
This concern over priority points to the second stage justification in which “it 
is left to each citizen, individually or in association with others, to say how the 
claims o f political justice are to be ordered, or weighed, against nonpolitical 
values.” (PL: 386) The idea o f an overlapping consensus comes into play in this 
stage. Since citizens are allowed to have full knowledge of their worldviews, their 
practical reasoning will take both political and non-political values into account. 
Citizens individually decide for themselves in what way the political conception is 
related to their more comprehensive views. Rawls thus concludes that “even 
though a political conception o f justice is freestanding, that does hot mean it 
cannot be embedded in various ways— or mapped, or inserted as a module— into 
the different doctrines citizens affirm.” (PL:387)
Rawls further distinguishes two types o f justification in the second stage: fu ll
221
justification by individuals and public justification by political society. The former 
refers to the endorsement o f a political conception from an individual’s 
comprehensive perspective. A political conception is fully justified when an 
individual accepts it by relating its principles in some way to his comprehensive 
doctrine as either true or reasonable. Since citizens affirm different reasonable 
conceptions o f the good, the justificatory reasons will correspondingly vary from 
person to person. It is possible that someone considers the political conception 
completely justified while others find it entirely ungrounded. (PL:386) 
Nevertheless, like pro tanto justification, full justification does not yield stability 
for the right reason in a pluralistic society because there is no agreement among 
citizens on the authoritative status o f a political conception. “It is left to each 
citizen, individually or in association with others, to say how the claims of 
political justice are to be ordered, or weighed, against nonpolitical values.” 
(PL:386)
What political liberalism strives for is public justification which occurs 
“when all the reasonable members of political society carry out a justification of 
the shared political conception by embedding it in their several reasonable 
comprehensive views.” (PL:387) In contrast with full justification, it depicts a 
situation in which different reasonable comprehensive doctrines converge on a 
freestanding political conception. It is not a result o f political bargaining. Rather, 
it is subject to citizens who individually decide how the political conception is 
related to their comprehensive views. “In some cases the political conception is 
simply the consequence of, or continuous with, a citizen’s comprehensive doctrine; 
in others it may be related as an acceptable approximation given the 
circumstances o f the social world.” (PL:xxi) We may say public justification is not
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determined by Rawls or any particular individuals. Rather, it is a result of the 
union o f different kinds o f full justification. The mutual recognition of the 
existence o f such a consensus then offers sufficient motivation for each individual 
to comply with the political principles. Therefore, as far as the justificatory status 
o f an overlapping consensus is concerned, Rawls argues that it is a necessary 
condition o f public justification:
There is, then, no public justification for political society 
without a reasonable overlapping consensus, and such a 
justification also connects with the ideas o f stability for the 
right reasons as well as o f legitimacy. (PL:388-89)
This means that justice as fairness is not publicly justified and therefore 
legitimate until the free-standing conception is shown to be sufficiently stable by 
the fact o f an overlapping consensus. The arguments in both stages are essential to 
the justifiability o f Rawls’s principles o f justice.4 Without the first stage citizens 
are unable to work out a freestanding conception o f justice as a basis for fair 
social cooperation. Its substantive content is entirely given by the political 
argument. Without the second stage citizens do not know whether the political 
values embodied in the political conception can occupy a proper and overriding 
place in their comprehensive ethical outlook. The motivational priority of justice 
is ultimately confirmed by the argument o f the second stage. Furthermore, we 
should note that the arguments o f both stages are available to citizens. It is citizens 
themselves who take up political and non-political standpoints and decide their 
proper relations.
4 This issue has been thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3.
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We now see that having recognized the permanent fact o f reasonable 
pluralism as a result o f the free exercise o f human reason, the later Rawls has 
given up the ambition o f grounding stability on congruence by resorting to a 
Kantian interpretation o f human nature. He believes that this approach is 
empirically impractical and morally illegitimate. A comprehensive conception of 
the good, including Kantian liberalism, can be maintained only by the oppressive 
use o f state power. This contradicts the liberal principle o f legitimacy according to 
which “our exercise o f political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials o f which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light o f principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.” (PL: 137) Rawls concedes the 
inability o f rationality to vindicate the good o f the sense o f justice in a pluralistic 
society.
However, this does not mean that the problem o f stability has been resolved. 
On the contrary, the question o f motivational priority becomes more salient. How 
can citizens commonly develop an effective sense o f justice to honour political 
principles if  they believe in a plurality o f incompatible conceptions o f the good? 
Rawls’s strategy is to draw a sharp distinction between values in the political 
domain and those in the non-political one. These two domains need not be in 
union. As Rawls puts it, “it can happen that in their personal affairs, or in the 
internal life o f associations, citizens may regard their final ends and attachments 
very differently from the way the political conception supposes.” (PL:31) The 
split o f the self into two parts unavoidably results in tension. The conflict can 
happen within oneself. A person’s ground projects may be in deep conflict with 
the requirement o f justice. It can also take place between two persons. People lead
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their lives in accordance with their worldviews. I f  they have fundamentally 
different conceptions o f the good, they will naturally have different views on how 
the social world should be arranged. Even if they uphold the same set o f political 
principles, it could be out o f radically different reasons. In a nutshell, the most 
serious challenge to political liberalism is how it can justify the priority o f 
political values over non-political values. Therefore, the possibility o f political 
liberalism hinges on answering the following question: “how can the values o f the 
special domain o f the political— the values o f a subdomain o f the realm of all 
values— normally outweigh whatever values may conflict with them?” (PL: 139) 
In the rest o f this chapter, I will focus on this issue and argue that political 
liberalism fails to offer a satisfactory argument for the priority o f political values.
2 The Importance o f Political Values
Rawls’s argument consists o f two complementary parts. The first part states 
that political values are very great values and hence not easily overridden. 
(PL: 139) The second part says that there are many reasonable ways in which the 
wider realm of non-political values is positively related to the values of the 
political domain so that an overlapping consensus is possible. (PL: 140) Rawls 
believes that when both conditions are met, a conception of justice will be stable. I 
shall argue that both parts are problematic. This section will examine the 
argument o f the first part.
The first argument seems simple and straightforward. Rawls believes that 
since the political values expressed by the conception of justice are very important, 
they thus have sufficient weight to override all other values that come into conflict
225
with them. These values include political and civil liberties, fair equality o f 
opportunity, economic reciprocity, and the social bases of mutual respect between 
citizens. They also cover the values o f public reason expressed in the guidelines 
for public inquiry and the precepts governing reasonable political discussion.
One possible way to justify the importance o f political values is to appeal to 
its object o f application. They apply to the basic structure o f society and specify 
the fundamental terms of social cooperation. The basic structure has a profound 
impact on every citizen’s life prospect from the start. It defines our fundamental 
rights and duties, and determines our initial place in life; it also shapes our plans 
o f life and limits our ambitions in different ways. Citizens recognize the special 
status o f the basic structure and therefore assign top priority to political principles.
Although this account provides a general justification for the precedence o f 
political values applied to the basic structure, it does not establish the 
overridingness o f Rawls’s political conception o f justice. Other competing 
conceptions o f justice could agree on the supreme importance o f the basic 
structure while denying Rawls’s specific account o f political values as overriding. 
Libertarianism, for example, may contend that the right to self-ownership and the 
right to private property should be the most important values for the basic 
structure. Rawls needs a more substantive argument to vindicate his claim. He has 
indeed done so. For example, he reminds us that his account o f fair cooperation 
among free and equal person, arbitrariness o f natural endowment and social 
circumstance from the moral point o f view, and people’s higher-order interest in 
developing their two moral powers adds up to a liberal egalitarian ideal. However, 
in Political Liberalism, Rawls reminds us that these ideas do not stem from any
comprehensive liberal worldview. Rather, they are seen as implicit in the public 
political culture o f a democratic society. The political conception of justice is 
constructed out of these shared fundamental ideas without appealing to any 
comprehensive moral doctrines. This seems to imply that the importance of 
political values largely depends on a sociological fact that citizens do take these 
political ideas very seriously. Their normative force is explained by their 
prominence in a particular form of political culture.
Rawls wants to avoid any controversy over conceptions o f the good so that 
the conception o f justice is given a chance to be the focus o f an overlapping 
consensus. This strategy, though understandable, makes for a weak argument. 
There is nothing wrong for a political theory to rest its justification on values in 
the public culture. However, in a pluralistic society we may reasonably doubt how 
plausible it is that citizens can have a high level o f consensus on a set o f political 
ideas and at the same time maintain deep disagreement on their conceptions o f the 
good. If a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is a 
normal result o f the exercise o f human reason, why does the same situation not 
apply to the political sphere? Our public culture contains as many competing 
political ideas as comprehensive doctrines. Most political values are essentially 
contested concepts. For instance, people have reasonable disagreement about the 
proper meaning o f freedom and equality, and their priority in a political system. 
Nor is Rawls’s idea o f society as a fair system o f cooperation uncontroversial. As 
a matter o f fact, we have witnessed the predominance o f the New Right in 
American society in the past two decades. The rightists obviously do not share 
Rawls’s ideas o f social cooperation and moral personality. Rawls may argue that 
the New Right’s interpretation o f political culture is mistaken. This response
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would put Rawls in a more disadvantaged position; many libertarians in fact find 
Rawls’s egalitarianism too radical for a capitalist society. A fundamental reform of 
the basic structure and a strong egalitarian ethos are required for a Rawlsian 
well-ordered society.
Moreover, even if  there is an overwhelming consensus on some political 
values, it does not entail that those values are desirable. Whether a value is 
justified does not depend on how many people actually accept it in a particular 
historical context. Rawls needs an independent argument to convince us that 
liberal values are the ideal moral basis o f social cooperation. The public culture 
per se does not inform us which set o f political ideas should be selected to govern 
the basic structure o f society. The importance o f certain values can only be judged 
in a wider moral context. Rawls, however, is reluctant to offer such an argument 
because he prefers presenting justice as fairness only as a freestanding political 
conception that does not involve any moral doctrines. But then, it is unclear why 
these values are overriding.
In addition, even if political values are proved to be significant, it does not 
automatically translate to an overriding motive on the part o f citizens to act in 
accordance with them. For political values are just parts o f a citizen’s overall 
value system. “It may be overridden by citizens’ comprehensive doctrines once all 
values are tallied up.” (PL:386) For apart from political identity, citizens also 
affirm non-political identities found in the nonpublic life and associations they 
belong to. Rawls recognizes that citizens have other non-political aims and 
commitments which shape their ways o f life and actions. “It can happen that in 
their personal affairs, or in the internal life o f associations, citizens may regard
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their final ends and attachments very differently from the way the political 
conception supposes.” (PL:31) That being said, there must be a kind o f unity 
between two identities grounded on one’s comprehensive doctrine, or he would 
face serious internal conflict and become disorientated. The priority o f political 
values would collapse accordingly. To avoid this, citizens must be able to perceive 
the political conception o f justice as in some manner positively related to their 
comprehensive views. This is what Rawls calls the second complementary 
argument for political liberalism. He says:
The history o f religion and philosophy show that there are many 
reasonable ways in which the wider realm of values can be 
understood so as to be either congruent with, or supportive of, 
or else not in conflict with, the values appropriate to the special 
domain o f the political as specified by a political conception of 
justice. (PL: 140)
If  this argument stands, a political conception o f justice will be the focus o f 
an overlapping consensus. Citizens will individually decide for themselves in 
what way the political conception o f justice is related to their own comprehensive 
views. They comply with the requirement o f justice for different reasons. The 
political conception gives no guidance in this regard; citizens’ comprehensive 
doctrines are their guidance. Rawls believes that this more tolerant and pluralistic 
approach will have a better chance to win citizens’ willing support o f his political 
conception o f justice. I will examine the plausibility o f this approach in the next 
section.
3 Two Model Cases for a Consensus
It is now clear that the possibility o f political liberalism depends on whether
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justice as fairness could be widely accepted by reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. Rawls’s task is to demonstrate how the political conception is congruent, 
compatible, or at least not in conflict with citizens’ conceptions o f the good so that 
the problem of priority can be settled. In the following discussion I shall use two 
model cases to demonstrate that Rawls’s argument for an overlapping consensus is 
unsuccessful.
To begin with, we should be reminded that Rawls’s idea o f an overlapping 
consensus is different from a modus vivendi. It has three distinct features. First, 
the object o f consensus is itself a moral conception. Second, citizens are presumed 
to affirm the political conception on moral grounds. Finally, citizens are moved by 
the effective sense o f justice rather than self-interest. In short, the consensus is not 
a consequence o f a contingent balance o f power. Rather, what it realizes is 
stability for the right reason. This ensures that “those who affirm the various 
views supporting the political conception will not withdraw their support o f it 
should the relative strength o f their view in society increase and eventually 
become dominant.” (PL: 148) When it comes to an overlapping consensus, the 
supporting reasons for the political conception are moral in nature.
In Political Liberalism , Rawls proposes several model cases to illustrate how 
a political conception is supported by reasonable comprehensive doctrines in 
different ways. They include a religious doctrine, Mill or Kant’s liberal moral 
doctrine, utilitarianism, and a pluralist account o f the realm of values. 
(PL: 145,169-70) Rawls contends that all o f them would accept justice as fairness 
based on the totality o f reasons specified within their comprehensive doctrines. 
Their acceptance depends on two conditions. First, each doctrine will develop its
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own reasons to support the political conception. Second, these reasons must be 
shown to be regulative in a citizen’s motivational system. Below I will use 
Kantian liberalism and utilitarianism as examples to assess whether these 
requirements can be met.5
Rawls’s account of the internal connection between Kant’s moral philosophy 
and his political conception o f justice is straightforward. He says:
The first was o f Kant’s moral philosophy with its ideal of 
autonomy. From within his view, or within a view sufficiently 
similar to it, the political conception with its principles o f 
justice and their appropriate priority, can, let us say, be derived.
The reasons for taking the basic structure o f society as the 
primary subject are likewise derivable. Here the relation is 
deductive, even though the argument can hardly be set out very 
rigorously. (PL: 169, my emphasis)
Rawls presumes that if  a person believes in a Kantian ideal o f autonomy, he 
will deductively accept justice as fairness as a political conception. Among the 
four model cases, this comprehensive doctrine shows the strongest inclination to 
political liberalism. Since the principles are directly derived from the value o f 
autonomy, Kantian citizens have sufficient motive to comply with the requirement 
o f justice. However, the seemingly deductive relation between autonomy and 
Rawls’s substantive principles is not as self-evident as Rawls supposes. A Kantian 
may not accept Rawls’s principles as the best expression o f moral autonomy. 
Nozick, for instance, ascribes the moral ground o f libertarian side constraint to
5 I focus on these two cases because they are regarded as competing and incompatible conceptions 
o f  justice in A Theory o f  Justice. It is particularly worthwhile to see how they can become 
members o f  an overlapping consensus in Political Liberalism.
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Kant’s moral doctrine as well. As he says, “side constraints upon action reflect the 
underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they 
may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving o f other ends without their 
consent.”6 Autonomy demands respect for a person’s self-ownership. Without his 
consent, no one has a right to take away his labour and property. Taking Kant’s 
ideal o f autonomy seriously requires a libertarian entitlement theory rather than a 
liberal redistributive scheme.
Rawls may argue that Nozick’s interpretation o f Kant is flawed. It is normal 
that different theorists have disagreements about the proper political implication 
o f autonomy. The real problem, however, is that from the point o f view of political 
liberalism Rawls cannot put such a challenge to Nozick. For following the logic o f 
an overlapping consensus, it is left to each citizen to decide individually how the 
claims o f political justice are embedded into the comprehensive doctrines he 
affirms. Having recognized the burdens o f judgment, reasonable citizens must 
accept the fact that “many of our most important judgments are made under 
conditions where it is not to be expected that conscientious persons with full 
powers o f reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same 
conclusion.” (PL:58) The burdens o f judgment set a constraint on public 
discussion about the truth or reasonableness o f a conception o f the good. Nor can 
the freestanding political conception provide any external guidance on people’s 
reasoning in this regard because “the guidance belongs to citizens’ comprehensive 
doctrines.” (PL:387)
6 Nozick, Anarchy, Slate, and Utopia (Blackwell, 1974), pp.30-31.
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One may counter that the Nozickean doctrine is so unreasonable that it 
should be excluded from the group of consensus. This is implausible because 
Rawls’s definition o f reasonable doctrine is deliberately loose. It only requires that 
the doctrine concerned is an exercise o f theoretical and practical reason, and 
normally belongs to a tradition o f thought and doctrine. Otherwise, the account 
“runs the danger o f being arbitrary and exclusive.” (PL:59) Moreover, a 
Nozickean could share the general idea of political liberalism. What he disagrees 
with Rawls about, rather, is that his commitment to autonomy would lead him to 
adopt libertarian principles. In this case, there is no more room for Rawls to 
maintain that his egalitarian distributive principles would necessarily be deduced 
from Kant’s moral philosophy. This shows that even in the strongest case, the 
possibility o f a consensus on Rawls’s principles is indeterminate. In Rawls’s own 
words, “whether justice as fairness (or some similar view) can gain the support of 
an overlapping consensus so defined is a speculative question.” (PL: 15) It must be 
speculative because the result is not determined by Rawls, but by numerous 
reasonable doctrines from their own point o f view.
We can now turn to examine the relation between utilitarianism and justice as 
fairness, another model case presented by Rawls. This is much more controversial 
because Rawls has always presented his theory o f justice as an alternative 
systematic account o f justice to utilitarianism. But all of a sudden Rawls suggests 
that utilitarianism as a comprehensive moral theory would have sufficient reason 
to take justice as fairness as the most reasonable political conception for the basic 
structure. As Rawls’s explanation goes:
This utilitarianism supports the political conception for such
reasons as our limited knowledge o f social institutions generally
233
and on our knowledge about ongoing circumstances...These 
and other reasons may lead the utilitarian to think a political 
conception o f justice liberal in content a satisfactory, perhaps 
even the best, workable approximation to what the principle o f 
utility, all things tallied up, would require. (PL: 170, emphasis 
added)
The main reason for utilitarianism to adopt political liberalism is that it is the 
most effective means to maximize utility. This is a serious claim. If  valid, there 
will be no conflict between two theories as Rawls presents in A Theory o f  Justice. 
Unfortunately, Rawls gives no further support for this claim. He simply supposes 
that justice as fairness is the most workable arrangement to meet the principle of 
utility. It is however unclear why this must be so. In principle, utilitarianism may 
favour a diversity o f social institutions depending on their contribution to the 
greatest net balance o f utility under particular social conditions. Thus, apart from 
Rawls’s principles o f justice, other competing non-liberal political conceptions of 
justice can make similar claims as well; which one is more plausible depends on 
empirical calculation.
But if  Rawls’s previous argument against utilitarianism is unchanged, we 
have reasons to doubt how it can be included in an overlapping consensus. 
Remember that the fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness is o f society 
being a fair system of cooperation for reciprocity between free and equal persons. 
The original position from which Rawls’s political principles are derived is said to 
be designed in accordance with this idea. This implies that if  utilitarianism accepts 
the political principles, it must accept Rawls’s account o f society as well. Yet in 
making a comparison between justice as fairness and utilitarianism, Rawls tells us 
that:
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Implicit in the contrasts between classical utilitarianism and 
justice as fairness is a difference in the underlying conception 
o f society. In the one we think of a well-ordered society as a 
scheme of cooperation for reciprocal advantage regulated by 
principles which persons would choose in an initial situation 
that is fair, in the other as the efficient administration o f social 
resources to maximize the satisfaction o f the system o f desire 
constructed by the impartial spectator from the many individual 
systems o f desires accepted as given. (TJ:33/29-30 rev.)
We can note that Rawls’s conception of society is fundamentally different 
from that of utilitarianism. Moreover, while justice as fairness takes seriously the 
plurality o f distinct persons with separate system of ends, utilitarianism views the 
principle for a society as an extension o f the principle o f choice for one man. As a 
deontological theory, justice as fairness holds that the concept o f right is prior to 
that o f the good; but as a teleological doctrine, utilitarianism holds that “the 
satisfaction o f any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into 
account in deciding what is right.” (TJ:30/27 rev.) Finally, justice as fairness “does 
not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of 
advantages enjoyed by many.” (TJ:4/3 rev.) Since justice as fairness conflicts with 
utilitarianism in so many ways, it is impossible that a utilitarian would endorse 
Rawls’s arguments for the rejection o f utilitarianism while continuing to uphold 
utilitarian beliefs in their non-political domain. After all, all the disputes between 
justice as fairness and utilitarianism will appear misguided if  Rawls’s argument is 
right.
Furthermore, even if  it is empirically proved that there is great social utility 
in accepting Rawls’s political conception o f justice, what it achieves would likely 
be stability for the wrong reason. We know that moral stability is secured by an
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effective sense o f justice specified by justice as fairness. Citizens are expected to 
act on moral reasons. In utilitarianism, however, the primary motive to abide by 
Rawls’s political conception is simply the belief that it can best promote total 
utility. The liberal sense o f justice does not play any role in determining 
utilitarians’ action. If their limited knowledge o f social institutions and knowledge 
about ongoing circumstances change, they have every reason to withdraw their 
support o f justice as fairness for another institutional arrangement. Here there is a 
motive gap between utilitarianism and the liberal political conception. A faithful 
utilitarian will not have the moral motive required by political liberalism. His 
acceptance o f the political conception is at most a modus vivendi.
Rawls dismisses this criticism. He insists that his conception of justice is 
based on moral grounds. They include “conceptions o f society and o f citizens as 
persons, as well as principles o f justice, and an account o f the political virtues 
through which those principles are embodied in human character and expressed in 
public life”. (PL: 147) Since these political ideas are drawn from the public culture 
and shared by reasonable comprehensive doctrines, utilitarianism as one o f such 
doctrines would then give sufficient moral motive to respect the liberal political 
conception. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these political reasons to support 
justice as fairness are different from those stemming from one’s comprehensive 
view. They represent two distinct types of justification. I follow Scheffler to call 
them political and non-political arguments:
A political argument for a conception of justice would be one 
that appealed to ideas implicit in the public political culture, 
whereas a non-political argument, say, would be one that 
appealed to a comprehensive moral doctrine. Thus one and the 
same conception o f justice might in principle be supported by
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arguments o f either type. Rawls might then be interpreted as 
asserting not that his conception o f justice is a political 
conception but, rather, that his arguments for that conception 
are political arguments.7
Scheffler’s idea is that the same conception o f justice can be argued for from 
two different perspectives. A utilitarian can either regard Rawls’s conception of 
justice as a constitutive part o f his comprehensive moral theory, or as a 
freestanding conception justified by the shared political values. In principle, the 
conception can be backed by either argument, each having its distinct normative 
source and motivational power. But I disagree with Scheffler that Rawls would 
regard these two arguments as equally important and independent o f  each other. 
Recall that the purpose o f presenting justice as fairness as a political conception is 
to reach an overlapping consensus. Only when there is an overlapping consensus, 
according to Rawls, can the political conception be publicly justified. (PL:388) 
Therefore, the political argument, or pro tanto justification, is insufficient to 
vindicate stability for the right reason.
If  the above analysis is correct, Rawls’s response to the charge o f modus 
vivendi misses the point. Even though his conception o f justice is justified by a 
political argument, it may still be rejected by a comprehensive doctrine. This 
explains why utilitarians would abandon justice as fairness if  they find better 
alternatives to promote the greatest balance o f satisfaction. To avoid this 
predicament, one solution is to set a constraint on citizens’ choice o f the mode o f 
justification. It can be stipulated, for instance, that in dealing with political
7 Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
p.139.
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questions o f constitutional essentials and basic justice, citizens should only appeal 
to the political argument to settle their dispute. This is the position that Rawls 
holds when he discusses the idea o f public reason. He suggests that on 
fundamental political questions citizens must honour the limit o f public reason. 
The content of public reason consists o f political principles and guidelines o f 
inquiry that specify ways o f reasoning relevant for political questions. It is a duty 
o f civility not to use non-public reasons, namely reasons deriving from citizens’ 
comprehensive views, in discussing and voting on the most fundamental questions. 
Furthermore, Rawls contends that “citizens affirm the ideal o f public reason, not 
as a result o f political compromise, as in a modus vivendi, but from within their 
own reasonable doctrines.” (PL:218)
Rawls’s idea o f public reason raises a number o f questions. For one thing, if 
citizens are all willing to set aside their comprehensive views and appeal to the 
same set o f political values to settle the questions o f basic justice, then the idea of 
an overlapping consensus is redundant. For the political argument alone is 
sufficient to confer priority to political values over non-political ones. This, 
however, is question-begging. What we have been asking all along is how it can 
be either reasonable or rational for citizens to be motivated to act on political 
values given the fact o f reasonable pluralism. The quest for consensus is necessary 
because Rawls acknowledges that people take their non-political beliefs and 
commitments seriously in their practical reasoning. That is why the non-political 
argument is needed. Once this is granted, as Scheffler notes, “any requirement that 
the participants in an overlapping consensus must view the conception o f justice
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as political would appear to be incongruous with the motivation for introducing 
the idea o f such a consensus in the first place.”8
Furthermore, an inconsistency exists between the idea of public reason and 
the idea o f an overlapping consensus. The former requires that one should only 
appeal to political values while the latter allows a diversity o f reasons drawn from 
comprehensive doctrines. With a closer look at Rawls’s account, we will find that 
this is a misunderstanding. Rawls’s point is that the limit o f public reason is the 
result o f an overlapping consensus. Only when the political conception is shown 
to be the focus of an overlapping consensus will citizens have sufficient reason to 
honour public reason. Rawls says:
Political liberalism relies on the conjecture that the basic rights 
and duties and values in question have sufficient weight so that 
the limits of public reason are justified by the overall 
assessments o f reasonable comprehensive doctrines once those 
doctrines have adapted to the conception o f justice itself.
(PL:219)
Rawls believes that an overlapping consensus entails the limits o f public 
reason. When a conception o f justice is shown to be accepted by a plurality o f 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, citizens will have sufficient motive to limit 
themselves to the use o f political values in discussing fundamental political 
matters. This account gets Rawls into more troubles though. I f  an overlapping 
consensus is the precondition o f public reason, it is then illogical for Rawls to 
appeal to the limits o f public reason to justify the possibility o f including 
utilitarianism as a member o f the consensus. Their relation cannot be reversed.
8 Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances, p. 141.
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Further, it should be recalled that the non-political argument is not only legitimate, 
but also essential to the very idea o f an overlapping consensus. Therefore, my 
contention that utilitarianism would at most adopt a liberal conception o f justice 
as a modus vivendi remains intact.
4 The Limits of the Burdens o f Judgment
I have examined two model cases and cast my doubt upon the possibility o f 
an overlapping consensus. We note that the difficulty o f Rawls’s project lies in the 
division between the political and non-political spheres. The aim of this division is 
to give room for a convergence o f reasonable comprehensive doctrines on a 
freestanding political conception. Each comprehensive doctrine is encouraged to 
develop its own reason to justify the political conception. However, once the 
plurality o f justificatory reasons is granted, there will be no way for Rawls to 
assure a consensus for the right reason.
Rawls, however, would complain that my critique has overlooked an 
important qualification o f his project, namely all members o f an overlapping 
consensus are supposed to be reasonable persons who are willing to recognize the 
burdens o f judgement in political justification. The burdens o f judgement warrant 
that a liberal conception o f justice will be the only acceptable choice available for 
reasonable citizens who hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines. It sets a strong 
constraint on citizens’ choice o f principles. Rawls therefore need not worry too 
much about my concern that citizens may not give priority to political reasons 
from their own point o f view. For their point o f view has been limited in the first 
place. We can note that the strategy o f this argument is similar to that o f rational
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choice in the original position. In this section, I will argue that this account of 
reasonableness is inconsistent with the primary spirit of political liberalism.9
Rawls’s main ideas are as follows. To begin with, he assumes that all 
participants o f cooperation are reasonable persons. Persons are reasonable in two 
aspects. The first is the willingness to propose fair terms o f cooperation and to 
abide by them. The second is the willingness to recognize the burdens o f 
judgement and to accept their consequences. The burdens o f judgement refer to 
those sources that result in reasonable disagreement about many o f our most 
important judgments. Rawls regards this as a normal result o f the exercise o f 
human reason within a liberal democracy. It is a permanent feature of the public 
culture o f democracy. (PL:36) The burden o f judgement entails that a public 
conception o f justice can never be justified by any comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrines. For this will violate the liberal principle o f 
legitimacy according to which “our exercise o f political power is fully proper only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials o f which all 
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse.” (PL: 137) Thus, 
it is unreasonable for citizens to use political power to repress any reasonable 
comprehensive views that are different from their own. Having recognized the 
burdens o f judgment and the principle o f legitimacy, it naturally leads to the 
conclusion that only a political conception o f justice as a freestanding view 
presupposing no particular comprehensive doctrines will be accepted by 
reasonable citizens. As Rawls puts it, “reasonable persons see that the burdens o f 
judgement set limits on what can be reasonably justified to others, and so they
9 I am indebted to John Charvet for his helpful advice on the argument o f  this section.
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endorse some form of liberty o f conscience and freedom of thought.” (PL:61) 
Therefore, reasonable citizens must accept the burdens of judgement which in turn 
commits them to a liberal political conception o f justice.
We can now start to evaluate this central argument o f political liberalism. 
First o f all, the claim of the burdens o f judgement may backfire on Rawls’s own 
conception o f justice. The reason is simple. If  it is true that reasonable people will 
have great difficulty in arriving at the same conclusion about many o f their beliefs 
and values in the non-political sphere even after conscientious and free discussion, 
why does a similar situation not apply to political values? There seems no 
apparent reason for Rawls to draw such a distinction and give privilege to moral 
values. Even if we agree that political values are implicit in the public political 
culture, it does not follow that these values will be generally acceptable to 
reasonable people. So the burdens o f judgement will not only exclude the 
possibility o f grounding justice on a moral doctrine, but also undermine the whole 
scheme of political liberalism. However, this claim is unreasonably strong. Moral 
experience tells us that in many cases we can reach informed and reasoned 
judgment on moral and political issues. It is too early for Rawls to divide human 
values into two spheres, and to assign a different status to them.
My second challenge is that the idea of reasonableness imposes some 
unreasonable demands on citizens. It should be noted that the claim of burdens o f 
judgement is a self-standing argument for justification of political liberalism. It is 
not derived from a person’s comprehensive doctrine. For example, a religious 
believer will maintain that what he believes is true. Even in face o f the challenge 
o f pluralism, he could reject other religions as false. It is almost impossible for a
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devout believer to accept that other competing religions are equally true or 
reasonable. Doing this would fundamentally undermine his belief. But for the 
sake o f political justice, Rawls demands that whatever a person believes in, it 
must be subject to the burdens o f judgment. That means the person has no ground 
to appeal to his belief to justify any principles o f justice. He should recognize that 
“this is a claim that all equally could make.” (PL:61) This is hardly acceptable for 
persons who have deep belief in their moral and religious doctrines. They may ask 
why they should set aside their claim that “the duty to religious and divine law 
being absolute, no understanding among persons o f different faiths is permissible 
from a religious point o f view.” (TJ:208/182 rev.)
Rawls actually admits that people have often acted in accordance with this 
doctrine. However, the acceptance of the burdens o f judgment, Rawls argues, will 
urge them to realize that reasonable people do not all affirm the same 
comprehensive doctrine. As a result, “we recognize that our own doctrine has, and 
can have, for people generally, no special claims on them beyond their own view 
o f its merits. Others who affirm doctrines different from ours are, we grant, 
reasonable also, and certainly not unreasonable.” (PL:60) People can continue to 
believe their doctrines to be true; meanwhile, they should accept that the truth o f 
their belief does not apply to other reasonable people. If they insist on doing so, 
they are unreasonable. But how could a person consistently uphold the truth o f his 
comprehensive view and accept the consequence o f the burdens o f judgment in 
the meantime? The latter seems to imply that a reasonable person must hold a 
position o f moderate scepticism which, according to Barry, believes that “no
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conception o f the good can justifiably be held with a degree o f certainty that 
warrants its imposition on those who reject it.”10 This moderate view does not 
reduce normative statements to expression o f personal preference and subjective 
feelings. Its central idea is to express an attitude of uncertainty towards the truth 
o f any conceptions o f the good attested by experience. I believe that Rawls’s 
account o f burdens o f judgment actually amounts to this sceptical position. It 
requires people to realize and accept that no matter how true or reasonable their 
conceptions o f the good are viewed from their own point of view, they can always 
be doubted and reasonably rejected by other people. When moderate scepticism is 
combined with another aspect o f reasonableness, namely that people have a desire 
to propose principles which others could not reasonably reject, a freestanding 
political conception will be the only acceptable candidate for fair cooperation.
Rawls does not accept this interpretation o f the burdens o f  judgement. For if 
political liberalism is grounded on a sceptical argument about conceptions o f the 
good, the idea o f an overlapping consensus would fail. He thus says:
Political liberalism does not question that many political and 
moral judgments o f certain specified kinds are correct and it 
views many o f them as reasonable. Nor does it question the 
possible truth o f affirmations o f faith. Above all, it does not 
argue that we should be hesitant and uncertain, much less 
skeptical, about our own beliefs. (PL:63)
Rawls here has adopted a method of avoidance to respond to the challenge. 
Political liberalism deliberately avoids making any judgment about the truth o f 
citizens’ beliefs. It stands outside and allows citizens to decide for themselves the
10 Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 169.
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epistemological status o f their conceptions o f the good. Political liberalism is 
neutral and practical. It simply recognizes the practical impossibility o f reaching 
any reasonable and workable political principles based on the truth of conceptions 
o f the good. This explanation, however, is not convincing. We note that the 
burdens o f judgement set normative and epistemological constraints on citizens’ 
practical reasoning. Citizens are required to view their most fundamental beliefs 
and commitments from a sceptical point o f view. If  they refuse to do so, they will 
be regarded as unreasonable and excluded from an overlapping consensus. It is 
thus misleading for Rawls to say that the burdens o f judgment are simply 
objective characterisations o f the fact o f reasonable disagreement. If  my argument 
is plausible, scepticism will substantially undermine Rawls’s claim that citizens 
will converge on a liberal conception o f justice from their own point o f view 
without having to make any change o f their conceptions o f the good.
One may ask if  the account o f reasonableness has already determined some 
form o f liberal political conception o f justice, why does Rawls need the second 
stage to handle the problem of an overlapping consensus? This is because citizens 
have to harmonize their acceptance o f the political conception with their 
non-political values. The reasonable alone is insufficient to warrant the priority of 
political values. The political conception must be shown acceptable within a 
citizen’s comprehensive view. This concern brings us back to my previous critique 
o f Rawls’s two arguments for the possibility o f political liberalism, namely 1) the 
greatness o f political values and 2) the existence o f many reasonable ways o f 
making the political conception o f justice congruent with comprehensive 
doctrines. In my previous discussion, I have used Kantianism and utilitarianism as 
examples to demonstrate the difficulty o f consensus. If  we think further, we will
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find that those non-liberal comprehensive doctrines, such as Platonism, Islamism 
and Thomism, will have even greater difficulty in accommodating liberalism in 
their worldviews. They have to liberalize themselves in both stages o f justification. 
At the first stage, they are required to accept the consequence o f  the burdens of 
judgment; at the second stage, they are required to accept the priority o f political 
liberal values over their non-political non-liberal values. Unfortunately, Rawls 
offers no answer why these non-liberal doctrines are willing to liberalize 
themselves in the way political liberalism suggests.
To conclude, this chapter has examined Rawls’s three essential arguments for 
an overlapping consensus. I have shown that all o f them are insufficient to 
establish the priority o f political values through the support o f an overlapping 
consensus. In other words, political liberalism fails to provide a better alternative 
to resolve the problem of stability. In this case, we have good reasons to search for 
other possibilities. This is what I attempt to do in the last chapter o f  this thesis.
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CHAPTER 6 
POTENTIAL CONGRUENCE
My thesis has so far been devoted to two fundamental questions, namely to 
what extent Rawls’s notion of stability can be justified, and if  it can, whether 
justice as fairness can offer a satisfactory answer to it. For the first question, I 
affirm Rawls’s claim that moral stability in terms of the motivational 
overridingness o f a sense o f justice is essential to the justifiability of justice as 
fairness. For the second question, I contend that the congruence argument o f A 
Theory o f  Justice and the idea o f an overlapping consensus o f Political Liberalism 
have both failed. The former does not stand because the Kantian teleological 
account o f human nature is incompatible with prudential rationality and 
reasonable pluralism; whereas the latter cannot adequately show how reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines would honour the priority o f political values from their 
own point o f view. In this light, the remaining question is whether it is possible to 
find another way to vindicate the stability o f justice as fairness. This last chapter 
attempts to present such an alternative argument for the motivational priority o f 
justice.
I will call this approach Potential Congruence. It aims to vindicate the idea 
that it is rational for a person to give precedence to morality over narrow 
self-interest because leading a just life can be presented as a higher-order 
regulative good in one’s rational plan o f life under favourable conditions. Put it 
another way, there can be sufficient reasons for a person to accept morality as a 
hierarchically superior value, and to form and pursue his conception o f the good 
as a whole subject to the requirement of morality. The right is not alien to the
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good. Rather, acting justly itself is essential to one’s well-being. This is not a new 
argument. Its spirit is not much different from Rawls’s idea of congruence. Similar 
to Rawls, potential congruence strives to attest the possibility that the desire to act 
justly and the desire to lead a good life are practically speaking the same desire. 
What is different is that it does not appeal to a Kantian metaphysical account o f 
human essence. It no longer holds that acting justly is the only way to express our 
human nature as free and equal rational being. It recognizes that this claim is too 
strong to be acceptable in a society o f reasonable pluralism.
Potential congruence is based on a conception o f human reason and interest 
that can be accepted by rational and reasonable people. It is a result of practical 
reasoning supported by substantive arguments rather than a forgone conclusion 
guaranteed by definitional or metaphysical truth. Besides, I am not making a 
general claim that all conceptions o f justice can achieve potential congruence. 
This is implausible because different conceptions make different demands on 
agents who in turn have different reactions to these claims. My discussion is more 
specific. I will first lay out some general conditions for congruence and then 
explore whether Rawls’s principles o f justice can be a focus o f congruence. 
Having said that, what this chapter presents is still a skeleton outline for this big 
issue.
This chapter consists o f five sections. In the first two sections, I will discuss 
two pre-conditions for potential congruence. They are the unity of practical 
reasoning and the pervasiveness o f moral feelings. After that, I proceed to 
examine whether it will be rational for an agent to give priority to justice as 
fairness. In Section 3, I discuss Rawls’s idea o f society as a fair cooperation for
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reciprocity which provides a foundational framework for Rawls’s two principles 
of justice. I then focus on the first principle o f equal basic liberties in Section 4. 
Through Rawls’s arguments for the priority o f basic liberties, I show that it is 
rational to affirm the good of the sense o f justice specified by this principle. The 
last section turns to examine the difference principle. I contend that the economic 
incentive argument underlying the difference principle is inconsistent with moral 
equality. I then propose the idea o f the “modification o f impersonal morality” as 
an alternative to justify the principle, which may therefore have a better chance to 
achieve potential congruence.
1 The Unity o f Practical Reasoning
I believe that the claim of potential congruence depends on two conditions, 
namely the unity o f practical reasoning and the pervasiveness o f moral sentiment. 
They provide background support for my subsequent claim that congruence is a 
viable and desirable option for moral stability. I will explore the meaning and 
implication of these two claims in this and the next sections.
The unity o f practical reasoning holds that a rational agent normally has a 
fundamental interest in grounding his reason for action on a unified and coherent 
value system. This view presupposes that we envisage each human life as a whole. 
We do not view our life as a series o f unconnected episodes, or think about our 
action as a sequence of unrelated and independent parts. For this would 
disintegrate our life and make it unintelligible. To understand someone’s action, 
we must have an accurate understanding o f his intentions in a particular social and
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historical setting.1 Moreover, as purposive beings, we desire to lead a meaningful 
and valuable life. It is our desire to justify to ourselves - and more often to others - 
that our life is worth living. We are not indifferent to our choice because our lives 
are irreplaceable and enormously important viewed from inside. Therefore, we 
need a normative framework to help us make decisions. This framework will 
provide explanation and justification for our actions, and give our life a unitary 
shape. Only so can the diversity o f intentions, desires, ideals and projects form an 
ordered and coherent whole within our lives.
This does not mean that our life will never become fragmented and divided. 
On the contrary, as MacIntyre notes, one of the characteristic features o f 
modernity is to partition human life into segments, each with its own norms and 
modes o f behaviour. “So work is divided from leisure, private life from public, the 
corporate from the personal.”2 We have many roles to play. These roles may 
sometimes come into conflict with each other. I am not saying that rationality 
demands a quest for the unity o f a life, though I tend to believe that more often 
than not rational actions presuppose such a normative framework.3 I prefer a 
moderate view instead which emphasizes only a commonplace phenomenology 
that most people under normal circumstances have a fundamental desire to view 
their life as a continued and unified whole based on a normative scheme. Without 
such a scheme, we might not be able to tell ourselves or others why we have made 
such and such decisions and why those are meaningful and significant; we might
1 MacIntyre has a good discussion about this issue. After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University 
o f  Notre Dame Press, 1984), 2nd edition, chap. 15.
2 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.204.
3 Rationality refers to means-end rationality. I am not able to deal with this complicated issue here. 
For more discussion, see Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans and Practical Reason (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987)
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not know where we were from, and where we are to go; we might also lack the 
resources and criteria to resolve conflicts o f values and obligations. When a 
person’s life is broken into many disconnected parts, he might probably become 
lost and disoriented. Therefore the quest for the unity o f practical reasoning is 
entrenched in our everyday life. Everyday vocabulary such as “plan”, “project”, 
“scheme”, “conception”, “worldview” and the like reflects this very deep 
psychological need o f human beings.
Rawls calls this normative framework a conception o f the good, or a rational 
plan o f life. It includes “conceptions o f what is of value in human life, and ideals 
o f personal character, as well as ideals o f friendship and o f familial and 
associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the 
limit to our life as a whole.” (PL: 13) In this sense, a person may be viewed as a 
human life lived according to a conception o f the good. “An individual says who 
he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he intends to do in his life.” 
(TJ:408/358 rev.) Besides, Rawls regards each person having a plan o f life as part 
o f the subjective circumstances o f justice. “These plans, or conceptions of the 
good, lead them to have different ends and purposes, and to make conflicting 
claims on the natural and social resources available.” (TJ.T27/110 rev.) Without 
this assumption, Rawls contends, “there would be no occasion for the virtue o f 
justice” (PL: 128/110 rev.) The good is conceptually prior to the right in this sense. 
Thus, the primary motive for a group o f people to gather together and agree on a 
conception o f justice is exactly that they can better advance their antecedent 
interests this way. Society is therefore a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, 
with the principle o f the right defining the terms o f cooperation.
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For Rawls, a person’s conception o f the good constitutes the basis for the 
unity o f practical reasoning. It offers a normative framework to integrate different 
parts o f our life into a whole, and motivates us to act in certain way. This has great 
implications for the claim of potential congruence. If  we agree that nothing can 
count as a reason for a rational agent unless it is capable of motivating him, then 
the source o f motivation must be viewed as stemming from his conception of the 
good. It follows that if an agent is willing to give regulative priority to moral 
considerations over other desires, it is because he has instilled into his conception 
of the good a respect for morality. The sense o f justice is conceived o f occupying 
a regulative place in an agent’s motive system which allows him to subject his 
overall conception of the good over a whole life to the constraints o f justice 
specified by a political morality.4 The desire to act justly is not a peculiar motive 
detached from a person’s plans and projects. Rather, the priority o f the sense o f 
justice is justified by establishing its supreme status in one’s rational plan o f life.
We can note that Rawls’s two kinds of argument for stability have 
presupposed the unity o f practical reasoning. His account o f congruence aims to 
show it is rational that “for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of 
justice as regulative o f their plan of life.” (TJ:567/497 rev.) The central idea of an 
overlapping consensus is to allow citizens individually to decide how the values 
o f the political domain are related to their comprehensive conceptions o f the good. 
Although citizens do not hold the same comprehensive doctrine, Rawls hopes that 
citizens can accept the priority of justice from their own point of view. Ideally, 
“there are many reasonable ways in which the wider realm of values can be
4 1 am indebted to John Charvet for clarifying this point.
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understood so as to be either congruent with, or supportive of, or else not in 
conflict with, the values appropriate to the special domain o f the political as 
specified by a political conception o f justice.” (PL: 140) Two arguments, though 
fundamentally different, basically share the same assumption that the desire to act 
justly must in some way be related to a person’s conception o f the good.
This assumption o f practical reasoning, however, could sound disturbing as it 
potentially vitiates the authority o f morality. It might be argued that if what one 
ought to do depends on whether that action can best realize his conception of the 
good, the normative force o f moral reason will then be reduced to the mere 
satisfaction o f self-interest. A person will have no reason to honour the demand of 
morality if  he finds abiding by moral principle not conducive to his interests. The 
qualitative difference between morality and self-interest is apparently dissolved. 
This contradicts the very idea of moral overridingness, that is, the idea that moral 
reason should overrule concern for one’s own good whenever the two sorts o f 
consideration diverge. After all, if  these two kinds of reasons are not conceptually 
different from each other, strictly speaking, the problem o f overridingness would 
not arise in the first place.
This challenge, though serious, depicts a misunderstanding about the nature 
o f potential congruence. First o f all, we should note that when an agent’s 
conception o f the good is said to provide a basis for his practical reasoning, it does 
not mean that he is purely moved by self-interest to realize an egoistic goal. We 
should draw a distinction between interest in the self and interest o f a self. While 
it is each rational individual’s interest in regarding his conception o f the good as 
worthy o f recognition and realization, the content o f the conception o f the good is
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not presumed to be egoistic or selfish. It all depends on what kind o f ends the 
person is pursing. As Rawls puts it, “if  wealth, position, and influence, and the 
accolades o f social prestige, are a person’s final purposes, then surely his 
conception o f the good is egoistic. His dominant interests are in himself, not 
merely, as they must always be, interests o f a self.” (TJ: 129/111 rev.)
A conception o f the good is a formal idea designed for explaining the 
structure o f practical reasoning. Its substantive content is filled in by agents 
themselves. It could encompass one’s religious, metaphysical and moral beliefs, 
interests and desires, aims and ideals, projects and commitments, and personal and 
impersonal interests. This is similar to Williams’s idea of “subjective motivational 
set” which may include:
Such things as dispositions o f evaluation, patterns o f emotional 
reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may 
be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent.
Above all, there is o f course no supposition that the desires or 
projects o f an agent have to be egoistic; he will, one hopes, 
have non-egoistic projects o f various kinds, and these equally 
can provide internal reasons for action.5
We thus see that although potential congruence has adopted a desire-based 
theory o f practical reason, the term “desire” refers to a wide range o f human 
dispositions. Commitment to moral principles could be an important element in 
one’s conception o f the good.6 The unity of practical reasoning just stipulates that 
the reason to act justly must be situated in an agent’s motivational set. It, however,
5 Bernard Williams, M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 105.
6 Rawls holds that his account o f moral motivation can be viewed as belonging to a person’s 
motivational set as Williams stipulates. See PL:85, footnote 33.
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does not say that moral reason is only instrumental to the agent’s narrowly defined 
self-interests. Impartial and partial concerns can co-exist in one’s conception of 
the good. O f course whether a person is willing to give priority to moral reason 
depends upon a balance o f motives.
It is therefore misleading to say that the claim of potential congruence will in 
effect reduce moral reason to the satisfaction o f self-interest. The claim does not 
hold that other-regarding reason and self-regarding reason are identical. Suppose 
the former refers to the moral point o f view which is identified with a distinctive 
set o f impartial considerations, whereas the latter is only concerned with the 
realization of personal well-being,7 potential congruence recognizes the potential 
conflict between these two distinct perspectives. For neither does it define 
morality in terms of the agent’s interest, nor define the agent’s good life in terms 
o f moral life.8 There is no conceptual connection between the dictates of morality 
and the pursuit of personal interest that could suppress all conflict between the 
two. The moral perspective has its independent status in one’s conception o f the 
good. What the claim of potential congruence aims to establish is that under 
favourable conditions a reasonable conception of justice can be shown to be 
congruent with a person’s pursuit o f well-being. As Scheffler aptly describes the 
idea, it strives to vindicate the claim that “moral norms should be capable o f being 
integrated in a coherent and attractive way into the life of the individual agent.”9
7 What should be counted as a moral point o f  view is a complex issue that I cannot discuss in 
detail here. But it is widely accepted that it should involve an impartial attitude toward other 
people.
8 According to Nagel, the first position is held by Aristotle while the second by Plato. The View 
from  Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 195-96; also see Scheffler, Human 
M orality  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.54.
9 Scheffler, Human Morality, p.l 02.
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It is a consequence of substantive justification rather than that o f conceptual 
guarantee.
It might be questioned if  a majority o f rational individuals, after deliberation, 
still insist that they have no motive to act justly, does this mean that the authority 
o f morality will lose its ground? The answer depends on what reason they would 
give to support their claim. There are at least two possibilities. First, these people 
are purely egoists so that morality has little hold on them. For egoists, moral 
reason would never have independent normative force. It is merely a means to 
realize their self-interest. Self-interest would trump moral considerations should 
they come into conflict.
Those who attempt to dissuade egoists may argue that acting morally is 
always beneficial to one’s personal interests. It is irrational for them not to do 
what morality requires. This claim is, however, too strong to be true. As I have 
shown in Chapter 4, prudential rationality does not have such power to vindicate 
the unexceptional congruence between justice and self-interest in a pluralistic 
society. We cannot provide a conclusive reason to convince an egoist to accept the 
overridingness o f the sense o f justice if  he is not willing to commit to a moral 
point o f view in the first place. In presenting his argument for congruence, Rawls 
acknowledges this point and stresses that we should not evaluate the goodness o f 
the sense o f justice from an egoistic viewpoint. Rather, “we are concerned with 
the goodness o f the settled desire to take up the standpoint o f justice.” (TJ: 
568/498 rev.) Members o f a well-ordered society already possess a well-grounded 
moral sentiment. The question is whether it is rational to give a regulative priority 
to the sense o f justice to overrule self-interest in case o f conflict. It may be
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complained that Rawls’s assumption is too idealistic to be applicable to our 
society. 1 do not think this is the case. I believe that a wide range o f moral 
sentiments is actually embedded in most people’s lives, which in turn provides a 
solid basis for the possibility of congruence.
We can now turn to examine the second possible account o f the failure o f 
moral authority. According to this account, the failure results from excessively 
demanding moral principles rather than from egoism. The real problem is not that 
rational people lack a moral motive to do what justice requires; they are supposed 
to have a sense o f justice. What they find unacceptable is that the moral constraint 
specified by a moral theory is too harsh to be compatible with their conception of 
the good. So it is a challenge to the motivational accessibility o f a theory rather 
than the authority o f morality in general.
The degree o f a theory’s demandingness is a function of a number of factors. 
According to Scheffler, two o f them are especially important:
One is the extent to which the theory’s constraints are confining: 
that is, the extent to which they narrow the range of morally 
acceptable courses o f action open to an agent. The other is the 
cost to the agent o f satisfying the theory’s requirements, which 
in turn is a function of such things as the degree of 
incompatibility, whether logical, physical, psychological, or 
practical, between what the theory requires the agent to do, and 
what it is in the agent’s own interest to do.10
How to decide an optimal level o f demandingness of a theory is an important 
issue that we cannot deal with here. It suffices to note that if  a theory leaves
10 Scheffler, Human Morality, p.98, emphasis added.
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agents with little room to pursue their life projects, or demands a great deal o f 
sacrifice o f their interests to meet the requirement o f justice, they may have a 
legitimate reason to reject the claim of overridingness. This is not because they 
are evil or self-centred. For they acknowledge the independent force o f a moral 
standpoint and accept that morality can make claims on them. But it is 
unreasonable to expect that an impartial assessment o f the value o f a person’s life 
should exhaust this very life. An impartial standpoint is only one of the many 
parts o f our life. Moreover, one’s own projects and interests can sometimes carry a 
disproportionate weight in determining what one may permissibly do. As rational 
autonomous beings, they have a fundamental interest in realising their 
conceptions o f the good. A reasonable political morality should take this factor 
into account. If the moral demand o f a theory causes strong tension in people’s 
lives, we can foresee that the chance o f attaining congruence would be slim. In 
short, the pursuit of moral stability warrants a reasonable constraint on the content 
o f principles o f justice.
2 The Pervasiveness o f Moral Feelings
Discussion above shows that potential congruence depends on a balance of 
motives. On the one hand, members o f a cooperative scheme should have a settled 
desire to act morally. They are not moved solely by self-interest. They are willing 
to discuss fair terms o f cooperation with others from an impartial perspective and 
to abide by principles that they find morally acceptable. On the other hand, the 
political conception of justice must not set excessive constraints on agents’ pursuit 
o f the good life. It should give people sufficient autonomy to form and develop 
their projects within a moral framework. A conception o f justice that satisfies
258
these conditions would then stand a good chance to vindicate the claim that 
observing the principles o f justice is an essential good in our well-being.
This looks like the right direction to resolve the problem of stability. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that this proposal is unrealistic because people are 
egoistic by nature. This nature is further exaggerated in an individualistic 
capitalist society characterized by unconstrained quest for wealth and power. 
Egoism prevails over morality. Potential congruence is impossible in practice. 
Admittedly, if  we are living in an egoist society, it is hard to justify the precedence 
o f the sense o f justice. It is also undeniable that the development o f capitalism has 
substantially eroded people’s moral concern about others. Our motives are 
fundamentally shaped and molded by the social and political system. Living in a 
competitive and individualistic market society makes it harder for people to 
accept the claims o f liberal egalitarianism as a regulative good o f their lives. I am 
well aware o f these difficulties.
However, this does not mean that potential congruence is doomed to failure. 
First o f all, following Rawls, what I am concerned with is the possibility of 
congruence in a well-ordered society in which its members have an effective 
sense o f justice and the basic structure is satisfied with a public conception of 
justice. Secondly, I do not believe that our actions are solely moved by egoistic 
concerns. No matter how imperfect our society is, we are living in an ethical 
community. Our mental and social lives are fundamentally shaped by moral 
beliefs and moral sentiments since we were bom. Moral concerns play an 
essential role in forming our conceptions o f the good and determining our actions. 
I call this phenomenon the pervasiveness o f moral sentiments, the second
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condition for potential congruence.11 The term “moral sentiments” generally 
refers to those moral attitudes, feelings, or emotions that have a significant and 
enduring place in a person’s life such as the sense of justice and the love o f 
mankind.12
As Rawls points out, a variety o f  moral emotions is interwoven throughout 
the fabric of human personalities and social life. These powerful feelings cannot 
be properly understood without presupposing moral beliefs and moral principles. 
Guilt, shame, indignation, remorse and resentment fall into this category. Take 
guilt as an example. When we ask a person why he feels guilty, it is not enough 
for him to describe his feeling as a mixture o f fear, anxiety, and regret. Nor can it 
be explained by expected punishment. Rather, the explanation must invoke a 
moral concept and its associated principles. The person’s experience o f guilt must 
result from doing something morally wrong. For example, he knows that he has 
taken more than his fair share in a distribution as defined by a conception o f 
justice. Similarly, a person feels ashamed because he has failed to live up to 
virtues defined by a conception o f moral worth. Thus, guilt and shame reflects our 
concern with others and with our own good. “In general, guilt, resentment, and 
indignation invoke the concept o f right, whereas shame, contempt, and derision 
appeal to the concept of goodness.” (TJ:484/423 rev.) This implies that we could 
not experience these important emotions if  we do not have pre-existing moral 
beliefs and principles; to have those beliefs, we must be moral beings in the first
11 On this issue, I am greatly indebted to Scheffler’s discussion. He calls this phenomenon the 
“resonance o f  morality.” See Human Morality, pp.68-70.
12 It should be noted that Rawls has drawn a subtle distinction between moral sentiment, moral 
attitude and moral feeling. Since his classification will not affect my argument, 1 will use them 
interchangeably to refer to the same meaning. (TJ: 479-80/420 rev.)
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place.
If  the aforesaid is correct, then an egoist who would never act from a sense o f 
justice is incapable of experiencing these moral feelings. A person cannot feel 
guilty if  he does not have a conception o f right and fairness. Or as Scheffler 
describes, “one can feel angry at being ill treated without having any moral beliefs, 
but one cannot resent the ill treatment unless one believes that it was wrong or 
unjustified or unfair.”13 This is because resentment is a moral attitude whereas 
anger is a natural feeling.14 Bernard Williams makes a similar observation when 
he remarks that it would be perfectly consistent for an amoralist to object to other 
people treating him in the same way as he treats them so long as “his objecting 
consists just in such things as his not liking it and fighting back. What he cannot 
consistently do is to resent it or disapprove o f it, for these are attitudes within the 
moral system.” 15 A person who has no moral attitudes and who therefore never 
acts out o f justice would be bound to strike us as humanly incomplete. As Rawls 
puts it, “one who lacks a sense o f justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes and 
capacities included under the notion o f humanity.” (TJ:488/428 rev.) So being an 
egoist is not only undesirable, but practically impossible in an ethical community. 
When a person grows up in a well-ordered society, he will naturally develop a 
diversity o f natural and moral sentiments through family, associations and public 
institutions. Once acquired, it may be difficult for the person to give them up at 
will. Moral concerns are deeply embedded in people’s practical reasoning. They
13 Scheffler, Human Morality, p.68.
14 A stimulating discussion about resentment can be found in P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and 
Resentment/’ in his Freedom and Resentment and Others Essays (London: Menthuen, 1974).
15 Bernard Williams, Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.5.
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are a normal part of human life. Those people who have reservations about 
congruence normally believe that self-interest gives an agent the most primary 
and strongest reason to act. There is an unbridgeable gap between living rightly 
and living well. However, if  the claim of the pervasiveness o f moral feeling is 
correct, egoism does not set a real challenge to the possibility o f congruence.
So far we have discussed the claims o f the unity o f practical reasoning and 
the pervasiveness o f moral sentiments, both o f which provide support for the 
possibility o f congruence o f the right and good. As Nagel aptly observes, “if  it is 
the function o f an ethical theory to identify both the moral life and the good life, 
and to reveal the reasons we have to lead each o f them, then a theory that allows 
them to diverge will be claiming something that is hard to accept, given the 
importance of each o f these ideals.”16 Nevertheless, this by no means implies that 
the society we find ourselves in is completely just. Nor does it claim that each 
individual has equally acquired an effective sense o f justice to honour the 
requirement o f justice. What the claim of the pervasiveness o f moral sentiments 
establishes is that “moral concerns resonate throughout the web o f human social 
relations.”17 It denies that concerns o f self-interest constitute the sole motive in 
practical reasoning. But this phenomenon alone is far from enough to prove the 
priority o f the sense o f justice specified by a political theory. To justify 
congruence, we need further argument to help us judge whether justice as fairness 
can be the focus o f congruence between the right and the good. This is what I am 
going to examine in the rest o f this chapter.
16 Nagel, The View from  Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p.205.
17 Scheffler, Human Morality, p.78.
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3 The Value of Social Cooperation
In this and the following sections, I will attempt to vindicate the potential 
congruence o f justice as fairness. My discussion will focus on the following 
question: is it rational for an agent to accept the priority of Rawls’s principles o f 
justice in social cooperation? If the answer is positive, then the question of 
overridingness o f the sense o f justice will be settled. This section will examine the 
value o f social cooperation; the next section will discuss the good o f basic 
liberties, and the last section will evaluate the difference principle. But I cannot 
here present the argument for such congruence in a rigorous and comprehensive 
manner, but shall merely indicate the direction that we should proceed in.
Some qualifications should be first noted. First, rationality refers to 
prudential rationality, according to which an action is rational if  it can best 
promote an agent’s informed interests, or rational conception o f the good.18 
Interests are understood in its broadest sense including one’s ends, projects, ideals, 
and impartial concerns for others. Second, my discussion is located in what Rawls 
calls the second stage where the principles o f justice have been worked out 
already. Participants in cooperation know the justificatory reasons for Rawls’s 
principles o f justice and their particular conceptions o f the good. They also 
approve the fundamental idea o f society as a fair system o f cooperation between 
free and equal citizens. The challenge o f congruence is to show how the 
requirement o f justice and citizens’ conceptions o f the good can be harmonized,
18 On the definition o f  the rational conception o f  the good, see 77, Chapter VII. The conception o f  
prudential rationality should be distinguished from that o f  instrumental rationality which is defined 
by the most effective means to satisfy an agent's existing desires.
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and the priority o f the former can be firmly established by affirming the good of 
the sense o f justice. Finally, as already argued above, I assume that people have a 
settled and effective sense of justice. They are not moved by self-interest though 
they have a fundamental interest in advancing their own conception of the good. 
In short, potential congruence does not attempt to justify liberal egalitarianism to 
egoists. It asks another question: suppose citizens have a moral motive, why 
should they affirm it as a fundamental and regulative value in their conceptions of 
the good?
With the above qualifications in mind, our discussion will start with Rawls’s 
conception o f social cooperation. Rawls holds that cooperation involves three 
basic elements. First, cooperation requires a set o f publicly recognized rules and 
procedures to determine participants’ rights and duties, and benefits and burdens. 
Second, these rules specify fair terms of cooperation for reciprocity which each 
participant may reasonably be expected to accept. Reciprocity means that all 
participants can benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark 
o f equality. Third, cooperation requires an idea of each participant’s rational good 
which specifies what they aim to achieve through that undertaking. Rawls refers 
to this as one’s conception o f the good. (PL: 16)
This conception o f social cooperation is a very fundamental idea o f Rawls’s 
whole enterprise. It conveys at least three important messages. First, people 
recognize that social cooperation is a fundamental common good for every 
participant. “There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes 
possible a better life for all than any would have if  each were to live solely by his 
own efforts.”(TJ:4/4 rev.) Cooperation not only improves our conditions o f living,
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but also realizes many valuable human capacities through associations and social 
unions. We can enjoy and appreciate one another’s excellences and individuality 
by participating in different types o f collective activities. Besides, as a matter of 
fact, we are bom into society. For most o f us, there is no entry or exit except by 
birth and death. “There is no alternative to social cooperation except unwilling 
and resentful compliance, or resistance and civil war.” (PL:301) Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect that persons have a strong reason to participate in social 
cooperation.
Second, social cooperation requires a set of rules to regulate and coordinate 
participants’ behaviour. These rules must be fair and acceptable to every equal 
participant so that we are willing to cooperate in good faith with all members over 
a complete life. To realize this ideal, the rules must enjoy an authoritative and 
overriding status. They should not be subject to people’s relative bargaining 
strength. For this would make cooperation unstable. What they want are moral 
terms o f cooperation based on mutual respect. As Charvet remarks, “cooperation 
on moral terms has the advantage that the terms—being necessarily authoritative 
for everyone’s self-interest—cannot be subject to challenge whatever changes 
occur in the relative bargaining position o f the cooperators.”19 Thus, participants 
have a higher-order interest in setting up an authoritative framework within which 
they can pursue their conception o f the good. The overridingness o f norms is a 
prerequisite for fair cooperation for reciprocity.
Third, if  persons have a regulative desire to participate in cooperation, it is
19 John Charvet, The Idea o f  an Ethical Community (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 
1995), p. 168.
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reasonable to assume that they have a corresponding desire to possess the 
requisite capacities for being normal and fully cooperating members o f 
cooperation. Only so will they be able to effectively enjoy the benefits o f 
cooperation. For this reason, Rawls defines two moral powers as the necessary 
and sufficient condition for being counted a full and equal member of a 
cooperative society. They are the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity 
for a conception o f the good. The capacity for a sense of justice is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and normally to be moved by an effective desire to act from 
the principle o f justice. The capacity for a conception o f the good is the capacity 
to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception o f the good. (PL:302) We 
are free and equal participants by virtue o f having the requisite minimum degree 
o f these two moral powers. We can note that the later Rawls does not ground 
moral personality on a Kantian interpretation o f human nature. Rather, it is a 
functional idea closely related to the notion o f fair social cooperation.20 We need 
not appeal to any metaphysical account to justify a conception o f moral 
personality.
Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that rational people have a 
regulative desire to be effective participants in fair cooperation. This entails that 
they have a higher-order desire to develop their two moral powers through acting 
on the principles o f justice which can most effectively express the very idea o f fair 
cooperation. Based on this, Rawls can then claim that his principles of justice are 
better than other alternatives to achieve potential congruence. In the following 
section, we will use the first principle o f  liberty as an example to demonstrate this
20 I am indebted to Thomas Scanlon for discussion about this issue.
266
argument.
4 The Good of Basic Liberties
Rawls’s  first principle o f justice states that “each person has an equal right to 
a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar 
scheme of liberties for all.” (PL:291) These liberties include freedom o f thought 
and liberty of conscience, the political liberties and freedom of association, as 
well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity o f the person. Now 
what we attempt to survey is whether participants have sufficient reasons to view 
basic liberties as a regulative good for their lives. Below I will present three 
arguments for the priority of liberty o f conscience proposed by Rawls to 
demonstrate how congruence is possible.21 All o f them are related to the idea of 
social cooperation.
The first argument holds that liberty o f conscience guarantees each 
participant an equal right to realize his determinate conception o f the good. This 
argument is straightforward and forceful. As I have repeatedly shown, the fact that 
people have a fundamental interest in pursuing their conception of the good gives 
rise to the circumstances o f justice and constitutes a major reason for social 
cooperation. A conception o f the good consists o f a person’s final ends and 
commitments which give substance to his life. Its importance is like what 
Williams calls a ground project or set of projects which are “closely related to his
21 It should be noted that in Rawls’s context these arguments are presented to rational parties in 
the original position o f the first stage. However, I believe that they are also valid in the second 
stage where participants know their conceptions o f  the good. For Rawls’s discussion see ‘T he  
Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” collected in PL:289-371.
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existence and which to a significant degree give a meaning to his life.”22 
Therefore, no one can afford to sacrifice his conception o f the good for other 
interests. If  they were to gamble in this way, Rawls says, “they did not know what 
a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction was” (PL:311) So, taking 
conceptions of the good seriously requires us to give liberty o f conscience a 
regulative priority over other desires and preferences in our motivational set.
The second and third arguments are both related to the capacity for a 
conception o f the good. They present the instrumental and intrinsic aspects o f this 
capacity. The second argument holds that the adequate development and exercise 
of the capacity to form, to revise, and to pursue a conception o f the good is an 
important means to a person’s good. The reason is this. As shown in the first 
argument, we have an essential interest in leading a good life in accordance with 
our philosophical and religious beliefs. We exercise our rational capacity to form 
our ends and choose the most effective means to realize them. Without this 
capacity, we do not know what matters to us and how to pursue our rational good.
Moreover, we also recognize that “leading a good life is different from what 
we currently believe to be good.”23 For we may be mistaken about the value o f 
what we are doing. We may come to see that our deeply held goals and projects 
are actually wrong. After deliberation, we may change the final ends o f our life. 
As autonomous and reflective beings, we keep on questioning our values because 
we worry about whether those values are really worth pursuing. As Rawls puts it,
22 Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality” in Mora! Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 12.
23 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 10.
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“there is no guarantee that all aspects of our present way of life are the most 
rational for us and not in need of at least minor if not major revision.” (PL:313) 
Because o f this, we have a higher-order interest to make sure that there are 
sufficient freedoms for each o f us to questions our beliefs, to examine our values 
in light o f whatever information and arguments available, and to revise our 
existing projects.
The third argument claims that the effective exercise o f the capacity for 
rational deliberation is not only a means to, but also an essential part o f a 
determinate conception o f the good. Living autonomously is itself intrinsically 
valuable. The main idea comes from Mill’s conception o f individuality. As 
autonomous and independent persons, we want to be our own masters and live our 
lives in our own way. Therefore, in forming and pursuing our conception o f the 
good, we do not want to simply copy it from others. We do not see ourselves as a 
machine to be built after a model. On the contrary, we are eager to exercise our 
rational power to make choice. As Mill famously proclaims, “if a person possesses 
any tolerable amount o f common sense and experience, his own mode o f laying 
out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his 
own mode.”24 One o f the preconditions of leading a good life is thus that “we 
lead our life from inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to 
life.”25 Rawls fully identifies himself with this liberal tradition by adding that “in 
addition to our beliefs being true, our actions right, and our ends good, we may 
also strive to appreciate why our beliefs are true, our actions right, and our ends
24 J. S. Mill, On Liberty (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p.82.
25 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 13.
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good and suitable for us.” (PL:312, author’s emphasis)
With these arguments to hand, Rawls offers a very powerful defense for the 
priority o f  basic liberties. Without basic liberties, we will not be able to fully 
develop our capacity for a conception o f the good. Without effective exercise o f 
this moral power, we will not be able to lead a good life and to be a full 
participant in cooperation for mutual benefit. Therefore, it is rational for 
participants to accept the overridingness o f the sense of justice. Abiding by the 
first principle is itself a regulative good for rational beings.
However, we should note that this argument is incompatible with political 
liberalism. If  we commit to viewing personal autonomy as a higher-order value 
guiding our life, it cannot just be limited to the political domain. It applies to our 
whole life. That means that if  people are convinced by the above arguments, they 
must have already accepted a liberal conception o f the free person. Liberalism 
takes toleration seriously. But toleration has a limit. The limit is defined by the 
principle o f equal liberties. Different comprehensive doctrines must liberalize 
themselves and respect other people’s liberties in the first place if they want to 
survive and flourish in a liberal society. A liberal should indeed hold that a liberal 
conception o f the person with its insistence on the priority of equal liberties 
deserves our allegiance because it is an essential means to, and a constitutive part 
of, leading a good life. Rawls has no reason to regret this.
5 M oral Equality and the Difference Principle
We now turn to examine the possibility of congruence for the difference 
principle. Predictably, this is much more difficult and controversial than the
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argument for the principle o f equal liberty. For it requires unequal distribution o f 
income and wealth among participants. There are two fundamentally different 
attitudes towards this principle. For some, it is too demanding because it sets a 
very rigid constraint on economic inequalities. But for others, it is not egalitarian 
enough because it allows unequal distribution among equal participants. This is a 
complex issue that has aroused heated debate in the past several decades. My 
discussion will only focus on a specific question: do rational people have an 
overriding motive to accept the difference principle in a fair cooperation for 
reciprocity? If they do, congruence may be possible even in this difficult area.
The difference principle stipulates that social and economic inequalities are 
permissible if  and only if  it is to the greatest benefit o f the least advantaged. 
Rawls holds that this principle expresses an egalitarian conception o f justice. 
Offhand it is not clear why it is so. For even if  a society satisfies the principle, 
inequalities will still exist and we do not know how large the gap may be. Rawls 
assures us that it is egalitarian because it embodies a Kantian conception of 
equality. So before we ask whether rational persons would have enough reason to 
adopt this principle, we had better work out its moral ground first. It should be 
noted that I make no attempt to present Rawls’s argument from the standpoint of 
the original position. Rather, I will take the difference principle as directly derived 
from a conception of moral equality. For, according to Rawls, “to accept the 
principles that represent a conception of justice is at the same time to accept an 
ideal o f the person; and in acting from these principles we realize such an ideal.”26
26 Rawls, ‘‘A Kantian Conception o f  Equality” in his Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.254-55.
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The argument for the difference principle can be roughly formulated as 
follows:
1. All participants in cooperation are equal moral persons.
2. The basis of equality is defined by their having a capacity for 
a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense o f justice to 
a certain minimum degree. (TJ:505/442 rev.)
3. That they are equal is expressed by the supposition that they 
each have, and view themselves as having, a right to equal 
respect and consideration in determining the principles for the 
basic structure of society.27
4. It can be inferred from (3) that justification of a conception 
of justice should not be troubled by the influence o f either 
social contingencies or natural distribution o f abilities and 
talents. These factors are arbitrary from a moral point o f view, 
and will affect the status of equal moral personality in 
determining the principles of justice.28 (TJ:74-75/64-65 rev.)
5. Since all participants are equal, they are granted a veto. Any
27 Rawls, “A Kantian Conception o f Equality," p.255.
28 I am aware that there are other interpretations o f  "arbitrary from the moral point o f  view." For 
example, Rawls sometimes says that it is arbitrary because no one deserves his place in the 
distribution o f  natural endowments and his initial starting position in society. (TJ: 104/87 rev.) Or 
as luck egalitarians claim, it is arbitrary because they are not the outcome o f  people's choice. No 
one should be responsible for this kind o f brute luck. I believe that these three interpretations are 
conceptually different from one another, and will result in a very different understanding o f  the 
difference principle. In my view, the interpretation o f moral equality is the strongest one. For if  we 
drop equality, the other two interpretations alone are not enough to support the claim that each 
person should be treated as equal. Desert and luck/choice dichotomy are conceptually compatible 
with unequal treatment. Moreover, Rawls clearly remarks that "once we try to find a rendering o f  
them which treats everyone equally as a moral person, and which does not weight men’s share in 
the benefits and burdens o f  social cooperation according to their social fortune or their luck in the 
natural lottery, it is clear that the democratic interpretation is the best choice among the four 
alternatives.” (TJ:75/65 rev.) The term "luck egalitarianism" is drawn from Elizabeth S. Anderson, 
“What is the Point o f  Equality?” Ethics 109 (1999), pp. 287-337. Luck egalitarians include Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice o f  Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality  (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991); Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Richard J. Ameson, 
“Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism," Ethics 110 (2000), pp.339-349.
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principles of justice must therefore be justified to every rational 
member of the cooperative scheme. “In this sense, it is 
egalitarian.” (TJ: 103)29
6. Following (5), the only acceptable principle seems to be that 
every participant should have an equal share of income and 
wealth.
7. However, it is irrational to stop at equal division if  there is an 
alternative scheme that can make all participants better off, 
including the expectations o f the least advantaged.
8. The least advantaged recognize that if they do not give the 
better off higher economic benefits, their long-term prospects 
will not be improved. The more attractive prospect o f those 
better off “acts as incentives so that the economic process is 
more efficient, innovation proceeds at a faster pace, and so on.” 
(TJ:78/68 rev.) Or put it in a third-person perspective, “society 
must take organisational requirements and economic efficiency 
into account.’^
9. Thus we arrive at the difference principle. “Taking equality 
as the basis o f comparison those who have gained more must do 
so on terms that are justifiable to those who have gained the 
least.”31
We can see that the whole argument begins with a conception o f moral 
equality. The difference principle is not presented as a result o f rational choice 
behind the veil o f ignorance. Participants are supposed to know their relative 
social and natural advantages and their conceptions of the good; they accept the 
difference principle because they are convinced by its moral premises. Rawls
29 This sentence is deleted in the revised edition.
30 Rawls, “A Kantian Conception o f  Equality,” p.262.
31 Rawls, “A Kantian Conception o f  Equality,” p.262.
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" Comment [LC1]: Ibid?
sometimes suggests that this argument only expresses some fundamental intuitive 
ideas informally because in a contract theory, “all arguments, strictly speaking, are 
to be made in terms of what it would be rational to agree to in the original 
position.” (TJ:75/65 rev.) I do not agree with this account. Conversely, I find this 
argument more fundamental and effective than the rational choice argument. It is 
more fundamental because the difference principle is directly derived from a 
conception o f moral equality, according to which the contractual constraints of the 
original position are defined. In this sense, the contractarian argument is 
redundant. As Charvet rightly points out, “if this equality o f value and rights is a 
constraining condition on the choice situation, which has to be independently 
justified, then it would be pointless to present the argument for justice in 
contractarian form.”32 The role of contract is merely to serve as a device of 
representation to work out the implication o f moral equality which has been 
antecedently justified. It is more effective because we need not bother with the 
plausibility o f the maximin rule and the disputable motivational assumption o f 
mutual disinterest. Since the argument straightforwardly appeals to our moral 
beliefs, its egalitarian character and moral attractiveness are more readily 
observed than those o f the rational choice argument.
This argument has its own motivational assumptions though. It presumes that 
all participants have a desire to accept equality as the most fundamental value in 
determining the terms of cooperation. Otherwise, they would have opted for a 
conception o f justice as mutual advantage in accordance with their relative
32 John Charvet, The Idea o f  an Ethical Community (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 
1995), p. 167.
274
bargaining power. The question concerned is how a participant’s life will be 
shaped if  he takes up the impartial standpoint in practical reasoning for the 
fundamental principle o f justice. Following the claim of the unity o f practical 
reasoning, the respect for equality must occupy a regulative place in his 
conception o f the good. The acceptance o f moral equality presupposes a 
corresponding egalitarian motive. Moreover, participants understand and accept 
the implication o f social cooperation, namely they are willing to give priority to 
the terms of cooperation provided that others will act in the same way. Thus, for a 
rational agent to be convinced o f Rawls’s argument, he must identify himself as a 
full egalitarian. Without this assumption, justification o f the difference principle 
would not even be initiated.
Be that as it may, it would follow from this line o f reasoning that moral 
equality does not deductively lead to the difference principle. It actually requires 
an additional psychological assumption that the better off need extra economic 
incentives to work more efficiently for the common good o f the whole community. 
Not allowing inequality in expectation makes the least advantaged even worse off. 
For otherwise, the better off would lack motive to develop new technology and 
increase production. Participants finally opt for the difference principle because 
they take this incentive argument into account. As Rawls remarks, “something o f 
this kind must be argued if  these inequalities are to be just by the difference 
principle.” (TJ:78/68 rev.) In other words, without the incentive assumption, 
participants would stick to the principle of equal share.33
33 Cohen has offered an incisive discussion on this issue. “Incentives, Inequality, and Community” 
in Equal Freedom ed. Stephen Darwall (Ann Arbor The University o f  Michigan Press), 
pp.331-397. Also see Cohen, I f  You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge,
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Nevertheless, the incentive argument is inconsistent with the moral 
commitment to equality. As shown above, participants are presumed to be full 
egalitarians accepting that all human lives are of equal value. That is why they 
accept that no one should have the right to gain from arbitrary natural and social 
advantages without having others’ consent. Since they are moved by this impartial 
concern, their sense o f justice is supposed to be able to outweigh the demand for 
economic incentives. They are willing to share one another’s fate. As full 
egalitarians, therefore, they should favour a high degree of equal distribution. 
They do not do so exactly because they qualify their moral commitment in the 
light o f the economic incentive argument.34 The difference principle is justified 
on the basis o f an admission o f the psychological limits o f human nature. It is not 
the most ideal principle o f justice. It is a second best that we cannot but accept 
because of the necessity for economic incentives. Surprisingly, Rawls seems to 
admit this consequence:
One might think that ideally individuals should want to serve one
another. But since the parties are assumed not to take an interest in
one another’s interests, their acceptance of these inequalities is only 
the acceptance of the relations in which men stand in the 
circumstances of justice. They have no grounds for complaining of 
one another’s motives. A person in the original position would, 
therefore, concede the justice o f these inequalities. (TJ:151/131 rev., 
my emphasis)35
This paragraph suggests that if rational parties have sufficient moral motive
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), chap.8.
34 Rawls mentions that inequality is sometimes allowed to cover the costs o f  training and
education. This account is different from the incentive argument. Strictly speaking, this kind o f
inequality is still in the framework o f  equal share because its function is to compensate costs 
incurred.
35 The last sentence is deleted from the revised edition.
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to help one another, they would not accept a distributive scheme that allows 
economic inequalities. But since this assumption is too idealistic under the 
circumstances o f justice, people cannot but accept inequalities specified by the 
difference principle. The principle is therefore a result o f compromise rather than 
the most justifiable political ideal. Needless to say, this conclusion will devastate 
Rawls’s whole philosophical enterprise which aims to justify a most reasonable 
conception of justice grounded on freedom and equality.
Rawls may defend his position by saying that the assumption o f mutual 
disinterest and the need for economic incentive only apply to the original position. 
This reply misses the point. When the parties make their rational choice behind 
the veil of ignorance, they know that the principles will apply to the basic 
structure of society. They also know the laws of human psychology. More 
importantly, they know that they will act on an effective sense o f justice in a 
well-ordered society. “Once the veil o f ignorance is removed, the parties find that 
they have ties o f sentiment and affection, and want to advance the interests o f 
others to see their ends attained.” (TJ: 129/111 rev.) So in making their decision, 
rational parties have no need to concede the justice of inequalities in order to “set 
up various incentives which succeed in eliciting more productive efforts.” 
(TJ: 151 )36 Furthermore, this response is inapplicable to my argument because it 
does not take place in the original position. Participants are presumed to be moved 
by a commitment to moral equality.
Alternatively, Rawls may bite the bullet and argue that the claim of economic
This sentence is deleted from the revised edition.
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incentive is a psychological fact that we should take for granted in constructing a 
conception o f justice. We are inevitably subject to the conditions o f human life 
with moderate scarcity and competing claims. We are not living in a Kantian 
kingdom of ends in which each rational agent is expected to have the purest sense 
o f duty to act in accordance with the categorical imperative. On the contrary, 
“justice as fairness is a theory of human justice and among its premises are the 
elementary facts about persons and their place in nature/’ (TJ:257/226 rev.) The 
ideal o f moral equality must be subject to the limitations of the circumstances of 
justice, and the difference principle is a compromise that we should bear with. I 
am still not convinced by this defence. It is incompatible with the egalitarian 
character o f justice as fairness. Rawls can no longer claim that justice is the first 
virtue o f social institutions because the difference principle fails to express a most 
justifiable conception o f justice from a moral point of view. I believe that Rawls is 
unsatisfied with this argument also. Otherwise, he would not delete several 
citations concerning the economic incentive mentioned above from the revised 
edition of A Theory ofJustice.
Is there any alternative argument to justify the difference principle in the 
egalitarian framework without appealing to the incentive argument then? 
Obviously, if there is one, it must be a moral argument compatible with the equal 
worth o f human beings. The difference principle can then be presented not as a 
compromise, but as a result of moral agreement. Nagel’s idea o f “self-limiting 
modifications o f impersonal morality” shows promise in this regard.37
37 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p.204. Nagel further develops his argument in Equality and  
Partiality  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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According to Nagel, we can think o f impersonal morality as developing in 
stages. At the first stage, we accept moral equality and recognize that objectively 
we are no more important than anyone else. So in practical reasoning our interests 
and welfare are accorded as much weight as those of other people. This impartial 
standpoint requires that each person has a right to equal respect and consideration 
in determining the principles o f justice. Apparently, this is exactly the starting 
point o f justice as fairness which justifies equal distribution o f primary social 
goods.
With further reflection on human motives, we are urged to go one step 
further to modify the principle o f equal share. First o f all, even viewing the 
situation from an impartial perspective, participants o f cooperation may recognize 
that as autonomous and independent agents, they have fundamental interests in 
forming and pursuing their conceptions o f the good which contain fundamental 
human needs as well as the major activities, projects and commitments around 
which their lives are organized. These interests provide meaning to their lives and 
set the background for their practical reasoning. Thus, they accept that it is 
morally legitimate for an individual, within certain impartial limits, to devote 
disproportionate attention to those things that matter most to him. The very fact o f 
their importance to his life provides by itself a reason for justification. So we are 
not morally required to evaluate and decide our actions from a strictly first-order 
impartial point o f view. This is, however, not a compromise between equality and 
self-interest. Rather, it is a judgment made within the framework o f impartiality. 
“When we regard people objectively and think about how they should live, their
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motivational complexity is a consideration.”38 Expecting people to sacrifice their 
ground projects and attachments to their loved ones for the sake o f impartial 
considerations per se is unreasonable and excessively demanding. As Scheffler 
suggests, a moderate conception o f morality should strive to strike a balance 
between the following two propositions:
The first proposition is that, from an impersonal standpoint, 
everyone’s life is of equal intrinsic value and everyone’s 
interests are o f equal intrinsic importance. The second 
proposition is that each person’s interests nevertheless have a 
significance for him or her that is out o f proportion to their 
importance from an impersonal standpoint.39
Now suppose that rational participants accept the modification o f impersonal 
morality and take the personal standpoint into account in deciding principles o f 
justice. They then have a moral argument for a certain degree o f unequal 
distribution o f income which is not a concession to the limits o f human weakness. 
They recognize that income and wealth are important all-purpose means to realize 
their conception o f the good to which they may legitimately devote 
disproportionate attention. Economic inequalities are thus, within limits, morally 
permissible. Those better off have a legitimate expectation o f more reward for 
exercising their natural talents. This does not mean that the dispensation for 
inequalities is unlimited. For the principles of justice should also be sensitive to 
the guiding principle that all participants are of equal value regardless of the
38 Nagel, The View from  Nowhere, p.202. But Nagel him self seems to view the modification as a 
compromise based on “tolerance and recognition o f  limits" between “our higher and lower selves 
in arriving at an acceptable morality.” I believe that this account is inconsistent with Nagel’s 
overall view about the co-existence o f objective and subjective standpoints. A similar critique can 
also be found in Scheffler, Human Morality, p. 125.
39 Scheffler, Human Morality, p. 122
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unequal distribution o f natural talents and social background. The difference 
principle represents a balance between the impersonal value o f others and our 
naturally disproportionate concern for our own lives.
The modification o f impartiality can somewhat alleviate the tension between 
the personal and impersonal point o f view. Compared to the principle o f equal 
share, the difference principle is less demanding and more motivationally 
accessible to normal rational persons. For participants who have already accepted 
society as a fair system of cooperation for mutual advantage between free and 
equal persons, this is an arrangement that they can reasonably accept. Therefore, 
congruence between the difference principle and participants’ conceptions o f the 
good is a realistic possibility. That being said, a Rawlsian well-ordered society is 
still an ideal very far from our existing society. Rawls’s theory demands an 
economic distribution deriving from a strong commitment to moral equality, 
which is in strong tension with a capitalist market economy. How to cultivate an 
egalitarian ethos through moral education and reform of the basic structure is a 
prerequisite for a liberal egalitarian society, and for the moral stability o f justice as 
fairness.40
40 For this issue, see Cohen, I f  You're an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), chap. 10. Scheffler also provides a good reflection on it. 
See Human Morality, chap.8.
CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this thesis, I describe my project as an attempt to 
vindicate the importance o f moral stability in liberal justification. I hope that my 
arguments have affirmed this claim. I will now summarize some main points that I 
believe this research has contributed to the study of Rawls.
I have made it clear at the outset that the problem of stability is essentially 
concerned with the motivational priority of a sense of justice. It is about how a 
rational agent, having a fundamental interest in advancing his conception o f the 
good, could have sufficient motive to act morally. Rawls recognizes that justice 
and goodness represent two distinct standpoints in practical reasoning. Both o f 
them make claims on us. However, a tension between these two standpoints is 
inherent in Rawls’s theory. For the subjective circumstances o f justice presume 
that participants o f cooperation have different conceptions o f the good; it is a 
natural and legitimate desire for them to pursue their good and in so doing, they 
make conflicting claims on the distribution o f natural and social resources. If 
Rawls wants to justify the overridingness o f justice, he must take up the problem 
o f stability and demonstrate why it is rational for an agent to give precedence to 
moral considerations over his ends and goals.
This is what Korsgaard calls the normative question of moral philosophy. 
“The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral agent 
who must actually do what morality says.”1 Thus, stability is a justificatory
1 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, ed. Onora O’Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 16.
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problem that determines the desirability o f justice as fairness. It is wrong for 
Rawls and most critics to say that the goal o f stability is to affirm the feasibility of 
a conception of justice independently justified.2 This account cannot make sense 
o f Rawls’s own claim that stability is essential to justifying justice as fairness. 
Worse still, it will lead Rawls to commit a category mistake.3 That is why I stress 
in Chapter One that we must draw a clear distinction between social stability and 
moral stability. Moral stability is not concerned with a purely practical matter of 
social order which is o f no relevance to the justifiability of a conception o f justice. 
Once this distinction is established, most criticism stemming from this 
misunderstanding can be dismissed. This is the first major claim I have made in 
this thesis.
My second major claim is about the place o f stability in Rawls’s two-stage 
justificatory structure. Against Rawls’s own account, I have argued that stability is 
the concern o f both stages. It is one o f the main grounds for contractors in the 
original position to prefer Rawls’s two principles to the principle of average utility. 
It is therefore misleading for Rawls to say that the problem of stability arises in 
the second stage only after the principles o f justice have been worked out in the 
first one on independent grounds. In addition, I contend that the real force moving 
the contractors to adopt the maximin rule actually results from moral 
considerations. Rawls’s principles are the result o f a moral argument rather than
2 For example, Freeman, perhaps the most sympathetic critic on this issue, says that “the question 
o f  its stability is raised to test the feasibility  o f  a just society conceived along the lines o f  this 
conception.” “Congruence and the Good o f  Justice” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls ed. 
Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.279, my emphasis.
3 1 must say that Rawls is partly responsible for this consequence because he fails to distinguish 
these two conceptions o f  stability when the problem was first formulated in A Theory o f  Justice. 
His later philosophical development, however, indicates that he is well aware o f  this distinction. 
See PL: 142
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rational calculation. Justice as fairness, strictly speaking, is not a contractarian 
theory.
Furthermore, I have explained that the second stage is necessary because the 
priority of the sense o f justice can only be settled when people are allowed to have 
full knowledge of their conceptions o f the good. As Rawls remarks, “the problem 
is whether the regulative desire to adopt the standpoint of justice belongs to a 
person’s own good when viewed in the light of the thin theory with no restriction 
on information.” (TJ:567/497 rev.) This implies that the justification o f justice as 
fairness is unfinished in the first stage. It needs one more step. The principles 
derived from the original position must be shown to be stable in the second stage. 
My argument is confirmed by Rawls’s later remark that “the argument for the 
principles o f justice is not complete until the principles selected in the first part 
are shown in the second part to be sufficiently stable.” (PL: 141) In that case, the 
decision in the original position is no longer the final court o f justification.
My third major claim is about Rawls’s congruence argument. Any discussion 
on the overridingness o f moral motive must involve an account o f practical 
reasoning. I point out that Rawls has adopted a desire-based prudential rationality 
and the idea o f a rational plan o f life to explain our reasons for action. When this 
view is combined with Rawls’s internalist position, it naturally leads to a 
congruence argument. Congruence is close to what Korsgaard calls the idea o f 
“reflective endorsement.” This view holds that morality is grounded in human 
nature. When an explanation o f human nature is found, it can then be argued that 
those moral principles that best express our nature are good for us. We would 
therefore have sufficient motive to accept the claim of morality. The priority o f the
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sense o f justice is grounded on the harmony of two normative points of view, 
morality and self-interest.4 Rawls’s appeal to the Kantian interpretation o f human 
nature as free and equal rational being as the basis of congruence is such a model.
I have argued that this metaphysical interpretation of human nature has 
turned Rawls into a liberal perfectionist within a classical teleological framework, 
rendering Rawls’s dichotomy between teleology and deontology misleading. If the 
moral foundation of justice as fairness is a Kantian conception o f the person, it is 
hard for Rawls to claim that he upholds a position of liberal neutrality. Moreover, 
this interpretation is inconsistent with Rawls’s desire-based conception of 
prudential rationality. This explains why the later Rawls is forced to make a 
philosophical shift to political liberalism.
Finally, my last major claim holds that the approach of potential congruence 
is more desirable and feasible than the idea of an overlapping consensus for 
affirming the motivational priority o f the sense of justice. Given the notion o f the 
unity o f practical reasoning and the pervasiveness of moral feelings, congruence is 
a realistic project for justice as fairness even though there is no room for it to be 
taken for granted conceptually in a post-metaphysical era. The later Rawls has 
given up this hope because o f the fact o f reasonable pluralism. However, I do not 
see the prospect of constructing a freestanding and thin conception of liberal 
egalitarianism that calls for the whole-hearted allegiance of citizens who hold a
4 Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativety, pp. 19, 60. It is interesting to note that Korsgaard 
ascribes Rawls’s congruence argument to the view o f  reflective endorsement while holding that 
Rawls’s Kantian constructivism belongs to the view o f  “the appeal to autonomy.” Korsgaard does 
not explain how these competing views can coexist in Rawls’s account o f normativity. A plausible 
explanation is that she does not view congruence as an essential argument for justice as fairness. 
However, my analysis shows that Rawls’s ultimate answer to the normative question rests on his 
argument for the reflective endorsement.
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diversity o f liberal and non-liberal comprehensive doctrines. I believe that the 
motivational priority o f justice can only be grounded on a substantive moral ideal. 
Toleration and mutual respect are better justified by appealing to a liberal ideal of 
autonomy and equality. It is undoubtedly comprehensive. But liberalism should 
enable citizens to lead a liberal way o f life. Only when citizens share the liberal 
ideal and recognize the fundamental good o f living an ethical life can a Rawlsian 
well-ordered society claim to be realistically utopian.5 Given that we have a 
moral nature, we have no reason to give up that hope.
5 The idea o f  political philosophy as realistically utopian is first raised in Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), p.4.
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